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The Political Culture of Social Consensus and Social Conflict: The Example 
of European Economic Integration and Globalisation in Ireland and France.
Barry Hennessy
Abstract
The major public sector strikes which hit France in late 1995 saw their 
protagonists attack the government of Prime Minister Alain Juppé for 
introducing social security reforms in a bid to reduce the country’s budget 
deficits in order to conform with the Maastricht convergence criteria for 
Economic and Monetary Union.
Thus, the wavering public support within France for the country’s European 
policy, which had first exhibited stresses at the time of the Maastricht Treaty 
referendum in 1992, was confirmed as a significant factor in social protest in 
France, and illustrated the extent to which the sacrifice of a French model o f 
economic and social progress for one which is pinned to international liberalism, 
can be a source of widespread public and political disquiet in that country.
This thesis examines and compares the evident French concerns and protests over 
such economic and social questions with the apparent absence of such concerns 
in Ireland, through an analysis of the political culture in both societies based on 
available theories, and observations regarding the factors governing their social 
and political consciences.
It concurs with the viewpoint that the apparent consensus regarding these issues 
in Ireland stems from a view that no other realistic option is open to the country, 
however it contends that factors such an historically weak left wing, the strength 
of Catholic social policy and previous experience of self-sufficiency are 
significant factors informing this ‘consensus’.
Chapter 1
1.0 Introduction
This thesis sets out with an objective to analyse a number of issues which have 
interested me greatly over the course of this decade. Since the 1980s, the 
European Union has achieved renewed vigour in its determination to unite the 
countries and people of western Europe in an ever closer political and economic 
unit. This process has taken place against the backdrop of a number of 
developments. The advance of world trade talks aimed at a steady deregulation 
of international commerce has made many regions of the world look at the 
possibility o f local alliances in order to be better able to compete in the global 
marketplace. Since the global market is fundamentally a liberal one, this attempt 
has, as in the case o f the European Union, led to a steady erosion o f existing 
barriers to the free movement, first of goods and services, and then of people 
and labour, within defined boundaries.
The trade element of the European Union is one which has always benefited from 
broad support, as most observers saw any move to facilitate commerce as being 
advantageous to firms within their own countries -  even if  it granted foreign 
firms similar rights to trade in their countries. However, as the European Union 
has developed and the full reality of the single market and ultimately economic 
and monetary union began to hit home, we saw the emergence in a number of 
countries of protectionist attitudes. This arose over the perceived loss of 
sovereignty inherent in aspects of the Union's objectives, and also the loss or 
erosion of certain national symbols or practices which were deemed to be out of 
line with a programme which was slowly moving from an intergovernmental to a 
somewhat more supranational view of Europe.
This thesis attempts to examine a number of questions. It is concerned with 
political culture. This is because I believe that the manner in which any society 
behaves when faced with such a prospect as an ever closer union of European
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states, and the erosion of aspects of its absolute autonomy will be determined by 
a complex web of historical and cultural factors which make up the political 
culture of a country and ultimately frame political debate, discourse, protest and 
dissent within it. With regard to that point, one of my main interests concerns 
the differences which exist between the countries of western Europe as they 
strive to build a European Union which both reflects themselves and gradually 
gains coherence in the global context. Ireland and France are two republics 
which are members of the Union. Both of them are liberal democracies and are 
comparable as western European states. However, there are also considerable 
divergences between them, and it is the analysis of these divergences and their 
impact, first and foremost on the countries' relationship with the European Union 
but then on their attitude towards the broader changes occurring on the world 
scene.
Carrying out such an analysis has not been an easy matter, and I suppose that 
like every honest introduction, this one should contain the caveat that the best I 
have hoped to do here is present a number o f perspectives and carry out a certain 
amount o f discussion along the lines I have mentioned above.
In addition to this introduction and a conclusion, this thesis contains four main 
chapters.
Chapter 2 contains an introduction to methodological and theoretical perspectives 
for analysing political culture in a comparative manner. Given the particular 
concern of this work with questions of conflict and consensus, and its contention 
that on questions of an economic or a European nature, Ireland exhibits much 
greater consensus regarding the dominant direction taken than France, this 
chapter also discusses issues regarding the existence or conflict or otherwise 
within societies. It also discusses the manner in which such conflict is likely to 
express itself, taking into account the question of access to power in different 
countries. In this latter case, particularly attention is paid to the question of 
Kreisi's political opportunity structure.
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Building on the groundwork laid in chapter 2, chapter 3 provides a detailed 
overview of a range of factors which, in the opinion of this author, have 
contributed to the contemporary political culture of both France and Ireland over 
the course of their modern history. Chapter 3 also serves to introduce the case 
study in chapter 4. The focus of chapter 3 has necessarily remained quite broad 
since I believe that the factors which contribute to the political and social profile 
of any country are wide ranging, and I freely acknowledge that those to which I 
have referred could be supplemented by others which I have not examined. 
What I have attempted to do is present an overview o f those which I believe to be 
of particular relevance and attempt to maintain cohesion in comparison by 
examining these in the context of the other country as well. The specifics o f both 
societies mean, however, that the relevance of the factors discussed varies 
against specific aspects of the history of both.
Chapter 4 is a case study chapter. The difficulty in doing a case study on a 
subject such as this is the availability of a suitable comparative issue. In an 
attempt to overcome this, I have wished to look more closely at an issue which 
reflects the desire of the governments and a large section of the élites in western 
Europe today to achieve greater levels of competitiveness in the context of 
European integration and economic globalisation. One key area within any 
country where conflict can erupt is in the area o f labour relations, and 
particularly the relations between what are often referred to as the social partners 
-  government, trade unions and employers. In late-1995, the French 
government proposed a series of reforms aimed at cutting down the country's 
budget deficit in line with the criteria for gaining access to European economic 
and monetary union. These reforms entailed social security cutbacks and also 
proposed interfering with the generous terms enjoyed by many public sector 
workers, such as early retirement schemes for railwaymen.
The result of this was a massive strike and protest movement within the French 
public sector in which criticism of aspects o f the European agenda was rife. Not
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long after this time, the Irish social partners sat down to negotiate a new 
partnership agreement, based on a model which has been in place since 1987. 
This approach, largely aimed at ensuring workplace stability whilst providing 
agreed pay increases for workers, builds on a range of initiatives put in place in 
Ireland over an extended period in order to provide the various social partners 
with a viable prospect of avoiding strikes and large scale loss o f working days. It 
is, as we shall see, a system which the social partners have found useful, but 
there is dissent. So far, this has been marginal, but I put forward the argument 
that there is the potential for it to become more vocal if  the partnership 
agreements do not continue to move with the times.
In chapter 5, I develop the question of the relationship between both countries 
and the European Union with a range of data and analysis to bring the historical 
and ease study picture up to date. The aim of this chapter is to give a picture of 
how the European Union and its possible implications are viewed, both by the 
public and also by the political establishment in both countries. In particular, I 
look at the opposition to aspects o f the European project in both countries, and 
look at its relative strength in what remains an overall favourable reaction to the 
European Union in both Ireland and France.
Before commencing with chapter 2 proper, I would wish to address one 
particular issue which has arisen in the editing of this work. The requirement 
that the thesis be submitted in either Irish or English, and the need to keep the 
length within some form of manageable limit obliged me to make a decision 
regarding the use of French in original quotes from French sources. I have 
decided, reluctantly, to rely on my skills as a translator and provide the English 
translation only, confident that the references provided will enable the reader to 
locate the originals without too much difficulty.
4
Chapter 2
Principles and methodologies in comparative political studies
2.0 Introduction
In order to begin a comparative study which has as its aim the better 
understanding of differences across two or more societies, it is first necessary to 
reflect on some of the approaches normally used in carrying out such a study and 
which more generally underpin comparative studies. In this first chapter, it is 
thus my intention to carry out an examination of a range of factors which are 
generally seen as being of importance when placing politics in comparative 
perspective. Among these are the approaches and methodologies commonly 
applied in carrying out comparative studies - the units o f measurement, the 
assumptions behind them, the necessary caveats which if  ignored would render 
the study meaningless. We must also consider the range of political parties and 
ideological currents which are generally found in Europe. There are a number of 
reasons for this. Firstly, it is obviously the case that both Ireland and France are 
part of Europe and it is within this theatre that their political systems must be 
analysed. Secondly, and more importantly, if  we are to establish any 
meaningful basis for a comparative study between the two countries in political 
terms, we must at least establish some baseline against which to assess their 
political systems.
In addition, since one of the primary interests o f this thesis is that of dissent and 
opposition and how, away from standard parliamentary opposition, these tend to 
manifest themselves more strongly in some societies than others, it is worth 
giving considerations to forms of more radical opposition seen in various 
countries, in particular social and new social movements and the factors which 
may influence their presence in certain societies moreso than in others. In doing 
so, we shall see how societies which adopt a more inclusive approach to a 
variety o f interest groups, particularly those with varying economic interests,
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will tend to be less prone to more radical forms of protest by social and new 
social movements since the mechanisms interest groups adapt in pursuing their 
agendas are influenced by the nature o f the societies in which they operate.
It is thus through an examination of these factors in cross-national comparative 
studies that I hope to set the basis for the more specific Irish-French comparison 
which follows in the successive chapters.
2.1 Principles and methodologies in comparative politics
Aristotle referred to politics as the master science. It is worth considering which 
are the traits of science which may contribute to this description. For one thing, 
science is the attempt to understand and, where possible control, a variety of 
social phenomena. It relies heavily on theories in its attempts to do this, since 
science is virtually worthless unless the principles and observations on which it 
relies can be stated and defended as valid and accurate. Scientific research is 
thus clearly about supplementing established theories with additional definitions, 
and also, where possible inserting caveats or expanding on knowledge already 
available.
Clearly, when the issue is politics, providing definitions or theories which 
unequivocally stand as the rules of the game, is next to impossible. The gap 
between theory and practice is perhaps nowhere as wide as in politics. After all, 
a suitably qualified researcher or theorist in the natural sciences will be referred 
to as a scientist, a politics student will not be referred to as a politician. Rather, 
the expression 'political scientist' is used, since rather than being actively 
engaged in the processes he studies, the political scientist remains merely an 
observer of an activity whose parameters seem to be in constant flux. How often 
do we hear these very same observers tell us that we are in uncharted political 
waters? It seems the sands in politics do infinitely more shifting than settling.
In carrying out any comparative study, it is important to bear in mind the
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existence of elements and aspects of comparative work which, of necessity, 
limit the parameters of the work which it is proposed to undertake. It is perhaps 
self-evident that in order for the research to have any value, the subject and the 
societies across which that subject is to be analysed, should provide a reasonable 
basis for comparative analysis. Thus, there appears to be little point in analysing 
the prevalence or effect of motions of censure in two national parliaments if one 
of them is in a liberal democracy and the other a totalitarian dictatorship! 
Similarly, there seems little point in comparing the extent o f constituency 
pressures on the work of cabinet ministers in Ireland and France since in the 
latter case the minister has ceased to be a parliamentarian - if indeed he ever was 
one - and his constituency is now being represented by his running mate 
{suppléant).
How then do we resolve the issue of valid comparative frameworks? Gregory S. 
Mahler1 has suggested that some of the most useful research on the subject has 
proposed that investigation be carried out based on two opposite perceptions of 
the issue. These are the 'most similar systems' design and 'most different 
systems' design. In the former, which is the more popular option for researchers, 
two political systems are chosen because of the overall high degree of similarity 
between them. Typically, research will then focus on a specific or a small 
number of differences between these societies in a bid to account for their 
existence within the range of similarities between the two polities.
Countering the 'most similar systems' approach is the 'most different systems' 
whereby researchers choose two political systems specifically as a result of the 
acknowledged differences between them. To specifically focus on Mahler's own 
example here, there may seem to be very little in common between the political 
systems of the United Kingdom and the United Arab Emirates, however should 
an observer or researcher notice a specific similarity between them, there will 
surely be an interest in accounting for it across the differences which generally 
predominate in any analysis of the two countries.
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Bearing these examples in mind, Mahler then suggests a number of common 
focuses for comparative political research which takes into account the two 
designs outlined above. There is firstly a focus of attention, within the study of 
comparative public policy, on what governments do. There can thus be 
comparisons of government action in different countries according to different 
criteria such as the levels of development o f the countries in question, or indeed 
changes in government action over a defined period. Additionally, such studies 
may focus on the means that governments use to implement their policies, the 
reasons why they act as they do and the stimuli which help governments to act in 
particular manners at particular times.
A second focus of study centres around political behaviour. Such studies may 
focus upon issues such as political stability, voting behaviour, leaders, party 
behaviour etc... The idea behind this approach is that when one has gained an 
understanding of how people behave in a political system, and indeed this 
applies both to politicians and the public, we then develop an understanding 
regarding the individual political systems in which this behaviour takes place.
A third focus will look at government institutions and focus upon anything from 
the legislature to the judiciary. It is clear that institutions are o f key importance 
since it is in them that the most significant powers o f the state are vested. Should 
they have the confidence of the people, they of necessity underpin the legitimacy 
of the state. A judiciary which is independent o f government or political 
interference will in general inspire the confidence of the citizens in their chances 
of getting a fair trial should they be brought before the courts. The issue o f the 
independence of institutions is, of course, a vexed one, particularly when those 
institutions sometimes prove themselves to be too independent for the political 
élites. There are many such examples in Irish law, such as the Supreme Court 
decision in favour of Raymond Crotty ordering the 1987 referendum on the 
Single European Act. The study of institutions may tell us much about the 
strength of the democratic foundations of a particular society. Where parliament 
is weak or dominated by one particular side, there is a strong argument for
suggesting that a stimulus will exist for more radical forms of political action 
since this may seem the only form of protest available. In some countries, 
controversies regarding the judiciary have seriously called into question its
impartiality, and sparked allegations from politicians that magistrates and judges
• 2were pursuing their own political agenda.
Finally, there are studies of countries themselves since the state - and in Europe 
the nation state - forms the traditional base unit o f any transnational study. It is 
logical that we should envisage studies which accept the state as a valid unit of 
comparison. There are those who insist on the many differences and variations 
existing within contemporary states, and who look to increasing evidence of 
decentralisation as a calling into question of the historical influence of the state. 
However, insofar as we remain citizens of states, we have national parliaments 
and are subject to the state in terms of taxation, law and ultimately war, it seems 
ridiculous to deny the role of the state at the present time and for the foreseeable 
future. Such a focus on states may be referred to as the 'whole-unit approach', 
and this is described in more detail on page 14 in this chapter.
I see the first option as being undesirable since I am attempting here to examine 
attitudes in two states towards issues such as European integration and economic 
globalisation. Often, in terms of their approaches to these issues, governments 
act in accordance with international treaties and obligations or broker agreements 
through a range of deals with other states. Government action does not, 
therefore, provide us with an entirely satisfactory framework for examining 
these questions since governments often find their actions limited by their 
broader obligations.
Rather, the second option provides for an interesting starting point since gaining 
an understanding of patterns of behaviour in polities enables us to better 
appreciate the type of positions likely to be adopted in domestic debates and 
ultimately by the leadership where they have room for manoeuvre. The third 
option offers us little of interest here in this context, given the observation I
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made above concerning the nature of brokering agreements at European or 
broader international level. However, the fourth point clearly ties in with the 
second, and the most desirable comparative framework for this thesis, since it 
looks to the state as remaining the traditional repository for the loyalties o f the 
citizen, and consequently the focus for their hopes and fears regarding the future. 
This does not mean that the other studies outlined are irrelevant in comparative 
work. Rather, it simply underscores the importance o f choosing an appropriate 
approach for the study in question, and since moves towards European 
integration and globalisation impinge on areas of the traditional sovereignty of 
nation states, and involve these states entering into agreements whereby the 
changes may be facilitated, it remains logical to look at behavioural issues in 
whole states as opposed to the other options put forward.
In this thesis, the objective is to study the two states since it remains my 
contention that if  we wish to analyse the political culture of two societies, we 
must acknowledge that the primary allegiance and origin o f the identity o f the 
great majority of citizens is the state, and it is certainly the case that in both 
Ireland and France, the state is by far the most important level o f political 
activity. However, deciding that Ireland and France as whole states are to form 
the basis for the study is only the beginning. We still need to establish the basis 
for our study of the two societies, and it is obvious that this can only be valid 
where the parameters are relevant and allow for a reasonable comparative study 
to be carried out.
Having decided on the state as the framework for this comparative study, we 
then need to give consideration to the manner in which we undertake a 
comparative study across states. A number are possible.
Ireland and France are broadly speaking comparable in terms of economic 
development and geographic location, although there are obvious differences. 
Sectors such as heavy industry are significantly less developed in Ireland than in 
France and in general the Irish economy is more limited in the range and extent
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of sectors it comprises than France's. In terms of geographic location, both 
countries are in north-west Europe, however the fact that Ireland is an island 
sharing a border with Northern Ireland alone, whilst France shares land borders 
with seven states and a direct tunnel link with an eighth is important.
The one factor, which allows us to draw a direct and valuable comparison 
between Ireland and France, is the fact that both states are republics and 
members of the European Union. Their systems of government, as liberal 
democracies, thus conform to the EU norms. Since the European Union project 
stands for ever closer unity among the member states, the persistence of 
divergence between them is of particular interest.
2.2 Methods of undertaking comparative studies
Dogan and Pelassy have argued that there is no study of politics that is not 
comparative.3 The argument behind this is that political science, as with all 
science, is based on the measurement and examination o f events which are 
comparable in order to test for hypotheses based on the results, and thus to 
formulate probabilities or theories based on these tests. Clearly, in order to 
undertake such a study, we need to be clear regarding the approaches which it is 
possible to take. A number of different schools of interpretation may be 
considered.
As previously outlined, the basic unit in comparative political studies has tended 
to be the state. Clearly, a very large number of states are available to us, if  we 
adopt the approach that all states are equal entities. However, the idealistic 
nature of the United Nations General Assembly which allows each member state 
one vote, does not underpin the reality of international relations at the present 
time. Even within the United Nations, the makeup of the Security Council has 
underpinned a world order dominated by the victorious World War II powers. A 
measure of the inequalities and the radical differences between states may be 
seen by the dimensions at the extremes. The Russian Federation covers
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17,075,000 square kilometres and possesses a population of 147,021,869 people. 
At the other extreme, we make take the example o f a state such as Nauru 
covering an area of 21.3 square kilometres and a population of 8,100. Even 
though both Russia and Nauru are states and have the same legitimacy in 
international law, finding a meaningful comparative framework between them 
will prove almost impossible.4
At the outset, I presented the 'most common' and 'most different' systems designs 
and suggested that each offered an entirely valid choice in terms of undertaking a 
comparative study. This is indeed the case, however the one limitation is 
perhaps in the extent of the analysis which it will be possible to undertake. It is 
surely desirable that the comparison focus on countries for which a significant 
number of common variables exist, accompanied by a reasonable amount of 
difference, thus requiring explanation in the context o f the overall similarities of 
the two societies. Deciding on what we mean by a sufficient number of common 
variables is not in itself an easy matter. As with any choice, there is the risk that 
it may appear very arbitrary, and not as such in keeping with any recognised 
scientific principles. Below therefore are a number of possible criteria for a 
study of this type.
Area is one valid criterion for undertaking such a study, as is a similar 
population since these factors will often introduce elements of commonality into 
the relations between these countries. This premise will, of course, not hold at 
all true if the political systems of the societies in question are highly divergent. 
A totalitarian, police state may rule with greater effectiveness, even over a 
fragmented or ethnically diverse society, than a democratic, pluralistic 
government - factors such as area and population being roughly equal. Other 
criteria may include similar levels of economic development, in the context of 
which we may wish to consider such issues as the levels o f democratic freedom 
enjoyed in two Latin American countries at similar points in their economic 
development and pursuing similar programmes for further improving their 
development. We may wish to examine the possible effects o f geographic
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location on political culture to see whether regional sensitivities or historical 
disputes with neighbouring states constitute a real impediment to the 
consolidation of democracy in some of the countries in question. Or indeed, we 
may choose two countries which are European liberal democracies, both full 
members of a significant transnational organisation such as the European Union 
but where attitudes towards this seem to differ and attempt to provide some 
explanation of this.5
A comparative study between states can be based any one of a number of 
different approaches including the whole-unit approach, the competing power 
centres approach and the local community approach.
The whole-unit approach by its definition implies the examination of both 
countries at state level. The aim is to compare all relevant structures in the two 
states that have aspects in common. This approach is best suited to a straight 
comparison between two states since any attempt to apply it to a multi-lateral 
comparison of necessity makes it extremely difficult to handle.
The competing-power-centres approach involves the identification of centres 
of political power and establishing the dynamics of competition between them 
and the powers for which they compete. One of the best known examples o f this 
competition is the conflict between core and periphery. This conflict can arise 
both between and within states. In the case of core-periphery conflict within 
states, this is generally a direct consequence of the manner in which the state 
was consolidated either voluntarily or in an enforced manner. It is logical that in 
those states where there is greatest resistance to the powers of the centre, the 
cohesiveness of the state as a whole will be weaker. The competing power- 
centres approach, taking account of the dynamics behind the successful 
functioning of individual states whose degrees of federalism may be greater or 
less, leads to a differing weighting of powers cither in favour of the core or the 
periphery as the case may be.
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The local-community approach specialises in the examination of smaller units 
across national boundaries such as towns or cities. In essence, this approach will 
attempt to identify aspects of politics and political life within small, local 
communities in different polities to arrive at an understanding of how these 
operate, generally against the backdrop of the nature of the societies within 
which they are located. This approach was used by Rokkan and Valen to identify 
differences in size, scale, potential for political organisation across two 
societies.6
In the case of this study, it will be clear from the outline I've already presented 
here that the third of the approaches above will not be of particular use in 
carrying out this study. The first approach will be of use in understanding the 
attitudes prevalent in both states to the processes in question, whilst the 
competing-power centres approach is of use in looking upon the evolving 
relationship between the individual national capitals which may be seen as 
peripheral to the core of decision making in the increasingly global markets. The 
new core might, in EU terms, be seen as Brussels whilst in world commerce 
terms this may be seen as the World Trade Organisation.
I am aware that these descriptions may seem somewhat unorthodox in the 
context o f the traditional core-periphery model, however the notion of 
competing power centres is, on balance, well applied.
In attempting to analyse politics in comparative perspective, we must have an 
awareness also of the broader methodological issues involved in the more general 
study of politics. These may be divided into normative and empirical 
approaches. The normative approach focuses on philosophical or theoretical 
considerations whereas the empirical approach concentrates on measurement and 
observation for its conclusions. Thus two political scientists studying the 
question of justice will differ fundamentally depending on whether their methods 
are normative or empirical. The normative approach may focus on questions 
seeking to establish the nature of justice, the concept o f a just society and the
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definition of just and unjust.
The empiricist will not be directly concerned with such matters. Rather, his 
concerns will be the realities of these questions as they are perceived by those 
directly concerned by them. Thus, although he may ask any number o f the 
questions mentioned in the previous paragraph, he will be asking them in the 
context both of the views of practitioners in the field of justice, in addition to 
analysing examples o f the application of justice to check for consistency or fresh 
observations.
I believe that the two approaches are not necessarily mutually exclusive. In the 
area of political culture, empirical examinations are likely to be somewhat 
unreliable, unless these are based on a series of examinations over an extended 
period of time and take account of the changes seen over this period. In reality 
though, empirical observations regarding political attitudes can be difficult to tie 
down, particularly since the public mood can be significantly affected by 
particular campaigns, and empirical studies would have to take this into account. 
A more reliable study of the political culture of a country will attempt to take into 
account a broader range of historical and cultural perspectives in the make-up of 
that culture. Thus, whilst an empirical element will be worthwhile in focusing 
attention on a particular manifestation of the political culture o f a particular 
society, and allow us to view this in comparative perspective where possible, I 
believe that it is best backed up with a solid theoretical foundation in order to 
provide a necessary grounding for the empirical material discussed.
Arend Lijphart has put forward four methods of empirical examination, only one 
o f which is based on experimental methods. The three non-experimental 
methods are the case study method, the statistical method and the comparative 
method. A case study is self-evident in terms of what it will generally 
encompass. It will contain an indepth analysis of a particular issue such as a 
public sector strike in France but will not necessarily arrive at a fully researched 
understanding of the broader dynamics giving rise to the occurrence of such a
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phenomenon within the society under question. It may provide a highly detailed 
analysis o f the conduct of the phenomenon under question and the affirmed 
ideologies of the participants, however it will almost inevitably fall short on its 
appreciation of the wider historical and cultural issues.
The statistical method of empirical analysis will take into account additional 
forms of measurement such as opinion polls and survey research. The inclusion 
of these elements is generally acknowledged to favourably contribute to the 
accuracy and relevance of an empirical study.
The comparative method is akin to a combination of case studies in which a 
particular aspect of political organisation or behaviour is selected and then 
examined across different societies. Thus, it is necessary that the study focus on 
a specific area or areas that are broadly speaking comparable in order not to lose 
its validity in comparative terms. It would not be valid to compare the Irish 
presidency and the French presidency in terms of their policy making influence, 
other than to conclude that the differences between them are so great as to render 
the comparison worthless. A far more worthy comparison would consider the 
comparative roles of the head of government - Taoiseach or Prime Minister - in 
both countries since both have a defined leadership role albeit one defined within 
certain parameters.8
My study combines these elements. Since it looks at two different societies, it is 
necessarily comparative. The case study forms the centrepiece of the work since 
it represents an extended analysis of the dynamic of interaction between a range 
of social actors in both Ireland and France. However, there is also a firm 
statistical dimension examining attitudes towards the European project in both 
countries, and illustrating the manner in which this perspective has evolved over 
time.
The concept of political culture has been with us at least since the time of Plato's 
Republic which observed:
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"that governments vary as the dispositions of men vary, and that there must be as many of one as 
there are of the other. For we cannot suppose that States are made of 'oak and rock' and not out of
the human natures that are in them."9
This, then, is central to our study since we are concerned here with the 
association of particular aspects of behaviour which have a political identity and 
the social attitudes and identity which underpin them.
2.3 Issues in examining political culture
At this point, we should perhaps first seek to arrive at a definition of political 
culture. Rather like in attempting to define culture, the task is not an easy one. 
Most of us have a reasonably clear idea of what we understand by culture, and 
would probably see this as the range of values, traditions, historical events and 
legends which contribute to a shared sense of identification or identity. 
However, culture is, as we know, a disputed term and is capable o f being 
manipulated, dismissed, imposed or distorted as a function of the power and 
resources of the dominant élite at a particular moment in time. The difficulty 
indeed is to separate political culture from the general notion of culture since the 
conduct of politics in a particular society will inevitably be linked to many 
aspects o f the culture of that country. Thus, one manner in which political 
culture may be defined is as representing the beliefs that shape a particular 
country/nation. It may also be interpreted by recourse to the term "political 
ideology" which may be described as a coherent way of viewing politics and 
government.10 I prefer to suggest that political culture refers to the range of 
factors, cultural, historical and ideological which influence the range o f political 
opinions operating in a polity and which inform and contribute to debate within 
it. I believe that this definition will be proven cogent as we analyse here the 
question of conflict and consensus in the political cultures of Ireland and France.
Charles F. Andrain and David E. Apter argue that the relationship between the 
rulers and the ruled in any society is made up of three analytical dimensions:
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cultural beliefs, structure and behaviour. Cultural beliefs stress the purposes and 
interpretation of rule. Structural conditions focus on the organisations through 
which political leaders exercise their power and the behavioural dimension 
explains how political messages are interpreted by individuals and how these 
individuals then operate political organisations.11
Political culture is thus concerned with the psychological orientation towards 
social objects and the political system as identified through the cognitions, 
feelings and evaluations of citizens. Political culture may thus be expressed 
through such factors as the sense of national identity, the manner in which one 
views oneself as an individual member of a polity, attitudes towards one's fellow 
citizens, attitudes and expectations regarding government performance and 
knowledge and attitudes regarding the political decision-making process.
In order for a particular political system to function, it is necessary for it to attain 
legitimacy. It does so by manipulating a range of cultural values and beliefs 
necessary for support to be garnered within a particular society. For Andrain and 
Apter, cultural interpretations probe the meaning of texts. Language and rituals 
convey shared meanings that give meaning to political experiences such as anti- 
government protests. In a bid to perpetuate their own power, the élites 
communicate texts such as ideologies, nationalist myths, legal decisions etc..., 
to the people as a means of asserting the legitimacy -  for them, often the natural 
legitimacy -  of the régime. The central tenet of the regime's philosophy is that, 
for as long as it manages to sustain the belief in the public's mind that it is 
superior to all the alternatives, it believes that people with acquiesce in it and 
refrain from taking part in dissident or opposition movements aiming at 
fundamental change.
There is a key role to be played in this strategy of self-preservation by supporting 
institutions which exist to reinforce the legitimacy of the primary ones. These 
are many and varied but include the schools, churches, mass media, political 
parties that accept the legitimacy of the existing order, and others. Challenges
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whose nature is fundamentally anti-system achieve success only when opposition 
leaders succeed in transforming the dominant principles of what is considered 
political legitimacy. This finality comes as the result o f a process whereby 
support is garnered for the idea that the existing political situation is the root 
cause of whatever social problems are being experienced.
As with any such subject, it has had its detractors and its promoters since it was 
first mooted as an area of study in its own right during the 1950s. It was Gabriel 
Almond, an American political scientist, who argued that every political system 
was embedded in a particular pattern of orientations to political action.12 Behind 
Almond and his fellow academic, Sidney Verba's use of this term was the 
assumption, based on a survey carried out across five countries (Britain, Italy, 
Mexico, USA, West Germany) in 1959 which provided data supporting the 
theory that a stable democracy required a specific set of attitudes based on a 
complex balance of subject and participant cultures and required high levels of 
system support and social trust fostered by overlapping membership of different 
groups. The study was called The Civic Culture and the data pointed to Britain 
and the USA as the paradigmatic 'civic cultures'. Among the other social 
scientists working in this area at the time was Seymour Martin Lipset who 
observed that enduring democracies were disproportionately found in wealthier 
and more Protestant nations.
An approach based on political culture came under attack from a number of 
quarters. One of the attacks suggested that the approach had become debased 
and confused with some seeing political culture as relating to the values of 
individuals whilst others saw it in group-oriented or institutional terms. Other 
criticisms fall within three broad categories:
1) Hidden assumptions: Left-wing critics accused Almond and Verba of 
celebrating existing Anglo-American democracy with its low levels of 
participation and deference to authority. In the same vein, there were 
allegations of ethnocentricity. With regard to stability, critics pointed out
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that other forms o f stable societies were possible outside the Anglo-American 
model.
2) Specific methodological issues: Critics pointed to the problems of using 
opinion polls for examining complex attitudes. With particular regard to 
transnational comparisons, they pointed to the difficulty in translating both 
words and concepts. How many Germans would admit to being 'racist' given 
the taboo nature of that word since the Nazi era in their country? Another 
related problem refers to the validity o f measurements that may be made in 
carrying out a study based on political culture. Specifically, there is the link 
between the qualitative and quantitative aspect of the study. Studies are 
generally poor at identifying future trends and many of the concepts 
employed are difficult to define.
3) Causality and primacy: How are the various factors explained? What 
dynamic explains the manner in which change in the political process takes 
place? Essentially, whilst we may observe that the political culture of a
particular society is made up by a number of factors or opinions, determining
13their proper causality is much more complex.
In defence of the political culture approach, Eatwell quotes a leading student of 
the subject Dennis Kavanagh, who states that political culture is concerned with:
"orientations towards political objects. Orientations are predispositions to political action and are 
determined by such factors as traditions, historical memories, motives, norms, emotions and 
symbols. We can break these down into their component parts as follows: cognitions (knowledge 
and awareness of the political system); affect (emotional disposition to the system); and evaluation
(judgment about the system)"14
Following from this, Ronald Inglehart said that the political culture approach 
argues
1) that people's responses to their situations are shaped by subjective 
orientations, which vary cross-culturally and within sub-cultures.
2) that these variations in subjective orientations reflect differences in 
socialisation experience, with early learning conditioning later thought.15
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Reference is, in addition, made by students of the subject to the existence of 
three specific elements of political culture - a 'system culture', a 'process culture' 
and a 'policy culture.'16
The system dimension refers to attitudes towards the nation, regime and the 
authorities in control of power at a particular moment in time, i.e. the 
government. It also encompasses values regarding national identity, the 
legitimacy of the regime in question, the legitimacy of the institutions and the 
effectiveness of individuals holding public office or occupying significant 
political positions. Process refers to attitudes concerning the role played by the 
individual him or herself within the political system and the attitude regarding 
other political actors. The policy dimension refers to the results of policies as 
'outputs' o f the political system.
When dealing with comparing political cultures, as with comparing any other 
aspects o f politics, we are faced with the considerable danger o f establishing one 
of the cultures under examination as something of a standard, a concept which 
will necessarily lead to a highly subjective examination. In order to avoid 
ethnocentricity in a study, we must avoid the notion that there is a base culture 
against which all others may be evaluated. There may, of course, be times 
when a base culture or system may be valid, such as where this may be 
prescribed. It may be the case, for example, that laws or statutes drawn up by a 
central government may regulate the behaviour and competencies o f local 
authorities, and it may be empirically observed that certain local authorities in 
peripheral areas are deviating from these. Thus, we may wish to acquire a 
knowledge of the underlying reasons behind this deviation, particularly if  it 
appears to be systematic.
Perhaps a better example would be the compliance of different EU states with 
articles of EU law or with the adjudications of the European Court of Justice. In 
such cases, the legal requirements may be seen as a standard, and their non­
application as a deviation. However, when we are seeking to compare aspects of
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the political culture in two states, without there being any internationally 
prescribed political culture, then it is incumbent on us to avoid an approach 
based on subjectively assessing differences between those states.
Some mention of political development and modernisation ought to be included 
here, since it is inevitable that political culture, as with any kind of culture, will 
evolve over time. However, evolution can happen in two ways, and this is the 
distinction between development and modernisation. Development may be seen 
as a process whereby indigenous political institutions adapt to and control the 
processes o f change affecting them. It is an idea which contains the notion of 
selectivity in terms of the type and pace of the changes which affect a country. 
Modernisation, on the other hand, tends to be a process which comes from 
outside, reflecting the dynamics of change in the wider world. Where a process 
of modernisation is not accompanied by a similar process of indigenous political 
or institutional development, it can have serious implications for the ability of
17the society in question to engineer modernisation should it wish to do so.
A series of studies initiated in 1963 by the Committee on Comparative Politics at 
the Social Science Research Centre at the Centre for Advanced Study in the 
Behavioural Studies in Palo Alto, United States, referred to a number of 
different crises faced by all nations in the process of political development or 
nation building. These are the crises of identity, legitimacy, penetration, 
participation and distribution.18
O f these, two in particular seem relevant to the question of conflict and 
consensus as they may arise with regard to the questions raised in this thesis.
The crisis of identity refers to the manner in which individuals within a political 
regime affirm their sense of political identity. Do they pledge their allegiance 
first to the state and secondly to a subdivision such as a region or major city? 
From the point o f view of the nation, fostering a sense of national identity has 
traditionally been seen as one of the most important tasks faced by emerging
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nations, since the failure to develop a national identity among citizens may lead 
to the undoing of the nation-building efforts of the élite by conflicting loyalties in 
the larger community.
The crisis o f legitimacy suggests the existence among the portion o f the 
citizenry of the opinion that the government in power is fundamentally bereft of a 
right to exist. This is entirely different from run of the mill opposition to 
government policy or aspects o f it. In a stable democracy, where a government 
has been elected in a democratic manner, its legitimacy as a government will not 
normally be questioned, even among its most implacable political opponents.
A crisis of legitimacy can arise, however, where a particular regime is in place 
which has not consolidated the support of a group or groups in society whose 
loyalty is towards another different form of government. This has been the case 
in France with those groups on the right who were converted only slowly to the 
republican cause. It must also be pointed out that there can be polities in which 
the opposition is a non-system opposition, i.e. where it is the stated aim of the 
opposition to overthrow the existing political system should they come to power.
It is my contention that there is considerably less evidence of a crisis o f identity 
or legitimacy in the Irish context than in the French, with, as we shall see in 
later chapters, a high degree of consensus being expressed regarding the 
dominant political and economic course being taken by the country. Irish people 
have, as we shall see from Eurobarometer evidence, little difficulty with their 
sense of national identity, consistently expressing few if any fears regarding the 
effect of the dominant policy or the European project on their identity as Irish 
people or their ability to continue as a part of the same nation.
Similarly, the legitimacy of the government is certainly not seen as being 
challenged. It is difficult to realistically assert that the fundamental legitimacy of 
the French government or political system was being called into question by the 
social movements of late-1995 which form the basis of the case study in this
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thesis. However, there was a mood among the demonstrators that France's 
ability to plan for its own future and the good of its own citizens was being 
compromised by acquiescing in a plan which proposed a drastic change in the 
social security system merely to reduce the country's budget deficits for a new 
currency. It may be suggested that the strikers were pointing to the imminent 
risk of a crisis of legitimacy if  a policy, which did not represent the priorities of 
many French people, were to be followed.
2.4 Common heritage in European politics
Following on from the suggested principles and methodologies o f comparative 
political analysis outlined above, I want to briefly analyse some of the factors 
contributing to what Yves Meny calls the common heritage in European politics. 
These are a number of the aspects which, despite the many differences that may 
and do exist between the different polities which make up the political map of 
Europe, can generally be seen as making up the fundamental common values 
held by the greater number of European societies. To an extent, these shared 
values allow us to consciously build up the list of elements which the western 
European countries have in common, despite the historical and cultural 
differences between them. The existence of these serves to justify the validity of 
a comparative study carried out between them.
The first of these is economic pluralism. Within the European liberal 
democracies, it has been customary for different agents to be allowed to operate 
within the economic marketplace. There is, of course, no such thing as a perfect 
market and European countries have been especially adept at imposing controls, 
either in the form of monopolistic or oligopolistic mechanisms or varying 
amounts of state intervention.19 Thus, although we speak of economic 
pluralism, the mixed economy has tended to be the norm in western Europe with 
a blend of state intervention and free market competition.
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The second aspect of the common heritage is social pluralism, requiring the 
acceptance of autonomous groups
"considered as normal, desirable means of organising individuals."20
Meny points out that there has been a degree of disagreement regarding this form 
of social organisation, particularly in countries such as France where the Jacobin 
tradition placed emphasis on the direct relationship the citizen could enjoy with 
the State, as opposed to one which was impaired by a role given to third parties. 
Evidence of this direct influence may be seen in the limited role of the French 
trade unions and the status enjoyed by direct internal bargaining particularly in 
the private sector.
The third factor is political pluralism, identified with the affirmation of certain 
liberties in the economic, social and political arenas. These would include the 
right o f assembly, formation of associations, religious freedoms and the right to 
property. For Meny, recognition of political pluralism entails an important 
consequence -  the recognition of freedom and choice and the right to defend this 
in a manner that is appropriate.21
Expression of choice is another o f the necessary factors making up the common 
European political heritage. This involves the acceptance of electoral 
competition and a recognition that such competition must be governed by rules 
which are sufficiently strict and neutral not to appear to favour one particular 
group. The full extension of the expression of choice has been a somewhat 
tortuous one, as reforms have tended to be slow in coming. These have included 
the lowering of the voting age, the extension of suffrage to women, fairness in 
the drawing of constituency boundaries, and the financing of elections.
Respect for freedom of choice is also about respect for the principle of 
opposition, and respect for the right of the opposition to oppose the policies of 
the government of the day. The British model of opposition is among the most 
institutionalised, with the main opposition party being officially referred to as
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'Her Majesty's Loyal Opposition'. David Denver has argued that this model is at 
its most robust when the traditional duopoly of parties in the House of Commons 
is at its strongest. He points out that this state o f affairs has served to make the 
Opposition responsible, as it respected the traditional balance of power which 
established the roles o f government and opposition and ensured respect for the 
principle that the government o f the day had the right to govern and the minority
99party the right to oppose. There are, however, equally solid grounds for 
opposing the idea of perpetual and irreconcilable opposition, as Denver 
acknowledges, particularly insofar as it prevents the development o f a national 
consensus on the great majority of issues.
Such an institutionalised approach to opposition is not found everywhere 
however, and France is one of those countries where the prospect of the 
opposition coming to power has often been associated with the spectre o f real 
régime change. The Fifth Republic was entirely a Gaullist brainchild and had 
been sharply criticised by many left-wing figures since its inception in 1958. 
When François Mitterrand won the Presidential Election in France in 1981, there 
was considerable suspicion on the Right that the Socialists still intended undoing 
much of the fabric o f the presidential régime. However, Mitterrand scotched 
such rumours at the outset by stating:
"The institutions were not made to fit me, but I find them a perfect fit."
Limitation of powers is another aspect of the common heritage and refers, 
predictably, to the checks and balances that are built into a particular political 
system in order to avoid all the instruments in power being placed in the hands of 
a few. The most common forms of limitation of power are the division between 
the powers of the Head of State and the Government, and the government, 
legislature and judiciary.
The final factor is the Rule of Law and Constitutionalism. This has both a 
national and an international dimension and has been built up through a mixture 
of tradition (inertia) and codification. According to Mény, these rights have
gradually been built up through a succession of rights established in Europe and 
the United States forming the basis of International Law. This 'western' model of 
the rights of the citizen and the rule o f law subsequently formed the basis for a 
variety of international legal documents and principles such as the Declaration of 
Human Rights, General Principles of Law and Higher Law. On a more localised 
level, in Europe it formed the basis of the European Convention on Human 
Rights.
We must argue from the above that the great majority of European Union 
countries share all o f these provisions, the difference between them often 
coming down to the legislative provisions governing their implementation and 
the structures of the political institutions affecting their dynamic. I f  we are 
interested in looking at questions o f conflict and consensus, it is necessary to 
look at the possibilities for access to political life and political institutions offered 
to dissenting views, and the manner in which their opinions are articulated 
within the particular framework of the society in question. With that in mind, I 
wish to move on now to look at the specific issue of interest groups in politics.
2.5 Interest Groups in Politics
One of my major concerns in this thesis is that of the role of interest groups in 
political life, since I believe that the manner in which this are active in different 
polities and the way in which they articulate their demands tell us a lot about the 
polities in question and their readiness to accommodate opinions and demands 
from outside the mainstream political sphere. The importance of this aspect o f 
political life stems from the fact that it allows us to observe the extent to which a 
society is exclusive in the way in which it deals with challenges from organised 
groups -  seeking to reduce or eliminate their influence and keep a firm hold on 
power for itself -  or whether it exhibits a more inclusive approach, striving to 
integrate interest groups into the decision making process through structures 
which channel their views into the formulation of policy or forms of social 
partnership.
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Interest groups come from across society and represent a cross-section of 
opinion. A number of them will tend to be very broadly based and will represent 
the interests of a large number of members. Among these are the major trade 
union federations, both representing white and blue collar workers and the more 
specialised professional unions such as those representing the teaching, medical 
and nursing professions.
A range of other interest groups will seek to have their views represented in 
society, and accommodating these will not always prove easy. Perhaps to the 
forefront among interest groups in most European societies will be the farming 
community which will constitute a powerful lobby. In most countries, the rural 
vote will be a key if  somewhat elusive one. Whilst there is no reason why 
farmers should inherently be more in favour of one political party than the other, 
certain parties are seen as being traditionally closer to the interests of farmers in 
each country than others. Those groups which are seen as being more distant 
from the interests of the farming community will have to gamer considerably 
more support in urban areas in order to make up for the shortfall in the rural vote. 
However, this can be a vicious circle since the support they garner in urban areas 
can reinforce the perception of their being distant from the concerns o f the 
farming community. This is particularly the case of the Labour Party in Britain 
and is somewhat true in the case of many socialist parties across Europe.
Smaller interest groups represent a range of interests in society, both established 
and temporary, and many o f these seek to have their standpoints recognised by 
the powers that be. The extent to which this will happen may depend on a 
number of factors; among them will be the desirability or necessity of including 
the views of these groups in the national decision making process from the 
standpoint of the government. Such a decision will take account of factors 
including the numerical and political strength of the group in question, but also 
the extent to which meeting its demands may meet with a positive reaction 
among the wider public. Consequently, groups which are numerically quite
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small can come to enjoy considerable influence where their case has attracted 
considerable public sympathy. Groups in this category are those representing 
citizens who have suffered a particular wrong, often at the hands of the state, 
such as infection with a dangerous disease.
Often, admission into the decision making process will alter the way in which an 
interest group operates since it will be in a position to lobby the authorities much 
from its position of influence than before. However this is far from being always 
the case. In the particular case of farmers, regardless o f the extent o f their 
integration into the decision making process, they have tended to jealously guard 
their right to engage in protests to demand more concessions. In France, this has 
been translated by the existence of radical groupings on the fringes of the 
mainstream farming unions who have primarily been the ones organising the 
more violent protests which occur periodically involving French farmers. 
Known as the enragés, their function is 'institutionalised' in the sense that they 
form a radical fringe which without fail appears and stages radical protests when 
farmers are dissatisfied with their lot. Whilst Irish farmers tend not to resort to 
the same levels of violence -  burning of foreign produce, attacking public 
buildings etc..., - as their French counterparts, they also resort to periodic street 
protests despite their easy action to government, and have on some occasions 
staged spectaculars such as releasing sheep in the lobby of the Department of 
Agriculture in Dublin.
Whilst interest groups generally tend to operate outside the conventional political 
arena, there are those who seek to enter it to advance their aims. The extent to 
which they will do this naturally depends on the opportunities afforded by the 
system for new parties or groups wishing to enter it. Certain systems such as 
first past the post make it particularly difficult for independent or single issue 
candidates to get elected since it will be difficult for them, under virtually any 
circumstances, to amass the sheer number of votes required in any one 
constituency to win the seat outright. The proportional representation system, 
such as that practised in Ireland, offers considerably better prospects to such
29
candidates to be elected, particularly where a number of seats are available in 
each constituency for proportional distribution. Thus it was that in 1991, four 
seats on Cavan County Council were won by the Cavan Road Action Group 
(CRAG), whilst at the 1997 General Election, a candidate was returned in the 
conservative constituency of Donegal South West representing a TV deflector 
campaign.
Another type of organisation which can become interest groups are the churches. 
It is important not to confuse the Church and the Christian Democratic parties 
which emerged out of the social Catholicism in a number of European countries. 
For one thing, the Christian Democrats experienced considerable difficulties 
gaining Church approval for their actions. Furthermore, although for an 
extended period during this century, the Christian Democrats did what they 
could to uphold the Catholic viewpoint in political debate, a number o f reasons 
such as a move towards the right and increased secularism among their 
supporters or power-base led these parties to distance themselves from the 
Church over time.
In general, where there was a dominant religion, this tended to be Catholicism 
as a result o f its unified nature. The Catholic Church as an institution and as a 
hierarchy has traditionally been a united and strong structure, able to propagate a 
strong and unambiguous message to a dedicated group of followers. 
Protestantism on the other hand, is much more fragmented. In many countries 
with large numbers of Protestants, these are spread out over a number of 
different churches and, since these churches themselves are often divided in 
terms of their beliefs - ranging from moderate Anglican to highly puritanical - 
there is not the same consistency and cohesion in their message.23
The reason why I believe that the relationship between interest groups and the 
political establishment is a key one, stems from the fact that more and more 
government action in today's Europe takes place against the backdrop of 
international obligations and is seen as less accountable than would previously
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have been the case. The extent to which interested groups can gain access to 
power in a particular country and have their views listened to provides an 
indication, not only of the relative openness of the political system to challenges 
but also the extent to which it feels confident in its ability to adhere to its 
obligations whilst accommodating new challenges.
Inevitably there have been those groups which have felt more dissatisfied than 
others with the politics of the major forces and which have sought to enter the 
political arena with new and more radical forms of politics. These are often 
referred to as new social movements.
2.6 New Social Movements
New Social Movements (NSMs) is an expression which generally refers to those 
groupings on the fringe of the mainstream political establishment. By definition, 
they serve to articulate the views and feelings o f those elements within a society 
who feel that their concerns are excluded from mainstream political or social 
debate. Needless to say, with such a wide definition, there can be any number 
of new social movements. They cover a wide range of forms of action, demands 
and political hues. In all cases however, they reflect viewpoints which are held 
with great conviction by their members and which are expressed, often with 
considerably more passion than is found within conventional, established 
political parties.
Many new social movements will be devoted to a single issue. We are all 
familiar with the major ones which have marked European political life over 
recent decades. In the nineteen seventies and eighties, the peace movement was 
one of the most potent NSMs in many west European countries. Its calls for 
nuclear disarmament often met with widespread success, particularly in those 
countries whose government's seemed most strongly devoted to the cause o f the 
western alliance, and where opposition on the part o f the mainstream political 
establishment was either muted or ineffectual. Two cases in point are Britain and
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West Germany. In the former, the Labour Party was strongly associated with 
the peace movement due to a number o f factors including the power o f the left 
wing among its rank and file members, and parliamentary weakness faced with 
the huge 100+ majorities of Margaret Thatcher's Conservatives during much of 
the 1980s. In the latter, the situation was somewhat different. The exclusive 
nature of the political system in that country meant that large numbers o f people 
who felt underrepresented by the major parties (CDU/SPD) and took to the 
streets in order to protest at the country being sandwiched in a bitter East-West 
arms race.
The example of the peace movement is perhaps a somewhat unrepresentative 
one, since it was a very large and very broadly based movement, bringing 
together large numbers of people who, in some cases, would not have been 
natural political allies. In the case of other NSMs, their activities are often quite 
different to that of the former peace movement.
The Swiss researcher Hanspeter Kriesi subscribes to a model for assessing the 
potential for new social movement activity within a given polity. This model is 
known as the "political opportunity structure" (POS) and it takes account o f three 
specific dimensions which are the degree of openness or closure of formal 
political access, the degree of stability or instability of political alignments and 
the availability and strategic posture o f potential alliance partners.24
The acknowledged expert in studies on new social movements, I believe that his 
perspective is of particular importance. Furthermore, the political opportunity 
structure offers a unique framework for examining the range of factors which can 
give rise to the prevalence of conflict in a society, and as such is useful in 
dealing with the central question o f conflict and consensus which this thesis 
seeks to explore. For that reason, I am according it considerable space in this 
chapter.
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Kriesi believes that the POS requires some modification in order to be relevant to 
the analysis of new social movements. He makes the point that the POS is not 
constant, rather it can undergo shifts over time, however these shifts cannot be 
anticipated by the individual actors who initiate political action in a social 
movement. Consequently, the new social movement takes account not o f the 
possibility of change intervening, but merely of the situation in existence at the 
time of its formation. A new social movement is, thus, based solely on 
strategic, short-time calculations. It is worth noting that modifications in the 
political opportunity structure reflect changes that may occur in the general 
political culture over time. Consequently, alterations in the nature o f politics 
itself can impact on the approaches adopted by those groups seeking to bring 
pressure to bear on political life.
Secondly, within the domain of the POS, Kriesi proposes to distinguish three 
properties of a political system: the formal institutional structure, informal 
procedures and prevailing strategies with regard to challengers, and the 
configuration of power relevant for the confrontation with the challengers. The 
first two categories provide the framework for the general setting which underlies 
the setting up of any new social movement, i.e. the nature of the institutions 
which challengers may take exception to and secondly the manner in which the 
challenges posed by a new social movement are likely to be faced by the 
establishment. This second property will significantly contribute to the type of 
new social movement which is likely to develop, since this will generally take 
account of the manner in which it is likely to be received within the polity.
The third property governs the likely strategies which the authorities will adopt 
when faced with the mobilisation o f a social movement. These strategies, 
according to Kriesi, will themselves define (a) the extent to which challenging 
collective actions will be facilitated or repressed by the authorities or established 
parties, (b) the chances of success such actions may expect to have, (c) the 
chances o f success o f the movement if  no hostile action is taken against it. These 
conditions will play a crucial part in the likely conduct of a social movement and
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the tactics which it will adopt.
Kriesi argues that formal access to the state is a function of the territorial 
centralisation of that state. In particular, he argues that decentralisation 
increases the prospects for formal access to the institutions since significant 
decision making is carried out at a variety of levels. Consequently, systems such 
as Germany or Switzerland offer important possibilities for access at local level 
given the power configuration in those societies. A more centralised system 
greatly limits access at regional level and almost eliminates them at local level.
Secondly, he argues that formal access to the state is a function of the degree of 
concentration of state power. Where power is divided among a number of strong 
institutions, i.e. when the separation between the legislature and the executive, 
and between the executive and the judiciary is strongest, the possibilities for 
formal access are increased notably. The conditions just outlined amount to a 
system of checks and balances which is found in those countries where the 
powers of the executive are clearly curtailed by an executive which generally 
remains accountable to parliament. It is worth noting, as Kriesi does, that 
whereas such a system appears eminently desirable, and we may wish to 
associated with ideas regarding stable, developed democracies, it is not 
necessarily a practice that exists all over western Europe. Kriesi points to France 
as a country where the executive is all powerful.
Thirdly, he points to formal access to the state as a function of the coherence of 
the public administration. Where the public administration is most coherent, co­
ordinated internally and professionalised, formal access will be more limited. 
Again, he points to France as an example of where this is the case, and here we 
see clearly how the state can be seen by potential protesters as something akin to 
an unassailable monolith when they wish to express a grievance against it. The 
centralised, universalist model which prevailed in France, virtually 
unchallenged until the decentralisation laws of the early 1980s, produced a state 
élite fiercely devoted to the ideal of the homogeneous French state in which
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regional diversity which called into question aspirational the republican sameness 
of all regions of the country was regarded as a threat.
Finally, Kriesi contends that formal access is a function of the degree to which 
direct democratic procedures are institutionalised. Clearly, Switzerland is an 
example o f a society where direct democracy enjoys a privileged position 
through the right o f anyone to campaign to have a referendum organised on any 
question which concerns them through popular initiative. In the case of 
Switzerland, should a campaign receive a certain number of signatures, the 
government is obliged to hold a national referendum on the issue.
When analysing the question of formal access to the state in an attempt to 
ascertain the likely dynamics and extent of social movements within a given 
polity, it is worth bearing in mind that the factors governing access to the state 
apply to inputs to the political system but that the framework in which they 
operate also impacts on the outputs from that system. Thus Kriesi points out that 
federal, fragmented and incoherent states with direct democratic institutions 
have difficulty in arriving at decisions and imposing them on society. 
Consequently, social movements will look upon weak states with weak 
structures as fertile ground for the mobilisation of collective action.
Depending on the structure o f the state in question, challengers such as social 
movements will be met with strategies which are exclusive (repressive, 
confrontative, polarising) or integrative (facilitative, co-operative, 
assimilative). The approach in question will, naturally, be the result o f a long 
established tradition in each country.
Kriesi puts forward the following as a model o f the institutional structures o f four 
case study countries.
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Dominant strategyWeak State Strong state
Exclusive formalistic inclusion full exclusion
- formal, but no informal - neither formal nor informal 
facilitation of access; facilitation of access; 
strong repression strong repression
- possibility of veto, but - possibility o f neither veto 
no substantive concessions nor substantive concessions
(Germany) (France)
Inclusive full procedural integration informal cooptation
- formal and informal - no formal, but informal,
facilitation of access facilitation of access
weak repression weak repression
- possibility o f veto, but - no possibility o f veto, but
no substantive concessions substantive concessions
(Switzerland) (Netherlands)
Obviously, one is tempted to ask whether one approach, inclusive or exclusive, 
is 'better' than another, and naturally this question cannot be easily answered. 
This is as a result of the historic underpinnings of the approach adopted in each 
individual country, and the cultural reasons behind this. It may be argued that 
where the institutions of the state are at their strongest, repression can be most 
effective since social movements are facing a tough battle to impose their will on 
a monolithic state. However, this, as with virtually any theory in political 
analysis, is only partly true. Kriesi refers to the periodic eruption of serious 
social protests in France as evidence of the manner in which, although the state 
may succeed in containing discontent for a certain period, the discontent will 
manage to surface occasionally and often in a spectacular manner. The massive 
numbers of people these heads of steam bring on to the streets frequently force 
French governments into embarrassing policy U-turns.
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2.7 The POS and the incorporation of interest groups in political structures.
It is, in the first instance, important to clarify aspects of the POS insofar as they 
relate to the particular cases of Ireland and France. Whilst Ireland is a country 
with a very centralised form of government which would, thus, justify the 
assumption that it would adopt an exclusivist approach to new challenges, it 
must also be pointed out that referenda are frequently used to address major 
political issues in the country. A certain number of these referenda are necessary 
since altering the Irish constitution requires popular approval. It is also the case, 
however, that certain groups in Ireland, particularly those active from a moral 
standpoint, have succeeded to forcing referenda to deal with questions through 
constitutional changes which might, in other societies, have been addressed 
through other approaches such as legislation in parliament. A particular example 
of this is the question of abortion where a plan to insert a constitutional ban on 
this practice was actually successful in 1983. Divorce had also been forbidden 
by a constitutional ban, but this was finally lifted in a referendum in late-1995.
The recourse to referenda in Ireland, required by the provisions o f the 
constitution, has opened up the way for a variety of interest groups to use a 
referendum campaign or the prospect o f one to seek to advance their particular 
agenda in this way. As we shall see later in this thesis, one of the particular 
issues raised in this way has been the country's European policy and, in 
particular, the future of Ireland's tradition of neutrality. A variety of groups, 
generally on the left-wing but also including the Green Party and a number of 
'community' groups, became vociferous in their claims that the path being 
adopted towards European unification would lead to the end o f Irish non- 
alignment and a variety of undesirable consequences such as wholesale 
conscription and Irish soldiers risking their lives in foreign battles. The fear of 
undesirable outside influences stemming from our European involvement also 
attracted the attention of those groups campaigning on the more traditional moral 
issues of divorce and abortion. Fear o f continental morals contaminating Irish 
ones played its part in gathering a range of interest groups together to oppose
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c e r ta in  E u ro p e a n  re fe re n d a .
Despite the assumptions contained in the POS model which would lead to the 
supposition that the Irish model might be exclusivist -  particularly the absence of 
effective decentralisation of powers to local government and other bodies 
there has in fact been the steady development o f partnership structures in Ireland 
aimed at incorporating a range of interests into national economic and social 
planning. The circumstances behind this process will be detailed in the next 
chapter. However, suffice it to say at this point that, although much of the 
partnership process still involves actors with a primarily economic brief, the 
National Economic and Social Forum has as one of its remits the broadening of 
the partnership process and the inclusion of groups who have thus far been 
excluded from much of the action.
With respect to France, the argument is made that the more closed POS allows 
for the inclusion of new actors only when this can be of specific use to one of the 
established political parties. Thus, the willingness o f the Socialist Party to 
accommodate a range of new social movements during the 1970s as it carried 
through a range of internal reforms was seen as an effective way of sidelining the 
Communist Party which had traditionally been seen as being more sensitive to 
the concerns of these groups. During its prolonged periods in government, 
however, Kriesi contends that the policy of the French socialists was at worst 
exclusive and at best one of what he terms repressive pre-emption. Indeed, we 
see a particular difference between France and Ireland in the manner in which the 
presidential system of government brought in by the Fifth Republic sought, 
explicitly, to limit the array of political issues which could be impinged upon by 
the range of political actors and opinions in the country, whilst in Ireland the 
manner in which referenda are needed to change the constitution -  and thus 
necessary on a range of issues -  points to a system which positively encourages 
direct, public participation on a range of questions. In this way, the required 
recourse to referenda, although often seen as divisive, actually serves to include 
the greatest possible range of opinion in the making of particularly important
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decisions, and may actually be seen as a legitimising force in the same way as 
the partnership programme today.
2.8 The political culture of conflict and consensus
We looked earlier in this chapter at the central ideas behind political culture and 
its examination. I want to move on here to a discussion o f the issues raised in 
analysing the political culture of conflict and consensus as it affects this thesis.
Analysing structural conditions is concerned with the power of governments, 
political parties, social groups and transnational institutions over the policy 
process. Effective political action by protestors is dependent on the existence of 
favourable structural conditions. Resource mobilisation theorists contend that, if 
structural opportunities outweigh structural constraints, there will exist an 
impetus for people to take part in opposition movements aimed at transforming 
the status quo. Inherent in this belief is the view that opposition movements need 
access to certain resources in order to achieve their aims. These resources can 
include money, information, weapons etc... I f  state repression is only limited 
and the groups are able to attain a high degree of freedom from state control, 
then the conditions will exist for organising effective forms of political protest 
against the State. If, however, the State is powerful and repressive, it is much 
more difficult for dissident groups to move against it. The mixture o f fear and 
intimidation that can arise in such cases can lead to fragmentation among the 
opposition groups who disagree regarding the best forms of protest to engage in.
An analysis o f the behavioural aspects o f political protest attempts to focus on 
the manner in which individual behaviour within a protest or dissident movement 
is impacted on by cultural values or socio-political structures dominant in that 
society. Central to these values is the extent to which people believe their 
protests are likely to achieve success. The theory that people make rational 
choices in terms of their political choices and participation leads inexorably to 
the conclusion that, in terms of their acquiescence or otherwise in protests,
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people assess what the likely outcome of such protests will be. In addition, even 
when people believe that participation in protests will actually achieve results, 
there will be divergence over the nature of these results and the desired 
beneficiaries of them. Purists will participate in movements because of the 
intrinsic worth of certain values or principles thereby being defended or 
promoted. Pragmatists will participate because they view the protests as being an 
effective mechanism for achieving tangible benefits which they believe will 
impact on their lives in particular, such as lower taxes or a better way of life for 
themselves or their families. This is not to suggest that protesters anticipate a 
change in the attitude of the authorities at the time they set initiate their action. 
Rather, they view their action as being the only way to achieve such a change 
and they determine the type of action they will engage in on the basis of the 
desired result and the anticipated level of difficulty in bringing this about.
Social conflict may become deeply rooted in society as a means of bringing 
about social change. As such, it becomes a cultural phenomenon seen as part 
and parcel of the political process. In the particular case of France, we may 
argue that social conflict has been a facet of the country's political culture since 
the Revolution in 1789. Although the revolution may have had as its aim the 
emancipation of all men in the values of the Enlightenment, the new structures 
put in place -  département, préfet -  had the effect o f putting in place a new élite 
which in time was to become the focus of protests not dissimilar to those which 
overthrew the previous régime.
The main division which emerged during this period in France was, however, 
that between Left and Right. Douglas Johnson points out that, at a meeting of 
the Estates-General in 1789, the nobles, believing they were entitled to a place 
of honour, took their seats to the right of the President, thus leaving their 
opponents with no option but to take their seats to his left. For Johnson, this 
event presents the inevitable view of the country as being in a state o f permanent 
conflict between two Frances: on the right the traditional elements deriving their 
culture from the heritage of the aristocracy, the Church and a certain view of
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France's cultural and historical importance. They were opposed in revolutionary 
times by an alliance of officials, professionals and notable figures of non-noble 
backgrounds who managed to ally themselves with the peasants, artisans, 
shopkeepers and others in order to overthrow the hegemonic power of the Right.
For Johnson, it is possible to carry these divisions forward and use them in order 
to provide an explanation for the evolution of the major divisions in French 
society over an extended period. Whilst he accepts that it is facile to propose a 
division of France into two unchanging, opposing camps, at great moments of 
national tension for more than two centuries, the country has, rather than 
uniting, shown a discernible division into Left and Right. He provides a 
framework for this division:
"Clerical and anti-clerical; Bonapartist or republican; monarchist or republican; nationalist or 
anti-nationalist; Dreyfusard or anti-Dreyfusard; Vichy or resistance. Sometimes the dichotomy 
has been shifted, so that the two Frances were more geographically defined, thus there was rural 
France and urban France. France north and south of the Loire, or the France that was Paris and 
the rest of France {'le désert français 0 as it was strikingly called. Sometimes the geographical 
dichotomy was more economic, and there was a France which was divided between those 
départements which were dynamic and active and those départements which were stagnant and
somnolent."26
The Left/Right cleavage is, of course, the most common one across the 
established western European liberal democracies but it is reasonable to argue 
that it originated in France. It went through something of a modification in the 
aftermath of the Second World War when a large section of the Right joined the 
republican fold for the first time, largely as a response to the shame of Vichy 
which saw the more conservative elements in the country supporting the Pétanist 
regime in its collaboration with Nazi Germany. Much of the new support for the 
Republic from elements on the Right was a direct consequence of the role played 
by General de Gaulle whose perfect right-wing credentials reassured many about 
the respectability of the Republic.
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If  we compare the French situation with the Irish, the inevitable conclusion that 
we arrive at is that Ireland's political culture is significantly less radical and 
sharply divided than is the case in France. A key question that arises surrounding 
this notion concerns the fact that the Irish nation was born o f a revolutionary 
impulse and might, consequently, be assumed to be more revolutionary in its 
outlook. For Brian Girvin, however, the fact that independent Ireland was born 
of violence should not be taken as implying that the underlying political desire in 
the country was to achieve great social change. He argues that the great bulk of 
the groupings who backed the final push for independence were actually highly 
conservative in their outlook in social and economic terms. Thus, in Ireland, 
argues Girvin, the revolution itself was not revolutionary.27
The conservatism evident in Irish political culture stems, at least in part, from 
the role played by the various churches in the country, and particularly the 
Catholic Church, from the eighteenth century onwards. A number of distinct, 
religious-based cultures existed in Ireland at this time. There was the Anglican 
élite that controlled the political, economic and social life of the country and 
depended on the link with Britain for their power. There was the Presbyterian 
tradition, concentrated primarily in north-east Ulster and which became 
increasingly radical and democratic during the eighteenth century under the 
influence of the Scottish enlightenment. Sectarian tensions, ever prevalent in 
rural Ulster, prevented the Presbyterians from making significant overtures to 
other faiths. Finally, there was the Catholic tradition which developed in a 
number of ways from the nineteenth century onwards as a result of the 
Devotional Revolution. Girvin argues that the failure of these groups to achieve 
a union on radical republican lines during the 1790s paved the way for them to 
splinter into different factions with different aims and this splintering was to 
mark the troubled development of Ireland over the intervening centuries.
Insofar as Irish Catholicism is concerned, it did present a liberal face in the early 
part o f the nineteenth century with Daniel O'Connell's drive for emancipation in 
the context of enhancing democratic freedoms for all citizens of the United
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Kingdom. By later in the century, however, the tone had become much more 
conservative. The Devotional Revolution in the Irish Catholic Church imposed 
the full doctrine of Rome on a Church which, hitherto, had been characterised 
by its folk identity. The main development with characterised the Devotional 
Revolution was institutional development, the building of large numbers o f new 
churches, a significant increase in both clergy and laity, the enforcement of 
clerical forms of dress on the clergy, and an insistence on doctrinal orthodoxy 
and clampdown on many 'folk' aspects o f the religious observance among the 
faithful. This emphasis on doctrine and an insistence on strict Catholic moral 
teaching was practised in the context of a society which had remained 
overwhelmingly rural and proprietorial. The consequence of this was to posit 
Irish society as distinct and better than those societies such as Britain, which 
were Protestant, urban and secular. Irish Catholic identity became an illiberal 
one, which considered itself to be clearly superior to the liberal and urbanising 
attitudes prevailing elsewhere.
Such a framing of national identity led to the development of an anti- 
intellectualism and an isolationism in Ireland from many of the values o f 
modernity espoused elsewhere. It would be wrong, however, to suggest that no 
modernising influences were present in Ireland during the nineteenth century. 
Joe Lee contends that a number of vital modernising factors were in place in 
Ireland by the mid-nineteenth century including, of particular note, the 
education system. Whilst I accept this argument advanced by Lee, I feel it is 
important to clarify it by stating one of the vital considerations here is the fact 
that the Church was central to both the education system and the health system, 
and consequently was able to enforce its own doctrinal outlook on these 
institutions.
The suspicions held by the Catholic Church in general regarding new forms of 
democratic governance could take second place only to a proposition which 
actually presented it with the possibility of enjoying greater influence than under 
the existing system of government. The influence enjoyed by the Catholic
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Church in Ireland, and its identification with the nationalist people, meant that it 
would enjoy a key role after independence. After all, the aforementioned health 
and education systems that had already been put in place prior to independence 
represented an infrastructure which was to prove all too valuable to the new state. 
Consequently, the Church was happy to immediately recognise the legitimacy of 
the new Irish Free State, and those who had fought for freedom were happy to 
concentrate their efforts on the simple issue of securing independence rather than 
on more fundamental questions of social reform.
Michel Peillon has described this state of affairs very ably as a blend o f 'cautious 
realism and nationalist rhetoric.' The major political parties in the country had 
their origins in the Civil War that followed the foundation of the State, and 
consequently voter allegiances to them and their own stances on important 
national issues had been directly influenced by that defining moment in Irish 
history. However, Peillon adds:
"Many doubt, and with good reason, whether treaty politics play a significant role in everyday 
political practice, where government decisions tend to be dictated by short-term pragmatic
considerations."28
Peillon continues:
"The predominance given to Irish political culture in explaining political phenomena may be 
attributed to the need to account for the political stability that has so far characterised political life
in the Republic."29
Peillon asserts that one of the reasons which may be put forward to explain the 
stability o f the parliamentary order in Ireland is the sense of continuity between 
the end of the British administration and the beginning of self-rule. There was 
also widespread literacy, a communications system linking villages and towns, 
an efficient administrative machine and, importantly, a programme of land 
reform -  nearly completed and in place -  by 1922. Indeed, the importance of 
the latter point is key, since many of the issues which had caused such conflict 
among the peasantry just a few decades before were almost completely resolved
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by the time the first native government took office. Although these did resurface 
prominently in inter-party rivalries after independence, they never aroused the 
same passions as had been witnessed in the periods of agitation of the late- 
nineteenth century. In addition, the influential Catholic Church put its full force 
firmly behind the State from the outset, thus ensuring that there was never the 
risk of a serious confrontation between the State and an institution which 
commanded the allegiance of the overwhelming majority o f people in the 
country.
Another key suggestion in Peillon's analysis is that certain authoritarian 
tendencies in Irish life have contributed to popular support for parliamentary 
institutions. However, he freely accepts that social change has made this 
explanation steadily less plausible over the intervening decades. One of the more 
compelling explanations provided by Peillon's study returns to the idea of 
continuity when the country gained independence. Ireland had, after all, been 
fully integrated into the British parliamentary tradition for over a century by the 
time it gained independence, and whatever the Irish may have thought of British 
rule, they had gained extensive experience participating in parliamentary 
democracy and had come to trust it through the various electoral reforms that had 
been introduced throughout the nineteenth century. The fact that the first Dail 
was made up of representatives elected to the British parliament in 1918 shows 
the extent to which the democratic system was accepted and granted legitimacy 
by the people. As with so many of the other great institutions such as the 
education system, hospitals etc..., there was an established tradition in place 
before the foundation of the State, thus leading these to be accepted by the 
people without difficulty.
2.9 Conflict, consensus and political stability
In analysing political culture in the context of conflict and consensus, I have 
deemed it appropriate to include some discussion here o f ideas o f political 
stability, since there is clearly a link between societies which we view as being
45
conflictive and our idea of their stability or otherwise. Summarising a number of 
values often seen as being linked to assumptions of political stability, Leon 
Hurwitz has described these as (a) the absence of violence, (b) governmental 
longevity/duration, (c) the existence of a legitimate constitutional régime, (d) 
the absence of structural change and (e) a multifaceted societal attribute. 
Huntingdon and Dominguez have suggested that the concept of stability contains 
two elements, namely order and continuity. They state that:
"The first involves the absence of violence, force, coercion and disruption from the political 
system. The second identifies stability with a relative absence of change in the critical components 
of the political system, a lack of discontinuity in political evolution, the absence from the society of 
significant social forces and political movements which wish to bring about fundamental changes in
the political system."31
The major difficulty in discussing or attempting to define such a concept as 
political stability is the fact that semantics plays a major role in how any 
individual will perceive the central notion which the term implies. A person 
living in a liberal western democracy which is well established, in which the 
same institutions, conflict resolution mechanisms, cleavages and ideologies 
have coexisted over an extended period of time will believe himself to be living 
in a stable régime. Indeed, this assumption will probably be correct. The 
problem is that the notion of stability is hereby applied to a particular set of 
circumstances, to which are probably applied also notions of democracy, 
individual freedoms, equal treatment before the law and the resolution of all 
disputes by non-violent means. Is it, however, reasonable to suggest that these 
are the only criteria by which stability may be measured? I would suggest that 
the answer here would have to be 'no'.
There are plenty of countries in which force, coercion, the infringement o f civil 
liberties and violence are employed without these countries necessarily 
considered as being fundamentally unstable. Is it reasonable to consider many 
countries of the Arabian peninsula which are profoundly undemocratic and often 
repressive as unstable countries? Furthermore, is it really true to infer that the
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mere existence of significant anti-system forces is an indication of an unstable 
country? How do we measure significant? If  20% o f voters in an election vote 
for anti-system parties, we may well consider this as significant. However, if 
the other 80% of voters support parties largely in favour of working with the 
status quo, we surely have to contend that the society in question is, broadly 
speaking, perfectly stable.
Consequently, a better definition of stability is perhaps put forward by Bridge 
and Farlie who suggest that political stability refers primarily to régime 
continuity:
"The continuity of basic features of a régime seems to form the only viable and truly general 
definition of stability, while their non-continuance constitutes régime change."32
Here we move away from notions that one type of political system is intrinsically 
more stable than another, and towards what appears to be an acceptable 
comparative framework for looking at stability. Taking the definition further, 
David Sanders suggested the following:
"The extent to which a political system may be characterised as 'unstable' at any given point in 
time varies in direct proportion to the extent to which the occurrence or non-occurrence of changes 
in, and challenges to the government, régime or community deviates from the previous system  
specific 'normal' pattern of régime/government/community changes or challenges; a pattern which
will itself vary over time."33
Patterns of conflict and consensus are, thus, not reflections on the stability or 
otherwise of a society. They reflect aspects of the political culture of a country, 
and of the dynamic between the various groups within it. Based on their history 
and the relationship between the range of political actors, countries will adopt 
measures which will have the effect of either facilitating the inclusion of various 
political or interest groups in the decision making protests, or hindering this, as 
described in the political opportunity structure presented by Kriesi. Societies 
which are characterised by social conflict, either on a periodic or ongoing basis, 
are thus not necessarily unstable societies. Rather, they can be societies where a
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strong and exclusive state limits the influence pressure or opposition groups may 
enjoy, forcing these groups to resort to a variety o f forms o f protest in order to 
advance their cause. Indeed, it is often the case, particularly in the French 
context, that concessions are granted in the aftermath of a concerted protest 
movement which would not have been granted in the absence o f such a 
movement.
There are reasons why certain societies may act in this exclusive manner towards 
pressure groups. In cases such as France, a presidential and exclusivist system 
has been seen as being necessary in order to achieve stability which was lacking 
in periods of more parliamentary rule. In addition, certain countries, such as 
Germany, limit the type of parties who may participate in their parliaments in 
order to exclude elements which had previously undermined the nature o f their 
democracy, or which threaten to do so. In such cases, the parties which 
participate in the life of the nation will tend to occupy a broad middle ground of 
political opinion, thus generating the conditions for more fringe elements to 
flourish outside the conventional structures and a range of extra-parliamentary 
measures to pursue their cause.
2.10 Conclusion
The political culture of any country is determined by a range of historical and 
cultural factors. It impacts on the manner in which individuals within a polity 
perceive it and their role within it, and, as we have seen, is likely to impact 
upon the manner in which demands are articulated and pursued within it. Certain 
countries will have an open political culture in which new demands or groups 
seeking access to the mainstream will be accommodated relatively easily. Other 
countries are more restrictive, and the model put forward by Kriesi, on the basis 
of extensive research, presents an overview of the opportunities for gaining entry 
to the political arena in a particular country. In the next chapter, we shall take a 
more in-depth look at a number of the historical factors which have contributed 
to the social and political makeup of contemporary Ireland and France.
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Chapter 3
Historical and social factors in the contemporary political culture of Ireland
and France
3.0 Introduction
In the previous chapter, I presented an overview of the prevalence of conflict 
and consensus in the political cultures o f Ireland in France. I would now like to 
develop this somewhat by deepening the historical analysis of both countries and 
by painting a picture of the role of the state and different social actors in both of 
them. It is worth noting that the major differences between both countries have 
much to do with their distinctive histories and the way in which the State has 
developed and consolidated its power in each. The dynamics in question are 
complex and arriving at an explanation which will describe these fully is not an 
easy, or indeed a finite task. Nonetheless, a number of distinct dynamics exist 
in both societies, and by tying these together, we may reasonably expect to 
arrive at a better appreciation of both countries.
As I have suggested above, historical factors will play a key role in providing an 
overview of both Ireland and France. The French state we see today is the result 
o f an evolution which has taken place over an extended period between the time 
of the Revolution of 1789 and today. It was consolidated in an extended by an 
extended push by the authorities to put in place secular institutions at the expense 
of the Catholic Church, which was hostile to the Republic. In consolidating its 
power, the Republic merely aggravated the hostility of Church elements towards 
it by steadily seeking to deprive them of those influences which they still held in 
society as a whole. From the very moment of the Revolution, there had been the 
emergence of a Left/Right cleavage in French society, as described by Douglas 
Johnson earlier. The Left was always represented by those more progressive 
elements whilst the conservatives belonged to the Right, and remained deeply
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suspicious of the secular state over an extended period -  indeed until after the 
Second World War.
In the case of Ireland, the State developed and forged an identity radically 
different to its French counterpart. For one thing, the Irish nationalists who 
gained independence in 1922 were, for the most part, devout Catholics who 
recognised the role played by the Catholic Church among the populace in the 
century prior to independence, and also its support for the nationalist movement. 
In particular, the network of institutions set up by the Church, such as schools 
and hospitals, constituted a resource which was badly needed by the new State 
and which it suited its founding fathers to conserve. Consequently, there was 
little incentive to provoke a dispute with the Church over their identity post­
independence. Whatever the merits of this approach, and indeed it may 
legitimately be questioned in the sense that it is questionable for a state to 
consciously entrust such an important responsibility as education, it did secure 
for the nascent state the support of the Catholic Church, and this support was 
particularly important in the life of the new state.
3.1 Ireland: The development of a nation and the role of the Catholic 
Church
I wish to begin by looking at the Irish situation, and particularly the question of 
the role of the Catholic Church and the manner in which it may be seen as 
something of a state substitute in terms of the range of services it has 
traditionally operated, very much in place of the state.
In France, the republican state has traditionally been seen as the agent of 
modernity. This view of the state stems from a number of factors including the 
principles of the revolutionary era whereby the citizen was vested with a range of 
rights which would have been inconceivable under the Ancien Régime. In 
addition, however, as the republic consolidated its influence into the nineteenth 
century, there was the development of a range of sectors guided by the founding
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principles I referred to above. Perhaps of most significance among these was 
education, which was set to become a highly contentious issue over time as we 
shall see. State schools were based on the idea that science should predominate 
over any denominational or confessional influence. Thus, there was no 
possibility o f an Irish style situation existing whereby the Church would be 
allowed to operate 'state' schools as I shall describe.
The Irish Catholic Church has adopted the practice, as seen in other 
predominantly Catholic countries, of seeking to have a continued, strong input 
into moral issues both among its own followers and at state level in general. It 
has historically been a strong force, associated as it is with the memory of the 
repression of the Catholic faith during the time o f the penal laws and its role from 
the period of the Land League to the final push for independence. Another factor 
placing the Catholic Church at the centre o f Irish society is its role as a 
modernising force, particularly insofar as the provision of education is 
concerned. From the outset, the Catholic Church has been centrally involved in 
the provision of education to Catholics, both through fee paying schools and the 
charitable work of various religious orders. As such it was seen as relieving the 
subordinate situation of Catholics by providing them with the most vital means 
known to escape from their inferior status - education.
This view of the Irish Catholic Church as a modernising force is o f key 
importance in analysing the contribution of the Church to Irish society over the 
past 150 years. Historical factors, most notably the Penal Laws, had seen Irish 
Catholics denied an education and prospects for social advancement since the 
eighteenth century. In the aftermath of the Famine, a number of changes were 
initiated which saw the Irish Catholic Church undergo significant change, in 
terms not only of its pastoral but also of its social role.
It is an often overlooked fact that the growth of organised religion in Ireland is a 
relatively recent phenomenon. The traditional faith, which is generally traced 
back to the arrival o f St Patrick in c. 432, survived over the centuries in a very
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localised form. Religion was as much about Christian faith as it was about the 
incorporation of diverse aspects of local traditions dating from as far back as the 
Celtic period. Such characteristics of Irish religious practice as wakes, 
pilgrimages to the Shrines of local saints and patterns date from the traditional 
period which lasted up to the middle of the nineteenth century. In addition, 
church attendance was significantly lower than that to be seen in later years. In 
the major cities it is estimated that Mass attendance ran at between 50% and 
75%, however in rural areas the figure was understood to be as low as 25%.'
The event, or rather series of events that changed this, are now referred to as the 
Devotional Revolution. The origins of this period are generally attributed to the 
immediate aftermath of the famine, however there had been a number of 
developments before this time, such as the foundation of certain religious orders 
such as the Sisters of Mercy and the Christian Brothers in the earlier part o f the 
century. However, it was in the aftermath of the famine than matters begun to 
take off.
Peadar Kirby identifies the characteristics that have defined the Irish Catholic 
Church since the famine, and the burdens with which it has struggled, as 
institutionalism, clericalism and devotionalism. The institutional development 
of the Irish Church was marked by a huge growth in the number of churches and 
similarly in the numbers of religious orders and the membership of them. In 
addition the numbers of priests and the role they played evolved similarly. Kirby 
recalls how, at the turn of the nineteenth century, nuns were practically absent 
in Ireland and there were only 400 male religious. Priests did not wear 
distinctive clothing and, as such, were indistinguishable from the local 
community. At the heart o f the institutional development of the Irish Church 
were the bishops, who spearheaded the drive to bring the Irish Church more in 
line with conventional Roman teachings and practices. The success o f the 
Bishops' crusade was to result in the complete transformation of the priests and 
religious of Ireland into a disciplined and obedient unit, whose adherence to the 
structures of the Roman Church could no longer be called into question.
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Some statistics from the period show that by the 1860s, there were 2,339 parish 
churches in the country, of which 2,000 had been built since the beginning of the 
century. The number of diocesan priests rose from 2,183 in 1840 to 2,938 in
1901.4 The growth in the numbers of institutionalised religious was coupled by 
the development at this time of the Catholic presence in other aspects for society. 
Throughout the early to mid nineteenth century, religious orders were involved 
in setting up institutions such as homes for the poor, hospitals and schools.
In addition, there was the growth of seminaries. The legacy of the penal laws 
and the folk nature of the Irish Church, meant that clergy had hitherto received 
their training at seminaries on the Continent. From the end of the eighteenth 
century there had been moves to establish new seminaries at home. Carlow and 
Kilkenny were set up in 1793 and Maynooth in 1795.
The new growth of the Irish Catholic Church as an institution accompanied the 
major effect on Irish society o f the famine, and the resultant commencement of 
the process o f emigration which has continued in various waves until this day. 
The change occasioned by the famine led, I would argue, to two major 
phenomena occurring. The growth in the number of churches and religious 
accompanied an ongoing, continuous fall in Irish population levels. As a result, 
the institutional Church could be closer to its flock than ever and have a much 
more direct input into the matters affecting their daily lives. Secondly, the 
movement of Irish people out of the country, into societies in which Catholicism 
was either a minority faith or one battling for its identity within a melting pot of 
other beliefs, meant that the Irish Church needed both to shape the religious faith 
of those destined to emigrate and provide them with clergy once there.
Education has long been a key priority for the Catholic Church in many 
countries. We know that Christian Democrat parties, the majority o f which were 
established to defend Catholic interests, took a very strong line on this issue 
given the importance attached by the Catholic Church to the principle that
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Catholic children should receive a denominational education. The debate 
regarding denominational versus state education, and the funding and operation 
of education, was a contentious one involving the Christian Democrats in Italy, 
the former West Germany and, as we know, France.5
The Catholic Church thus began setting up hospitals, schools and other 
institutions operated and often staffed by religious. In this manner, given the 
fact that the overwhelming majority of the people had hitherto been excluded 
from such services, the Catholic Church effectively was setting up some o f the 
key institutions of the Irish state some seventy years before the state itself was 
established. Whilst this may seem like a debate between secularism and 
devotionalism, my argument is that it goes much deeper than this in the Irish 
context. As we have seen earlier, the relationship between Catholic beliefs and a 
hostile state was a phenomenon in various continental countries, and contributed 
to the growth of Christian Democrat parties. In Ireland, the contributing factors 
were somewhat different.
In the nineteenth century, the Church's problem was not a secular state, rather it 
was a state with an established religion but which had repressed and then failed 
the Catholic people, thus creating the incentive for a range of Catholic 
institutions for the Catholic people. Indeed, as I suggested above, with the 
foundation of the Irish Free State, any tensions between Church and state were 
set to lessen yet further, as Catholic institutions continued to flourish albeit 
under state tutelage. By this expression, I mean that religious orders remained 
the owners of those schools and other institutions they had built and conserved a 
high degree of autonomy over their management, however they received state 
funding since their schools were, in the great majority o f cases, operating as 
public institutions, and of course teaching the curriculum as prescribed by the 
Department of Education. I do not wish to deviate excessively here on to some 
of the more tragic revelations of recent years concerning mistreatment and indeed 
sexual abuse of children by members of religious orders. This is likely to be the 
result of various factors including the lack of adequate screening for men and
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women entering religious life. I would just say, however, that when we 
consider the very large degree of confidence which was placed in religious orders 
in the administration of a wide range of services particularly regarding children, 
we are almost inevitably faced with the old maxim that if  power corrupts, 
absolute power corrupts absolutely. The only difference here is perhaps that the 
word power ought to be replaced with trust.
It is necessary to balance this analysis with a more general perspective on the 
secularism, and an attempt to interpret it in the Irish context. In a recent article, 
Nikki R. Keddie addresses the relationship between secularism and the state in an 
attempt to move towards a broader comparative framework. In her article, she 
compares Ireland and Poland in the sense that nationalism in both countries has 
been tied to the Church.6 Indeed, Keddie goes on to point out that most 
nationalist identities are secularist and that the religious toleration that tends to be 
favoured by governments is tied to a weakening of belief primarily as a hedge 
against fundamentalism. Keddie also points out that most modern states wish the 
primary loyalty of the citizen to be to the state or nation concerned and not to the 
Church or other institution. Indeed, she points out that nationalism may be seen 
as a substitute for religion, and she alludes to the French distinction between 
religion and modernity by pointing out that most seventeenth or eighteenth 
century religious conflicts had come to be seen as "bloody, indecisive and 
inimical to national unity."7
In order to better situate the position enjoyed by the Catholic Church in Irish 
society, it is helpful to look at a number of the specific stages and events which 
have marked the course of Irish history in this regard. I stated earlier that 
Catholic institutions essentially represented a layer of Irish Catholic statelike 
structures in place well ahead of the actual state itself. In arriving at a better 
understanding of the historical situation, it is also important to bear in mind that 
the years before independence were marked by a number of stages of 
administration which themselves contributed to the final shape of the relationship 
between Church and state, particularly in the field of education.
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Following the 1918 General Election, the victorious Sinn Fein MPs refused to 
take their seats in the House of Commons and set up the first Dail in Dublin. In 
the climate which prevailed at the time, Dail Eireann was not in a position to 
appoint 'ministers' with responsibilities for all the conventional portfolios 
associated with fully functional governments. Nonetheless, this did not prevent 
the formulation of distinct priorities for Irish education during this period. In his 
book Church, state and the control o f  schooling in Ireland, E. Brian Titley 
recognises that "it would have been financially impossible to replace the national 
school system."8 However, he goes on to point out that plans existed during this 
period to supplement national schools with new Irish-speaking primary schools. 
Although it would have been in the government's power to establish such schools 
under state control, this was not considered. Indeed, it was reported that the 
bishop of Waterford had been invited to act as patron of one such school. As 
Titley remarks:
"The managerial situation was not to be interfered with, even in the cause of Irish."9
The ties between the Catholic Church and Irish education after independence 
stem from much of the work on curriculum development which was undertaken 
during 1921 and 1922. A strong bond links three strands of the elaboration of 
education policy at this time. These strands are, perhaps not surprisingly, 
nationalism - Titley even suggests chauvinism -, the Irish language and religion, 
specifically Catholicism. The first two are obviously closely related, although 
nationalism as such rears its head in the case of history where the call was made 
for the teaching of the subject:
" ...to  develop the best traits o f national character and to inculcate national pride and self-respect.
This will not be attained by the cramming of dates and details but rather by showing that the Irish 
race has fulfilled a great mission in the advancement of civilisation and that, on the whole, the 
Irish nation has amply justified its existence."10
With regard to Irish, the recommendation was made that:
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"...the Irish language be elevated to a pre-eminent position; that the curriculum be pruned of 
several subjects to allow for the increased attention to Irish; and that a distinctly Irish flavour be
given to certain subjects."11
Any discussion on the Church side o f these developments must, in Titley's 
analysis focus in on the presence and role o f two men: The Rev. Timothy
Corcoran S.J., professor of education at University College Dublin and Eoin 
MacNeill, Irish Free State education minister. In the immediate period 
preceding independence, it is to Professor Corcoran that we must turn. He first 
came to prominence in the planning of the future Irish education system in the 
aftermath of the Irish National Teachers' Organisation Annual Congress 1920, 
when a conference was called regarding the design of a new Irish curriculum. 
Various groups including the Dail's Irish department Aireacht na Gaedhilge 
agreed to participate and the National Programme Conference on Primary 
Instruction met for the first time on January 6 1921. Professor Corcoran agreed 
to act as adviser to the conference.
The recommendations of the conference were as outlined above, and they bore 
the strong influence of Professor Corcoran insofar as the whittling down of
  n
English influences was concerned. Professor Corcoran also agreed to serve as 
adviser to the Dail Commission on Secondary Education which sat from 
September 24 1921 to December 7 1922, and reported to the then Free State 
education minister Eoin MacNeill. At its first session, Frank Fahy, on behalf of 
Dail education minister J.J. O'Kelly placed before the delegates - who included 
representatives from the Catholic Headmasters Association and the Christian 
Brothers - a view of what it was they were expected to come up with.
"He informed them that the purpose of their inquiry was to determine how best education could be 
structured in order to revive the ancient life o f Ireland as a Gaelic state, Gaelic in language, and
Gaelic and Christian in its ideals. "13
In many respects, this may be seen as summing up the entire philosophy which 
came to underpin the Irish educational system, and in placing their trust in 
Professor Corcoran the INTO, the Dail and the other bodies involved were
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choosing a powerful advocate for those values. It is not the within the scope of 
this chapter to discuss the nature of the curriculum that emerged from these 
discussions. Rather, I wish to look at another aspect o f the terms of reference of 
the secondary commission, which was the requirement that it consider the 
coordination of the whole education system. Titley reports that this task was 
apparently left to a seven member coordinating committee presided over by 
Professor Corcoran. This grouping seems to have considered its mandate to be 
the coordination of educational programmes and as such it ignored questions of 
structural reorganisation.14 Whether this was merely a matter of innocent 
interpretation, or a concession to Church interests cannot be assessed here. No 
copy of the commission's report remains in existence and the report itself has not 
been documented in an indepth way. However the Church's position was not to 
be challenged, a point reinforced by a statement from the Central Association o f 
Catholic Clerical Managers on October 20 1921 as both the secondary 
commission and primary conference were engaged in their deliberations.
"We are confident that an Irish government established by the people for the people, while 
safeguarding the material interests of the new State, will always recognise and respect the 
principles which must regulate and govern Catholic education. And in view of the impending 
changes in Irish education, we wish to reassert the great fundamental principle that the only 
satisfactory system of education for Catholics is one wherein Catholic children are taught in 
Catholic schools by Catholic teachers under Catholic control."15
Thus we see the strong ties that bound the new Irish State to the beliefs and 
outlook of the Catholic Church even before its official birth, and which meant 
that the Church was destined to play an important role in its consolidation in the 
decades after independence.
This state o f affairs is, o f course, in marked contrast to that which prevailed in 
France, and I shall turn to analyse this a little later. It is worth noting, however, 
that there is more than a contented Church to be borne in mind when looking at 
the consensus which, I wish to argue, has come to characterise Ireland today, 
and has its roots in the past. The broader left/right cleavage which characterises 
most European liberal democracies has also been absent Ireland. It is possible to
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relate this to the events of 1918, when the Irish Labour Party, the oldest 
established political force in the State, held back from standing in order to allow 
Sinn Fein a clear run. This eclipsing of class based politics by the national issue 
has been a key element in Irish political culture over the course o f this century, 
and has basically meant that the primary divisions in the country were on the 
national issue, as opposed to on social or redistributive concerns.
3.2 The Irish Labour Party: a victim of itself or o f the society which evolved 
around it?
The extent to which the Labour Party became cast in its role as a party unable to 
pursue the type of agenda seen elsewhere was clear from many of the statements 
of its leaders around this time. Their statements seemed to echo the corporatist 
terms of the Catholic social movement which was gaining momentum in Ireland 
from the 1930s forward. This statement from the party leader from 1927-32, 
T.J. O'Connell, is indicative:
'Our ranks must be as comprehensive as our policies, uniting farmer and town worker, wage- 
earner, salary-earner, professional man, shop-keeper, industrialist, housewife, in the bonds of
genuine political conviction, realist patriotism and patient enthusiasm for social progress and
reconstruction.'16
However, even though the Irish Labour Party never resembled other left wing 
movements in Europe in the scope of its militancy or effectiveness, Whyte 
points out that the militant legacy which led to the birth of the party in 1912 
continued to play a role over several decades. It is perhaps paradoxical that we 
must note here the reality that the statement from T.J. O'Connell quoted above 
should have been made before the publication of Quadragesimo Anno, whereas 
during the 1930s when the impact of the Pope's encyclical was making itself felt 
very strongly, Labour should have been seen to move away from the national 
acceptance of the Pope's teaching.
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During this period, a reference to a 'Workers Republic' appeared in the party's 
constitution, and against the backdrop of the Pope's teaching this caused grave 
concern to many elements within the party, including one of the more 
confessional affiliated unions, the I.N.T.O. The teachers lobbied the Labour 
leadership to alter the reference, a concession they succeeded in obtaining. 
Indeed they report that for having done so, they received "the express 
commendation of the general body of the Bishops."17 The phrase 'Workers' 
Republic' was replaced by the following:
"The Labour Party believes in a system of government which, while recognising the rights of 
private property, shall ensure that, where the common good requires, essential industries and 
services shall be brought under public ownership with democratic control."18
Although there was some internal dissent within the party to such an obvious act 
of deference to Catholic values, Whyte reports that it was a move which proved 
electorally advantageous to the party, with significant gains in both local and 
general elections over the following years.19 The consolidation of Labour's 
conversion to Catholic social teaching came during the early 1940s as a result of 
a bitter conflict between a prominent party member William O'Brien and the 
experienced labour movement leader Jim Larkin. Larkin had remained outside 
the party fold until the 1940s, being significantly more militant than the party's 
position. However, he joined the party in the early part of the decade and 
succeeded in being approved as a Dail candidate for the 1943 General Election. 
O'Brien, whose animosity towards Larkin was long standing, saw this as an 
excuse to fan the flames, and given the fact that Larkin had once been a 
communist, circulated stories of a communist plot to infiltrate the party. 
Militant Catholic opinion was thus mobilised, and The Standard obliged with 
stories supportive of O'Brien's position. This led to a split which lasted until 
1950 and further affected the Labour Party's prospects of gaining enhanced 
influence and prestige in Irish politics.
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The sheer measure of the Labour Party's tameness and lack of willingness to 
adopt radical postures was perhaps best summed up by Panitch. He categorised 
Labour as an:
"integrative political party, fulfilling systematic functions like representation and brokerage, 
demand conversion and aggregation, imbued with a conception of the social order as being 
basically unified rather than fissured, and effecting a compromise between the sectional interests 
of various classes in the society by means of policies 'in the national interest.'"2"
This notion of national interest is one which tends to arise in Ireland in a manner 
which is particularly interesting. With the major 'socialist' party hemmed in as a 
result of allowing the national issue to take centre stage, and the country in 
desperate need of furthering its economic development, it was possible for 
Eamon de Valera's Fianna Fail to appeal to a sense o f national interest in 
pursuing a policy of economic self-sufficiency which was much less about a 
sense of practical economics than a desire to reinforce the country's sovereignty. 
This it did, first with the Economic War in the 1930s, and then with the broader 
policy of import substitution which gained a particular impetus during the 
Emergency. Fianna Fail has been characterised by political scientists as a 
'national party', appealing to the people and to other political forces to put aside 
sectional differences in favour of the national interest. To this extent, its role in 
the developing industrial relations mechanism in Ireland is interesting, and we 
shall look at this later. It is, however, reasonable to suggest that although the 
links between Irish nationalism and the Catholic Church were strong enough to 
represent a challenge to a strident left-leaning Labour Party in any circumstances, 
Labour never made much of an attempt in post-independence Ireland to recover 
from its self-imposed sidelining in 1918 and challenge the dominant policies in 
the country. It thus remained a weak, if inoffensive force generally, and failed 
to establish a clear niche for itself in Irish societies for several decades.
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3.3 Catholicism in France: a vision divided
From the late-nineteenth century onwards, the development o f Catholic social 
teaching had influenced the labour movement in a number of European countries. 
The Papal encyclical Rerum Novarum, published in 1891, presented the idea of 
relationships between employers and unions which were not necessarily 
conflictual, but rather could be based on certain common interests such as the 
success of the company, common Christian values and social justice. The 
Catholic trade union movement started about this time and it adopted the name it 
has retained to the present day - CFTC - in 1919. A number of organisations 
were founded to spread social Catholic doctrine and there was also the 
development of a social Catholic press whose best known title was the Lyons- 
based Chronique sociale de la France. However there was to be a stern rebuke 
coming from the Vatican for those whose interests in Christian Democracy were 
leading them too far down the political road. In the aftermath o f the founding of 
one of them, the influential Sillon movement by Marc Sangnier in 1899, Pope 
Leo XIII issued his riposte in a 1901 encyclical Graves de communi in which he 
stated that Christian Democracy, rather than indicating an endorsement o f any 
political régime, merely meant ‘beneficial Christian action among the people.’
The story of French social Catholicism is one of a movement made up of people 
with the most honourable of intentions but whose efforts were repeatedly 
frustrated by their fellow Catholics. The interwar period was of particular 
significance for both major factions of the French Catholic fold. A new political 
party, the Parti Démocrate Populaire, was founded in 1924. On a resolutely 
Christian Democrat footing it appeared to offer considerable promise if  the extent 
of its ideological grounding was anything to go by. It considered the family to be 
the bedrock of society - an idea that went right back nineteenth century liberal 
Catholics such as Marc Ozanam and Frédéric Bûchez. In addition, the party 
proposed protective legislation for children, measures aimed at stimulating the 
birth rate and social insurance schemes. Its leaders were also influenced by the 
example of popular democracy being given in Italy by Sturzo which, based on
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what he termed ‘intermediate bodies’ such as family, profession, commune and
n o
region which would act as a buffer between the state and the individual.
The PDP did not however unite French Catholics. It was unmistakeably a liberal 
party, and as such it was completely at loggerheads with the right wing Catholic 
organisation Action française led by Pierre Maurras. In addition, Marc Sagnier 
was by this stage back on the scene and although heavily involved in 
international work on behalf on the League of Nations and other causes, he was 
at the head of another liberal Catholic organisation called Jeune République. In 
his view, PDP was still too far to the right and he could not pledge his support to 
it. Sagnier believed in the establishment of full scale dialogue with the moderate 
left, and he believed there was no appetite for this among most o f the PDP. In 
fairness, there were those within the PDP such as Comilleau who were prepared 
to countenance such a dialogue, but Sagnier tended to discount their 
commitment.
Whatever the merits of their policies and organisation, the PDP was not a 
success in electoral terms. In 1928 it scored seventeen deputies, however it lost 
seats in both 1932 and 1936 by which time it was down to just thirteen seats.24 It 
would be easy to pin the blame solely at the door o f conservative Catholics for 
the very muted success enjoyed by the proponents o f social Catholicism. In 
reality, the attacks launched against Catholics by anticlerical republicans did 
much to fan the flames of discontent between Catholics and the dominant secular 
elements in France. Thus when, in 1850, the legislative assembly debated a bill 
promoting Catholic schools put forward by the royalist education minister the 
comte de Falloux, it sparked an inflammatory reaction by Victor Hugo:
“Your law is a masked law. It says one thing and will do another. It has the look of liberty and the 
intention to enslave. That is your custom. When you forge a chain you say: Here is a liberty!
“So, you wish to be given peoples to educate. Fine. Let us see your pupils. Let us see your 
products. What have you done to Italy? What have you done to Spain? ... Spain has lost the secret 
of strength that she held from the Romans, the artistic genius she held from the Arabs, the empire
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that she held from God. And in exchange for everything you have lost for her, you have given her
the Inquisition.”25
In this context, it cannot be surprising that many French Catholics adopted a 
similarly hostile attitude towards the republican values which men such as Victor 
Hugo stood to defend. Thus, in 1870, Louis Veuillot, editor of the Catholic 
publication Univers claimed that France’s defeat in the Franco-Prussian war was 
a direct punishment from God for France’s decision to stray into the paths of
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interpretation of contemporary events as punishment for the revolution did not 
end during the nineteenth century. As late as 1940 one Catholic newspaper 
claimed, with regard to the country’s fall to Germany, that:
“what has collapsed so lamentably is a house which people tried to build without G od.”27
Although Marshal Philippe Pétain was not himself a practising Catholic, he 
nonetheless gave support to this view of matters when he made the following 
statement shortly after coming to power:
“I hate the lies that have done us so much harm ... Our defeat is explained by our laxity. The 
pleasure principle destroys what the principle of sacrifice has built up. It is to an intellectual and
moral reflection that I urge you first of all.”28
The final dimension of French social Catholicism which it is useful to analyse is 
the role played by intellectuals and the Catholic press. One particularly key 
figure here is Emmanuel Mounier, the founder, in 1932, of the review Esprit. 
Although clearly on the left of Catholic thought, Mounier was not a particular 
friend of those seeking to establish conventional Christian Democrat parties 
operating within the republican régime. If  anything, his primary concerns were 
spiritual, and indeed he described himself and his colleagues as revolutionaries 
in the name of the Spirit. As such, they sought as their primary objective to 
dissociate spiritual matters from politics and in particular from the right wing. In 
fact, in describing Mounier as left wing, we must really view this as a reference 
to his liberal outlook, since the position adopted by his publication tended to
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avoid outward support for any existent political formation. Although he attended 
a conference in Rome which dealt with the fascist corporatist state, Mounier 
came away from the event convinced that the Italians had made a serious mistake 
in placing greater importance on the state than they did on the individual. Even 
if  he subsequently never wavered in his opposition to fascism or Nazism, 
Mounier nonetheless looked upon the Third Republic as an established disorder 
and he was concerned with finding a third way in politics away from the 
traditional right/left cleavage in France.29
Another review, more radical than Esprit was Terre Nouvelle which was 
founded in 1935 by Maurice Laudrin. Laudrin was unashamedly a socialist, and 
the fact that he had joined the SFIO and published a book calling on Christians to 
reject the power of money saw him dismissed from his role as personal secretary 
to the Archbishop of Paris in 1931. Terre Nouvelle sought to reconcile 
Christianity and communism and when in 1936 the French Communist Party 
offered a hand of friendship to Catholics, Laudrin’s publication stood virtually
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alone in not rejecting it.
In addition to these two reviews, there was also an important role played by 
newspapers from a Catholic perspective. The chief figure in Catholic journalism 
in the inter-war period was Francisque Gay, an old collaborator of Marc Sagnier 
and leading Catholic journalist and publisher. His credentials as a liberal were to 
win him the ire o f conservative Catholic figures, in particular Maurras after the 
latter’s organisation Action française had been condemned by Pope Pius XI. 
Gay’s weekly newspaper La Vie catholique fell in resolutely behind the papal 
line, a not insignificant stand to take given the paper had a weekly circulation of 
about 40,000 until it eventually went to the wall in 1938.
In addition to this, Gay was also co-director of the daily Catholic paper L ’Aube 
set up in 1932 as the voice of Christian Democracy. LA ube  had an explicitly 
political mission and broadly speaking aimed to undermine the image of Catholic 
politics in France being associated with nationalism and reaction. The reality
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was, however, that for all their worthy efforts, the social Catholics and Christian 
Democrats of the interwar period could never overcome the underlying difficulty 
in France whereby the historic divisions between left and right in France, and the 
climate of anticlericalism that still existed, made many Catholics wary of being 
seen to associate clearly as Catholics in just about any manner. Additionally, the 
success of secularism in France had been to greatly reduce the numbers of 
practising Catholics at any rate, thus greatly limiting the potential audience
31social Catholics and Christian Democrats could hope to enjoy. Thus, for all 
the frenetic activity within their ranks, the divisions among French Catholics 
prevented them from ever attaining the kind of power necessary to represent a 
coherent force on the political scene. A little like the divided trade unions, their 
moments o f glory were at best sporadic, and more often than not limited to the 
issue of Catholic education.
3.4 The Irish State: a developing corporatism?
The Irish situation was, as I have already described, rather different. Firstly, 
the relationship between Church and State could hardly have been described as 
antagonistic. However, the influence which the Church was allowed to conserve 
in society was to make itself felt in a number of specific ways. In the first 
instance, the Church held a particular position regarding communism and 
socialism. Its outward hostility towards these phenomena had a particular effect 
on the conduct of left-wing politics in Ireland over an extended period. As we 
have seen, the difficulties involved in advocating strong left-wing views in 
Ireland led the Labour Party to adopt a more integrative agenda and to openly 
state an aversion to interclass conflict, something which, in the broader 
European context of the twentieth century, is quite extraordinary. It is also the 
case that the Catholic Church managed to wield its power over the Irish 
government on occasions when it felt the latter was trespassing in areas over 
which it felt it had moral control. A particular example of this was the Mother 
and Child Scheme of 1951 which saw the Church successful force the 
government to withdraw a scheme which would have introduced free health care
67
for mothers and young children. The moral opinion of the Church was that it 
was not for the State to decide as to the healthcare requirements of individuals in 
society, but rather for the individual themselves according to the tenets o f their 
faith.
The holding of such a view by the Church, and the fact that it was able to 
prevail, essentially contributed to the fact that the Irish State was much more 
limited in its direct intervention into matters o f the economy or society then 
elsewhere. This is not, of course, to suggest that such intervention did not 
happen in an indirect manner. Obviously, underlying policies such as self- 
sufficiency and import substitution speak for themselves in terms of their impact 
on the way the country did business. There was also the setting up of the semi­
state companies which, although owned by the people through a shareholding 
vested in the most appropriate government minister, have generally been able to 
independently take most of the decisions directly affecting them. By and large, 
however, the State in Ireland has preferred to act in an auxiliary capacity, and 
this has particularly characterised its approach to industrial relations.
Away from the specific difficulties the Labour Party had in pursuing an openly 
left-leaning political agenda, the Irish trade union movement had a decidedly 
adversarial background. This was largely due to its origins in the British trade 
union movement, and the strong ties which bound the two, largely thanks to 
men such as James Connolly and Jim Larkin, both of whom had been immersed 
in British trade unionism before bringing their radicalism to Ireland.
From the foundation of the state up to the 1960s, free collective bargaining was 
the norm within the industrial relations system in Ireland. The state's policy as an 
auxiliary actor was consistent, and it was content to allow the employers and 
unions to resolve their differences among themselves. However, from the late- 
1950s onwards, there was a move towards state planning of the economy as the 
worst o f the recession of that period took hold. Although free collective 
bargaining had succeeded in bringing about significant improvements in real
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income, this was to the detriment of the overall economic wellbeing of the state. 
In particular, inflation was on the increase at a time when problems of 
unemployment were becoming chronic as protectionist policies such as import 
substitution became steadily less viable.
We do know that the advocacy of Catholic social views in Ireland from the 1930s 
onwards found many sympathetic ears in Ireland. The University College Cork 
academic and newspaper editor Alfred O'Rahilly, who published the Catholic 
weekly The Standard ran an edition in the early-1940s which featured a number 
of European leaders o f the time who came from a 'Catholic' standpoint, such as 
Franco and Salazar. Away from such extremes, it is the case that the attempts 
by the Catholic Church to promote its vision of the social order took hold to an 
extent that is sometimes unacknowledged. Archbishop John Charles McQuaid of 
Dublin was the churchman most closely in touch with the government as Primate 
of the Republic. During the Emergency, the Archbishop set up the Catholic 
Social Services Council (now Crosscare) in order to assist the needy of the 
Archdiocese. During the 1930s, the fortieth anniversary of the encyclical Rerum 
Novarum saw the publication of Quadragesimo Anno which restated many o f its 
principles and which was used by the Irish hierarchy as something of an 
inspiration for its own drive for Catholic social teaching.
The leading Irish journal from a Catholic perspective of the period -  and indeed 
today -  is the Jesuit run Studies and this regularly carried articles on forms of 
governance and social order in Catholic countries, such as corporatism. It is 
know that Studies was avidly read in government circles in Ireland, including by 
figures such as de Valera and Sean Lemass. Lemass in particular was, as we 
have seen, concerned with questions of national planning and the establishment 
of forms of agreement between the major social actors.
The consciousness on the part of the Irish government that a new type of 
economic order was called for was being mirrored elsewhere in Europe at that 
time. Governments, conscious that collective bargaining, whilst popular with
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unions, was doing little to foster continued expansion in the wider economy, 
sought to limit its scope either by going down the road to neo-corporatism or by 
jettisoning the commitment to full employment and re-introducing market 
discipline. During the 1970s indeed, it became something of a trend for 
European governments to preside over the evolution of corporatist structures 
within the framework of liberal democratic institutions.
Neo-corporatism is perhaps best described as a more voluntary approach to 
collective strategy making than its predecessor. The state seeks to co-opt the 
leadership o f social interest groups into policy formation in return for a 
commitment from these groups that they will seek to 'deliver' their respective 
constituencies when it comes to implementing agreed policies. There are, 
however, two variants of neo-corporatism which may be discerned when 
discussion corporate state involvement in industrial relations.
• The legislative variant in which the state defines and controls the operations 
of corporate bodies.
• The social contract in which the state establishes corporate structures in the 
context of bargained voluntary agreement and joint commitment to embody
32the 'common purpose' in new institutions and reforms.
Bill Roche points out that the traditions o f Anglo-Irish industrial relations are 
such that if  the government were to resort to regulatory laws, this would be 
perceived by unions as an act of hostility to organised labour and antipathy to 
'common purpose' or 'social partnership'. For this reason, Irish efforts at neo­
corporatism have tended to place a continuing importance on the voluntary 
nature of the institutions and negotiations, albeit making threats to legislate if  it 
was felt this would heighten co-operation.
The first steps in this Irish version of neo-corporatism were made in 1946 when 
the Labour Court was established. This first phase was a long one and was 
characterised by the consolidation of the role of the Labour Court through a
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number of measures. As early as 1948, de Valera spoke of the need for a 
national agreement on pay to be negotiated through the Labour Court, and 
although the defended the voluntary principle on which the court had been 
established, he indicated that the government would impose a statutory norm if 
an agreement could not be found through Labour Court co-ordinated bargaining. 
There was, thus, the establishment of a 'threat-response' pattern o f state 
influence over collective bargaining which came to be something of a norm up to 
the 1970s. Although it may appear a somewhat negative negotiating tactic, the 
reality is that its strongest point was the fact that it managed to consolidate the 
place of the Labour Court as an honest broker in the field o f pay determination.
As the years passed, however, we have seen that there was a growing mood in 
Ireland and elsewhere in Europe in favour of state planning of the economy, and 
thus a desire for institutions which would advance that objective. Consequently, 
from the 1960s onwards, the unions were enticed into consultative bodies. As 
has already been indicated, there was a natural hostility towards corporatist 
arrangements on the part of most of the traditional parties in Irish industrial 
relations. However, they did see the possibilities stemming from national 
economic development, and they were thus willing to trust the state to pass on to 
them the profits accruing from their co-operation and restraint. They were, in 
addition, convinced to give up their commitment to free collective bargaining 
because of the proportion of the national product, and thus the social wage, 
determined by government taxation and expenditure and which were increasing 
during the decades of growth.
Considerable disagreement exists over whether Ireland has followed a corporatist 
or a voluntarist agenda, and we shall see later what the view from the Irish 
Congress of Trades Unions is on that question. Dr Gary Murphy o f the Dublin 
City University Business School has put forward the view that it is corporatist, 
and indeed he has developed this view in a working paper.34 He attributes the 
moves towards such a change to the particular vision and work of Sean Lemass 
who was engaged in a long-running internal battle within Fianna Fail to arrive at
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a significant change in the party's economic thinking. It is worth pointing out 
here that Lemass' particular experience in economic matters had doubtless 
fuelled his desire to try a policy which differed from the traditional protectionism 
which was the hallmark of Fianna Fail economic policy at that time. During the 
Emergency -  the euphemism used in Ireland to describe the World War II period, 
Lemass had been in charge of supplies. The difficulties o f the period, with 
Ireland's traditional import markets being closed off, meant an intensive 
programme of rationing and the compulsory introduction of tillage farming on all 
available and suitable land. This provided Lemass with valuable experience in 
the implementation of a policy in the national interest, although clearly many 
countries, regardless of their divisions, have had to do this at different points in 
their history.
Lemass was an early convert to Keynesianism in the post-war period during 
which it gained rapid ground throughout Europe. However, he was one of very 
few in a party which was rigid in its deflationist and, within the confines of 
protectionism, market driven approach. The particular quandary Lemass faced 
was that although he was heir apparent in Fianna Fail, he could neither afford to 
let those with whom he profoundly disagreed have free reign over economic 
policy, nor be seen to oppose them too vigorously lest he fatally compromise his 
own position in the party. Consequently, when Fianna Fail was out of office 
during the period of the first Inter-Party government in 1948-51. he opposed the 
somewhat more liberal policies of the new administration, including the setting 
up of the Industrial Development Authority, with all his vigour. By Fianna 
Fail's return to power in 1951, he needed to see some agitation within the 
Parliamentary Party. This arose through a number of factors. Scan MacEntee 
was appointed Minister for Finance and he immediately set about placing the 
party back on its traditional economic footing, ably assisted by the conservative 
Secretary of the Department of Finance, J.J. McElligott. In opposition, Fine 
Gael proved weak and it was thus up to Lemass' allies within Fianna Fail to 
provide the opposition to this conventional economic thinking on the part o f the 
dominant wing of Fianna Fail. In January 1953, a meeting of the Parliamentary
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Party devoted its entire attention to issues of economic policy. During the 
discussion, de Valera explained that the party's policy was to pay its way and 
that anything over and beyond this could only be achieved through additional 
taxation. Furthermore, the Taoiseach insisted that increased production from the 
land was the remedy for most of the country's problems. Needless to say, this 
did not prove satisfactory to the Lemass wing who continued to call for reform, 
and within six months, twenty deputies put a motion to the parliamentary party 
declaring that:
"The party is o f the opinion that in present circumstances a policy of financial austerity is no longer 
justified and requests the government to frame a progressive policy suited to the altered situation, 
with a view especially to putting an end to the undue restriction o f credit by the banks, and making 
low interest loans available for farmers and house purchasers."35
However, the matter was either fudged or simply repressed. It dragged on over 
several months, and finally in January 1954 it was discussed again. The minutes 
of this meeting record simply that:
"after a number of teachtai had contributed to the debate, the acting minister for Finance, 
Proinsias MacAogain (Frank Aiken), replied and An Taoiseach made a comprehensive statement 
on the party's financial and economic policy. Deputy Carter withdrew the motion on behalf o f the
teachtai who had signed it."36
Lemass and his allies were, in fact, deeply influenced by the developments they 
saw elsewhere in Europe where states were urging more co-operation between 
the different economic actors in the interest of the state and its overall economic 
development. Lemass realised that for this to happen it was necessary for the 
government to be the hegemonic player in the administrative system; he also 
held it in the highest importance that he be at the head of such a system. In order 
to do this, Lemass needed a long-term economic strategy that would return 
Fianna Fail to power in 1957 and improve the economic fortunes o f the country. 
He saw it as necessary to establish more concrete arrangements between the 
government and the various actors in the economy, such as the employers and 
unions. Furthermore, Lemass, although he was firmly of the belief that political 
interests should lead in the country, bemoaned the lack of independent thinking
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being done within the civil service. It was ultimately a fortuitous meeting of 
minds between the new Minister for Finance (Lemass) and the young Secretary 
of the Department (T.K. Whitaker) that provided the documentary framework for 
a change in Irish economic policy in 1958 with the publication o f  Economic 
Development.
The chronological order o f the developing economic relationships in the country 
in the years following is somewhat roundabout. Despite the relative importance 
o f agriculture in the Irish economy and the desirability o f improving relationships 
with the farming lobby, the presence of a coercive Minister for Agriculture in 
Paddy Smith -  even after Lemass became Taoiseach -  made establishing a 
fruitful relationship with them difficult. Instead, it was in the relationship 
between itself, the employers and the unions that the government made the first 
real progress. For Murphy, the crucial moment in the relationship between these 
three came with the setting up of the Committee on Industrial Organisation in 
1961. This step could have been considerably less important had the ICTU been 
left out, as was the initial intention. However, having had to ask to be included, 
Congress was. Garret Fitzgerald, who was then acting as an advisor to the 
Federation of Irish Industries (FII), maintained that it was only ever due to an 
oversight that the unions were omitted.
"They proved to be the most constructive partners. Indeed, insofar as tensions existed within the 
committee they proved -  as I had anticipated -  to be between the Department of Industry and 
Commerce on the one hand and the rest o f us, with Finance, the CII and ICTU endeavouring as a 
troika to nudge that department into psychological acceptance of free trade."37
The impact of the CIO lay in its success in making the various social partners 
aware of the need for reforms in order to face the considerable challenges ahead. 
It pointed out the inadequacies o f industry to cope with the transition from a 
protective framework to an interdependent economy Its findings led all parties 
involved to the recognition that there could be no return to the former 
protectionist position and they resolved to adopt a trilateral approach in their 
attempt to revolutionise the Irish economy in the light of new free trade
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conditions. A consensus developed that it was better to face the future as a 
member of an economic alliance rather than as an isolated economy and 
economic growth should be sought through an export-led initiative.
The extent to which this new outlook was not just confined to the corridors o f the 
CIO was apparent in the statements made by individual participants, such as 
John Conroy, General President of the Irish Transport and General Workers' 
Union who pointed out that:
"freer trade is coming and unless we all realise this and prepare we will find that every workshop 
and factory not fully and efficiently equipped will cease to produce to economic requirements and 
all the employees will find themselves unemployed."38
It was a remarkably frank statement for a union leader of his generation to make, 
but it marked the new sense of realism which abounded in Ireland in the period 
after the economic shift of 1958-9. Such statements also grew out of determined 
coaching on the part of Lemass and the government, urging acceptance by the 
unions that changes were necessary. What is of particular interest is that, in his 
contacts with the social partners, the particular issue which Lemass stressed was 
Ireland's application to join the then European Economic Community. He placed 
great importance on the fact that the traditionally privileged trading relationship 
with Britain was coming to an end and that business must assume that tariffs 
would come to an end by 1970. As it happened, the initial EEC application was 
unsuccessfully because of General de Gaulle's refusal to admit the UK, however 
Lemass' views regarding the wider world and economic progress stood 
nonetheless, and, as we have seen, were broadly speaking successful in 
modifying the business culture in the country. Indeed, Murphy points out that 
by the early-1960s, Europe was the goal of the majority of politicians and
i q
interest groups and even the Catholic Church was voicing no overt protest.
Thus, there was a progressive change in the industrial relations framework in 
Ireland. It is worth reminding ourselves here though that the 1960s was not all 
sweetness and light as regards the relationship between the trade unions and the
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interlocutors. During the 1960s, there was a greatly increased volume of 
industrial unrest, inflation rose steadily as unprecedented gains were achieved 
through decentralised bargaining. Meanwhile, the government continued to 
pledge its support for the principle of the auxiliary state and free collective 
bargaining. However, it had continued to extend its influence through moral 
persuasion and threats to legislate. Congress moved in a similar direction by 
stating that the objectives of trade unionism would require action in the political 
and legislative spheres, and its leadership sought to gain support for a concerted 
pay policy.
During the 1970s, attempts were made to put in place a more corporatist 
structure to regulate the relationship between Ireland's employers and unions. 
This was done against the background of the negotiation of a series o f central 
agreements -  nine between 1970 and 1980 -  concerning pay restraint and the 
consequent control of inflation. Four of the agreements negotiated between 1971 
and 1980 were concluded on a bipartite basis and the other four on a tripartite 
one. Bill Roche points out that opposition to a more formalised, corporatist style 
approach was based on a prevailing view within the trade union movement that 
the greatest gains were still likely to be achieved by the freest possible form of 
bargaining, and that if  social partnership was to be envisaged, a higher price 
should be charged that the restraint which the unions were showing in the 
virtually annual negotiations on pay issues.40
There were moves towards a more structured approach in the late-1970s, with a 
very particular role being played by sub-committees of the Employer-Labour 
Conference who were involved in monitoring and administrative functions. They 
adopted a role of 'non-adversary inquiry' on pay issues for the first time, an 
indication of the amount of progress which had been made since the earlier 
attempts at bipartite and tripartite negotiations a decade earlier. However, 
towards the end of the 1970s, the negotiations on agreements became steadily 
more difficult, despite efforts by the Fianna Fail government elected in 1977 to 
encourage matters through the setting up of a Department of Economic Planning
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and Development. By 1979 matters were critical, despite the best efforts by 
trade union leaders to keep them on the rails. The General Secretary of the ICTU 
announced a new programme of 'National Understandings' flanked by 
government leaders. However, the pressures from PAYE workers arguing for 
greater tax concessions were becoming too great, and at a Special Delegate 
Conference of Congress, the whole system temporarily collapsed, only to be 
revived, in characteristic fashion, by a coercive response from the government 
threatening to impose a 7% limit to pay increases.41
By 1981, though, the pressures were becoming too great for the existing 
structure o f agreements and partnership to survive. From the point o f view of 
employers, excessive wage rises fuelled inflation and accelerated 
unemployment. Unions, on the other hand, felt that unemployment was a 
reflection, more than anything else, of deficient demand and should be 
addressed through expansionary policies. In addition, the lack of any durable 
affinity between the various trade unions and the parties to government also 
meant that there was little formal backup in national politics to support the 
standpoint of the unions and lend it further strength. Moreover, despite 
commitments given regarding the importance of job creation, unemployment 
continued to grow, thus indicating that in that regard at least, partnership was 
failing. All of these factors contributed to the failure of the existing model by 
1981.42
During the early- to mid-1980s, there was a return to decentralised bargaining 
during which workers achieved real improvements in pay, albeit against a 
backdrop of increasing inflation and unemployment. This disengagement on the 
part o f all parties -  and the state in particular -  represented a return to the default 
position in Irish industrial relations, since the system had always been based on 
voluntarist principles. In addition, the crisis in the state o f the public finances 
during the 1980s left the state little margin for conceding large scale pay 
concessions in the public sector, whatever the case in the private sector. The 
idea of a national agreement which was more beneficial to private sector workers
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than their public sector counterparts was inconceivable, and this thus served to 
reinforce the reserve of the government during that period.
By 1987, when Fianna Fail were returned to government to replace the Fine 
Gael/Labour coalition, the country was in a very serious economic state. 
Unemployment was soaring, there was high inflation, and emigration had again 
reached crisis levels. Charles Haughey's return to power was accompanied by a 
commitment to the idea of national recovery, and he encountered a trade union 
movement which was willing to do business with his government.
The Irish approach based on the principle o f social partnership between the 
employers, trade unions and government -  as the primary groups -  has gained in 
standing in the twelve years of its existence in its present form. It is, however, 
an approach which is likely to surprise those who recall the traditionally 
adversarial nature of the relationship between the different players in the Irish 
industrial relations system. In an attempt to gain a better appreciation of the 
rationale behind the Irish model of partnership, I carried out an interview with 
Paula Carey, the research officer with the Irish Congress o f Trade Unions. The 
agreed transcript of that conversation now follows:
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Interview with Paula Carey, Irish Congress o f Trade Unions 
ICTU Head Office, Raglan Road, Dublin 4
1. We appear to have arrived at a point in Irish industrial relations where the 
great bulk o f the unions are involved in a 'don't rock the boat' consensus with 
the government and employers. How have we got there?
The Irish trade union movement has learned the hard lessons o f  the 1980s, as 
has the rest o f  Irish society. We have had to ask the question, 'how effective is 
rocking the boat'? Irish trade unions have emerged from  the classical British 
model o f  trade unionism, which is a confrontational model. In the past, this 
legacy was translated by the traditional reliance on collective bargaining. 
Although collective bargaining often brought about impressive wage increases, 
during the 1980s it was in fact accompanied by a real drop in living standards as 
a result o f  rising inflation. Between 1980 and 1987, in the absence o f  any form  
o f  national agreement or understanding, living standards dropped by some 20%. 
In addition, the Irish trade unions were observing developments elsewhere. In 
particular, looking towards the UK, the saw the massive drop in influence 
suffered by the British trade unions as a result o f  the sweeping legislative 
measures introduced by the Thatcher government. The movement looked fo r  
models in order to plan its future course o f  action. It saw in the models o f  a 
number o f  northern European countries models which it fe lt it could learn from. 
In particular, the Nordic countries seemed to propose a model fo r  finding  
solutions which benefited not only their members but the economy in general. 
Consequently, the ICTU saw the possibility for attempting such an approach in 
Ireland. There are many specific factors in the Irish case. Since a consensual 
model was not part o f  the Irish industrial relations inertia, much work was 
required o f  Congress in order to garner support from among the unions 
themselves.
2. How do we assess the importance of voluntary bodies i.e. the Labour Court 
and policy-discussion bodies in laying the groundwork for the current model?
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It is important to note that every body is a product o f  its time, ju s t as every 
agreement is also a product o f  its time. The Irish voluntarist system has worked 
extremely well, not least because o f  the high level o f  respect fo r  the Labour 
Court which exists within the industrial relations framework. However, we must 
set any observations regarding bodies in period. In the 1980s when there was a 
large amount o f  conflict, the Labour Court was jamming up with the backlog o f  
cases being brought to its attention. This was one o f  the factors which led to the 
establishment o f  the Labour Relations Commission, with its new set o f  rules 
including a mandatory four week cooling off/initial mediation period before 
referral to the Labour Court.
The Employer Labour Conference was a very useful structure during the 1970s 
and early-1980s fo r  keeping an eye on parity between public and private sector 
pay fo r example. However again, it is vital to assess the importance o f  any one 
particular body against the background o f  the particular circumstances 
pertaining during the period in question.
3. Does the ICTU see Ireland as being engaged in a corporatist or voluntarist 
industrial relations environment?
There is still a healthy respect within the trade union movement fo r  the 
voluntarist nature o f  Irish industrial relations. The extent to which this question 
arises and remains a major talking point may be seen in the debate surrounding 
trade union recognition in Ireland. Corporatism requires an amount o f  
legislation in order to function, and with the discussion o f  trade union 
recognition in Ireland, it is inevitable that resorting to legislation in order to 
enshrine the current industrial relations framework would involve raising the 
question o f  union de-recognition in addition to union recognition. This situation 
would not necessarily be more advantageous to the unions. Nonetheless, 
Ireland is moving in the direction o f  corporatist arrangements, and there is the 
likelihood o f  some form o f statutory regulation in the years ahead.
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The Irish partnership model has evolved in an ad hoc manner rather than in a 
structured manner as is the case in continental corporatist models. Unions make 
a strategic decision to enter into partnership over a defined period, 
understanding that i f  the conditions offered to them when a new partnership is 
being negotiated are not to their satisfaction, they can withdraw. Ireland is 
heavily influenced, in business terms, by the United States and consequently it is 
important that the structures put in place be flexible enough to adapt to changes 
in the global economy which the US dominates. The works councils, which are 
so much a part o f  the German system o f  corporatism have proved to be an 
inflexible structure and would thus be unattractive in the Irish workplace. In 
addition, such a structure o f  workplace negotiation is not well embedded in the 
Irish industrial relations system. Although a system o f  works councils may 
eventually be put in place in Ireland as part o f  the consolidation o f  partnership, 
these would need to be flexible enough to deal with the reality o f  the Irish 
economy.
Ireland may be moving towards something o f  a corporatist model, however the 
intention is that this would be flexible corporatism.
4. Is there still a perceptible difference in the attitudes towards partnership of the 
British-based unions? What is it?
There are certain unions which are vocal in their opposition to the partnership 
model, such as the ATGWU and MSF in particular. A certain number o f  their 
arguments are perfectly valid, and indeed it would be positively unhealthy i f  the 
renewed participation o f  the unions in a partnership were to occur without any 
dissent or discussion. However, sometimes the unions which oppose partnership 
on the grounds that particular aspects o f  the previous accord had not been 
fulfilled or its inadequacy in satisfying their desire for a larger pay increase, 
miss the big picture regarding the broader achievements o f  the partnership 
approach.
81
The ICTU seeks a mandate to negotiate a new partnership agreement at a special 
delegate conference, and this process affords all affiliated unions the 
opportunity to engage in a genuine debate on the proposal. A particular 
difficulty with the British-based unions is that many o f  them have their 
headquarters in Belfast and a large membership in Northern Ireland as opposed 
to in the Republic. Since the partnership agreements apply to the Republic only, 
it was necessary to change the ICTU constitution in order to prevent Northern 
Ireland members from  having a say in an agreement which did not concern them.
5. Does the ICTU foresee a return to a freer form of collective bargaining or 
more conflictive industrial relations in the future?
The ICTU has worked hard in order to put in place a consensus-based system. It 
has set to stress the advantages o f  a genuine spirit o f  partnership between 
employers and unions through the setting up o f  the PACT scheme, operating in 
eight regions and comprising representatives o f  the employers and the unions 
from  eight companies in each region which have succeeded in achieving a stable 
form  o f  partnership within their company. However, despite the efforts made to 
promote the partnership model, the reality is that it is still not fully embedded in 
Irish society.
Abandoning partnership would be difficult after the progress that has been made. 
However there is a range o f  problems. The lynchpin o f  each partnership 
agreement is the pay deal. This has been heavily bolstered by tax reforms up to 
now. However, a serious question arises over the amount o f  scope which 
remains fo r  further tax cuts in the years ahead. The only way that a new 
agreement could offer similarly attractive benefits to workers would be i f  the pay  
deal came bolstered by some form o f profit sharing or employee stakeholding in 
firms. There is also the need to further advance the question o f  union 
recognition.
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It is clear then that the Irish trade unions are quite specific in their analysis of the 
prevailing economic order. Their vision is characterised by a consciousness of 
the economic history of the country in the period since independence and also of 
the realities of the global -  and particularly American-dominated -  economy at 
the present time. This consciousness is hardly surprising. Ireland is a small 
society, and the spatial distance between those formulating policy and those at 
the receiving end of it is never too great. Free collective bargaining which results 
in large pay increases for some whilst making the economy less competitive for 
the majority and thus driving away investment, will not go unnoticed. The Irish 
have a history as regards making conscious economic decisions which take 
account of the country's economic history. This was, after all, the case with 
T.K. Whittaker's Economic Development, which the political élite received 
virtually without demur in the aftermath of the economic catastrophe of the 
1950s. It is, however, interesting to come across such a frank admission as was 
provided by Paula Carey that the Irish trade union movement gives special 
consideration to the standpoint of major US-based corporations in formulating its 
approach to subjects raised in partnership negotiations. Moreover, the fact that 
the Irish trade union movement was concerned by the legislation it saw being 
enacted in Britain indicates the end to which fear o f the government's options in 
the event of encountering an uncooperative trade union movement had become 
ingrained over the development of the voluntarist system in Irish industrial 
relations.
Ferdinand von Prondzynski has identified a number of important facets o f Irish 
trade unionism and industrial relations more generally which are useful pointers 
to the evolving but dominant influences in the way Irish society looks at 
politically divisive economic issues. First and foremost, he points to corporatist 
tendencies43 which he attempts to associate with Roman Catholic teaching and 
traditions which existed in continental models such as Franco’s Spain or 
Salazar’s Portugal. He also concludes, however, that Irish industrial relations 
may be characterised as voluntaristic, antagonistic, non-participative -  in the 
sense that ordinary workers play little or no role in general, and they are only
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represented at management level through worker directors in the semi-state 
sector -, centralised, non-flexible -  a point with which I must disagree -, and 
institutionalised. Von Prondzynski does however draw particular attention to the 
role played by what he terms 'institutions of the middle ground', such as the 
Labour Court and Labour Relations Commission. With reference to the Labour 
Court -  although I am sure this could be applied more generally -  he summarises 
its role as being one of using its good offices to persuade and cajole parties in 
dispute in order to achieve a peaceful settlement.
Von Prondzynski acknowledges the role played by these institutions, however 
he also points to an interesting phenomenon whereby there can be an excessive 
reliance on these institutions to produce solutions and their failure to do so can 
leave the parties somewhat lost for answers themselves, as in the case o f the 
1991 ESB strike.
The obvious risks associated with such a distancing from traditional adversarial 
trade unionism were also addressed by the senior official of the Services 
Industrial Professional and Technical Union (SIPTU), Des Geraghty in an artice 
in the Irish Times on the fiftieth anniversary of the death of Jim Larkin. 
Geraghty grappled with the difficult task of asserting that today’s SIPTU was 
remaining loyal to the legacy of the father of organised Irish trade unionism. 
Geraghty pointed out that Larkin’s trade unionism:
“had a lot in common with the great industrial movements of the early years of this century in 
Britain, the United States, Russia and central Europe where, armed with a new creed of socialism, 
Bolshevism and militant syndicalism, labour leaders began to challenge the older and more 
conservative craft unions as well as the exploitation of employers.”44
Larkin’s trade unionism was thus one of conflict, whereby the movement fought 
long and high-profile battles to defend the rights o f its members. Political and 
industrial action were combined and new patterns o f striking such as going out in 
sympathy and the boycott of “tainted goods” - the produce of scab labour. There
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may be little apparent connection between the form of militancy promoted by 
Jim Larkin and today’s Irish trade union movement. However for Des Geraghty:
“He bequeathed that sense of vision which allows the modern trade union movement to move 
beyond a defensive pay bargaining agenda to seek a new role for workers in the 21st century 
w orkplace.... Larkin organised labour and bargained for its price. Our labour movement now  
bargains about everything which determines the quality of life. It’s a qualitative change, a 
ripening of the seed sown by Larkin and his peers. The modern trade union movement uses 
collective intelligence more than collective muscle, but demands recognition of workers as full,
intelligent human beings.”45
That sums up the change which has arisen as regards the mainstream Irish trade 
union movement today. Whether Geraghty really can claim the right to be 
considered as an inheritor of Jim Larkin’s legacy is, in my view, very dubious. 
It is clear that on a day to day basis, SIPTU (as the clear descendent o f Larkin’s 
unions) is now far removed from wage conflict and far more concerned with 
reaching a consensus than were the trade unionists of former times. O f course, 
the clear argument exists that were it not for the tougher battles of that period, 
today’s trade unionists would not be in a position to focus on newer issues and 
priorities. However, it is clear that the agenda has moved on and is now likely to 
look much more closely at issues such as work organisation, employee 
participation in decisions, participation of women etc... Indeed, an issue which 
is exercising the minds of the trade union movement to a particular extent at the 
moment is that of the minimum wage.
3.5 France and Social Partnership: unwilling or untrustworthy partners?
In France, we know that this form of partnership has not been in evidence. But 
how do we go about explaining this? Essentially, the French trade union 
movement has been dogged by a number of persistent problems. Mirroring the 
broader divisions in society, it is sharply divided along political lines and is thus 
faced with major difficulties in terms of effectively acting in concert. It is also 
numerically very weak and appears almost incapable o f attracting larger 
numbers, particularly in the private sector where it is, in many cases,
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practically absent. Janine Goetschy and Patrick Rozenblatt46 point out that 
France loses relatively few days due to stoppages when compared with Italy or 
English-speaking countries. However, what the authors do concede is that 
where strikes do take place in France, they tend to involve large numbers of 
workers reflecting a CGT and Communist Party tactic of mass demonstration 
strikes to influence aspects of the political agenda.
John Ardagh reports that only 15% of the French labour force is unionised, a 
figure which compares with 51% in Britain and 38% in Germany.47 The 
strengths o f the major individual unions are similarly weak as a consequence. 
The largest single French trade union is the communist controlled Confédération 
Générale du Travail which can accurately lay claim to some 900,000 members, 
although it attempts to claim many more. It is traditionally the most hard-line of 
the French trade unions and is particularly favourable to large scale strikes and 
protest movements. The main rival of the CGT is the Socialist Confédération 
française démocratique du travail which has some 800,000 members. Like its 
larger rival, it is a revolutionary union in that it is dedicated to the overthrow of 
capitalism, however as we shall see from our case study, it has been adopting a 
much more conciliatory approach over recent years. As the CFDT has 
moderated its approach, there has been evidence, again addressed in the case 
study, o f a more radical position being adopted by the third union force in 
France, Force Ouvrière, traditionally seen as a more moderate pair o f hands in 
the French trade union environment. These are the three major French trade 
union federations however they have a range of problems of their own to deal 
with.
The CGT is a large and powerful force however there is a predictability in its 
approach which deprives it of something of the element of surprise. It always 
comes parti pris in the sense that it has tended to slavishly adhere to the 
Communist Party line. Thus, in times past when the party attempted to justify 
Soviet policy in Poland or Afghanistan, the CGT dutifully rowed in. Given such 
close ties between the CGT and the Communists, there appears to be little to be
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gained from attempts to convince the union to adopt its own independent stance 
should it be accommodated in any formal conciliation structure. The CGT's 
primary strength lies in nationalised industries and also in the large-scale blue 
collar sector, i.e. in heavy industry.
The CFDT is traditionally more white collar than the CGT, and has always been 
seen as somewhat more moderate. However, as I stated above, it is a 
revolutionary union in the sense that it calls for the overthrow of capitalism, and 
as such as distinctive from a number o f other union federations which its 
members may well have been attracted to join. The CFDT’s membership grew 
consistently until 1976 when it stood at over 800,000 members at which point it 
experienced a significant off having reached about 600,000 at the end o f the 
1980s. Over the course of the 1990s, the CFDT may be said to have had some 
difficulty finding the appropriate course of action to take on a number of the 
major questions which have concerned the wider trade union movement. Thus, 
in the case of the December 1995 social movement, its General Secretary Nicole 
Notât was conspicuous in her lack of support for the movement and was, 
consequently, sharply criticised by her counterparts in other federations. Given 
the widespread popular support for the 1995 strikes, it can only be assumed that 
Notât and her colleagues called the situation badly and all in all, the episode was 
a rather bruising one for the CFDT.
Force Ouvrière's pedigree differs significantly from the two union's discussed so 
far. It is the result of a split in the CGT in 1948 and as a result its identity has 
tended to betray the bad feeling existing between the two unions since then. FO 
has never been a revolutionary trade union, and this fact is expressed through a 
marked anti-Communist stance and a belief in negotiation with the government 
in order to achieve its aims. This standpoint was most strongly articulated and 
indeed reinforced by the union's long-serving general secretary André Bergeron 
who, in addition to opposing the use of the strike weapon save as a last resort 
and believing in concerted negotiation with the government, also believed that 
trade unions should insist on remaining independent from their political masters.
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The problem with all of this is of course that in a trade union environment such 
as France's, it will take more than a benevolent stance on the part o f one trade 
union to transform the manner in which business is transacted with the state. 
Furthermore, faced with a more conciliatory approach on the part of the CFDT, 
FO with its current general secretary general Marc Blondel has itself appeared to 
harden its stance, playing a full part in the 1995 social movement and joining in 
the chorus of criticism of Nicole Notât.
Another reasonably important trade union in France is the Confédération 
française des travailleurs chrétiens. This union is Catholic in its origins and 
outlook, and was formed in 1964 as a breakaway group from the CFDT, with 
whose policy of secularisation it disagreed. The CTFC tends to view strike 
action as something which must be envisaged only as a last resort, and it derives 
most of its inspiration from the social doctrine of the Catholic Church 49
One of the primary factors affecting the amount of influence that the trade union 
sector in France can wield is that of the fragmentation and dissension within its 
ranks. As a result of the differences in outlook o f the major unions which I 
outlined above, finding common ground between them on any kind o f long term 
goal or objective is difficult if not impossible. This reality comes against the 
background of what Vincent Wright has referred to as the 'highly individualised, 
atomised and anomic' society of France whereby belonging to large groups is 
seen as depriving an individual of his individuality.50 I f  this explains the low 
levels of unionisation seen in France, it also provides us with a framework for 
appreciating why unions with differing origins, often born of a succession of 
splits, have been so reluctant to co-ordinate their activities on anything other 
than the sporadic national protest movements over issues of government policy 
which provoked debate on the broader political level as well as among the 
unions. The entrenched divisions among the trade unions have had a knock-on 
effect on the attitude of the authorities towards them. Faced with trade unions 
who could not bring themselves to work together and overcome their differences 
in the interests of their members, the government knew that any effort to work
with the trade unions on an ongoing basis would be something of a wild goose 
chase since establishing common ground would prove virtually impossible.
There is also the perception of the trade unions, as with other pressure groups in 
French society, as defenders of acquired privileges which hinder attempts at 
'progress' on the part of the state. The Fourth Republic was referred to as le 
régime des intérêts as a result o f its instability and perceived inability to stand up 
to the demands of the interest groups. Since one of the founding principles o f the 
Fifth Republic is that it should be strong enough to withstand the very pressures 
which hindered the government of its predecessor, it follows that the state views 
the gap between it and the interest group as unbridgeable, and indeed as a 
challenge to repress the latter.
In his previously cited book, Vincent Wright provides an overview of a number 
of theories which have been advanced in a bid to explain the nature o f relations 
between the State and the pressure groups under the Fifth French Republic. The 
first model presented is the domination-crisis model, largely associated with 
Stanley Hoffman and Michel Crozier, and anchored in an analysis o f French 
attitudes towards authority and change. A number o f the points made echo those 
which I have put forward myself above. Specifically, in an individualised 
society such as France, there is a tendency towards fragmentation and a hostility 
towards any genuine effort towards dialogue and fruitful interdependence. Each 
individual group exists solely for the defence of its own interests and its members 
and defends its rights against others as well as against the state in any bids it 
should make to challenge these.
On the reverse side, the state authorities view the groups as 'delinquent 
communities' or 'subservient clients' whose normal servility in the face of 
authority allows them to be treated with authoritarianism and indeed contempt. 
However, there is a basic realisation on the part o f the state that many of the 
traditional rights of the pressure groups must ultimately be respected as a result 
of their potential for revolt should this not be the case.
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This model thus presents an image of a society which, for prolonged periods, 
sees a largely peaceful society avoid the type of conflict which seems to erupt 
sporadically. Where conflict does erupt, it does so as a result of an attempt to 
impose some sort of reform which threatens the acquired rights of the groups in 
question, and without which it appears almost impossible that the reform would 
be pushed through.
Another model presented by Vincent Wright is the endemic and open conflict 
model. This model rests on a number of the assumptions shared by the previous 
model, concerning the authoritarian nature of the state and the fragmentation 
evident among the groups, however it differs from it in the central thrust o f its 
argument. In the parliamentary régime of the Third and Fourth Republic, the 
strength of the assembly made it the natural valve through which the range of 
feelings evident in the country could be expressed and provided a forum through 
which the different interest groups could hope to be heard through the influential 
voices o f those parliamentarians close to them. The greatly diminished role of 
parliament under the Fifth Republic and the development of a disciplined pro- 
govemment coalition has led to a very distinct change in the dominant political 
culture of France which has become more exclusive in its approach towards 
those outside its ranks.
Deprived of their traditional influence within the previous régime, the interest 
groups were forced into various forms of extra-institutional pressure. It is 
possible to place this type of pressure into a number of categories. The first and 
most obvious one is strike action, of which France has tended to see more of 
than countries such as Britain or Ireland. However, although disruptive strike 
action is an effective and popular weapon of protest in France, it is worth noting 
that French strikes only very occasionally prove to be long and drawn out 
matters. The fundamental weakness of the French trade unions means that they 
are rarely able to mobilise their divided ranks for anything more than a short and 
sporadic display of defiance. Consequently, there has tended to be a preference
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for the successful formulae of journées d'action or lighting strikes where normal 
business is severely disrupted or indeed paralysed over a period of a few hours.
Away from the traditional and internationally followed principle of strike action, 
other more radical forms of protest have found their strength anew in 
contemporary France. Farmers have tipped or poured agricultural produce onto 
roadways in protest at imports or low prices, industrial workers such as those in 
the steel industry have taken part in spectacular antics such as burning down 
public buildings, taken managers hostage or even disrupting the Tour de France 
cycle race. Other radical forms of protest have come from quarters such as the 
ecology lobby which has blocked the routes of proposed motorways, closed 
ports to protest at oil pollution and occupied the site o f proposed nuclear plants.
Wright makes the observation that many of the better organised and more 
threatened pressure groups in France today present two very distinctive outward 
images. On the one hand they have their moderate spokespersons whose job it is 
to negotiate with the government and other authorities, and their more militant 
members or enragés who take part in the extra-institutional forms of protest 
which have so often been a feature of the Fifth Republic. Thus, we find that 
commandos or brigades engaged in violent and even paramilitary activities 
against anyone from government ministers and local officials to tax inspectors, 
are also card-carrying members of major, organised federations such as the 
respected farmers union, the FNSEA.51
It is clear that the role of these groups of enragés is largely to press home the 
demands of the major established federations which they are, at least loosely, 
tied to. In a society in which the federations can never be sure of the influence 
they can carry from day to day or year to year, the threat o f violence or street 
demonstrations has often swayed matters in their favour. On the fringes of large 
demonstrations, there are often those more physical elements, frequently 
referred to as casseurs whose actions have led to considerable amounts of 
damage across many French population centres. The street has had its victories.
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In 1986-87, pressure from the train drivers brought about major concessions 
from the government. A series of major demonstrations in 1993 led to the 
withdrawal of the Plan Balladur on the employment conditions facing young 
people, whilst in 1995-6, a similar outcry led to the withdrawal of the Plan 
Juppé on social security reform.
The reality is though that, whilst activity of this nature may be considered a part 
of French political culture, it is not by any means successful on all occasions. 
On some key political issues, the government has held its ground, most 
particularly when faced with OAS violence in the latter stages of the Algerian 
War. Furthermore, the fundamental strength of the government under the Fifth 
Republic, and the increasing exposure of France to both internal and external 
market pressures has meant that, whilst extra-institutional pressures may have 
impacted on policy at particular, defined moments, they have rarely been able to 
prevent the object of their protests becoming a reality over time. Thus it has 
been in the case o f artisanal bakers opposing the sale o f cut-price bread in large 
supermarkets, and small shopkeepers opposing the development o f large 
supermarkets to cite just two obvious examples.
The fact remains though that France is a society in which recourse to mass 
protest and even unrest in a bid to bring about concessions is seen as simply part 
and parcel o f political activity under the Fifth Republic. One of the difficulties 
however about approaches which aim to portray this activity as being simply a 
consequence of the political reality of the country at the present time, is that they 
fail to recognise the much deeper entrenchment of these in French political life 
over a very long period of time. Fundamentally, we must recognise that taking 
to the street, often in an angry crowd, to push forward one's claims goes right 
back to the time of the Revolution of 1789 and that many of those who today 
engage in such practices would trace their legitimacy back to that same period. 
The revolutionary legacy is thus the basis for the belief that the French people 
may take their destiny into their own hands if  and when they so choose, and they 
do this by engaging in protests o f the kind which I have described above.
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3.6 Labour Relations in France
The form of protest that many observers often associate most closely with France 
is strikes. The lay observer might be forgiven for thinking that the French trade 
unions possess an extraordinary ability to mobilise large and often irrepressible 
protests. However, the reality is somewhat different. In this section, I wish to 
take an overview of the French trade unions.
In France, the principle of trade union membership is enshrined in the 
Constitution, as is the right to strike. There is a very high degree of pluralism 
with a variety of unions holding highly divergent positions, all stemming from 
the starting point that labour is not merchandise. Overall, collective bargaining 
has been seen as week in the French industrial relations system. The adversarial 
nature of the relationship between employers and unions has had a direct impact 
on the nature of bargaining undertaken in France. This is despite a significant 
amount o f legislation designed to improve the environment for collective 
bargaining passed between 1919 and 1982. It was only in certain sectors and 
during exceptional periods when the balance shifted in favour of the unions, that 
collective bargaining could be imposed on a reluctant management. Often, 
bargaining arose only when social conflicts became prolonged or broadened, and 
then under considerable pressure from the state. Collective agreements have, 
thus, primarily tended to be end of conflict agreements.
The French state has attempted to set an example for other actors in the economy 
by advocating improvements in industrial relations practices in the country. The 
standard terrain for such initiatives was the very large public sector in which 
levels of unionisation were at their highest and which comprised many of the 
country's largest corporations. As a result company agreements on pay and 
conditions became common in France from the 1950s, and by the 1970s the 
public sector was being used to give a renewed impetus to collective bargaining.
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By the 1980s, some of the larger French industrial groups, still in public hands, 
were among the first to set up European Works Councils of their own accord.
The state obviously plays the dominant role in the introduction of legislation 
aimed at modifying and revising work practices and laws. The newly elected 
socialist government o f the 1980s revised a third o f the existing labour code 
(iCode du Travail) in just over 2 years. The working week was reduced from 40 
to 39 hours a week, whilst the statutory retirement age was lowered from 65 to 
60. There was also an additional week's statutory holiday entitlement. There 
was also the introduction of the Auroux Laws, designed to place collective 
bargaining at company level on a mandatory footing. Another concern of 
legislative measures is the status of interest organisations and collective 
bargaining. The main five union confederations have all obtained representative 
status under the terms of the 1950 Act on labour relations. The right to 
representation implies certain privileges such as the right to participate in multi­
industry and sectoral bargaining, the right to representation within the company 
and the right to nominate candidates for election as délégués du personnel and as 
members of the works council. The right of representation amounts to a legal 
recognition for the confederations which is essential for their participation in the 
various tripartite consultative bodies set up by the government, and for receiving 
financial assistance to train representatives. There are, however, some limits 
placed on the representative status attained by the confederations. The FEN has 
representative status within the education sector only, whilst the CFE-CGC is 
viewed as representative only for white-collar, managerial and supervisory staff.
The main problem in relation to representation concerns the steady erosion o f the 
level of the vote obtained by the recognised union confederations in elections to 
the works councils. The primary victim of what is being seen as a process o f de- 
unionisation is the CGT. Between 1982 and 1996, the proportion o f non-union 
representatives on works councils rose from 18.4% to 26.6%. Indeed, in 1996 
non-union representatives won more votes than representatives of any single 
confederation for the first time ever. There has also been a progressive falling
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off in the percentages o f workplaces with at least one union representative on the 
works council. Between 1989 and 1992 this figure fell from 55% to 50.7%. The 
reasons for this are broadly speaking those which serve to explain the overall 
weakness o f the Irish trade union movement as a whole.
We can cite the high proportion of small to medium-sized family-owned 
companies, the existence of an active anti-union policy on the part o f many 
employers and the resistance to any expansion of union influence within firms, 
conservatism and excessive politicisation within the unions, and a reluctance of 
unions to engage in active recruitment and retention of members in favour of 
mass mobilisation at particular moments. There are other factors too, such as 
the poor relationship between the unions and political parties, thus limiting the 
real influence of trade unions outside periods of specific industrial conflict, and 
the persistent intervention of the state which, through its attempts to compensate 
for the weakness o f the unions, may have reinforced this weakness in its 
eagerness to push through improvements to workers' rights on their behalf.
In looking at collective bargaining in the French context, we are faced with an 
inevitable paradox. Particularly since the 1982 Auroux Law which made 
collective bargaining at company level compulsory, some 92% o f French 
workers have in fact been covered by a collective agreement, the highest rate 
within the OECD.53 However, the actual amount o f real bargaining going on in 
the economy is extremely limited. The main reason for this is the large amount 
of extension which is carried out. Under this practice, an accord reached 
between management and unions in one sector can be extended, by the 
government, to cover other firms or workers in comparable sectors where no 
such accord exists. However desirable it may be to bring more firms and 
workers 'in' on the benefits of collective agreements, here once again we have an 
example of the government undermining the potential benefits o f collective 
bargaining by engaging in the arbitrary extension of an agreement reached in just 
one sector or part o f a sector.
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In addition, the actual regulations governing collective bargaining in France are 
somewhat nebulous. There is, under the 1982 law, a requirement on employers 
and unions to engage in collective bargaining, however there is no time 
constraint imposed on such bargaining and no requirement that agreement be 
reached. In addition, any agreement reached does not have a specific expiry date 
and does not contain a specific clause prohibiting strike action or other forms of 
industrial conflict whilst the agreement remains in force. Consequently, it was 
incumbent of one of the parties to call for renewed talks in order to review the 
agreement. The obvious consequence of this approach is that it tends to trigger 
small-scale conflicts within companies as the unions in particular pursue their 
demand for talks.
There have been a number of developments in the area o f French collective 
bargaining over the past two decades. For some time up to the early-1980s, 
most agreements were central ones. However, the importance o f these accords 
then declined. There was however a very important increase in company-level 
accords. There are a number of reasons for this. The aforementioned Auroux 
Law of 1982 made it compulsory for employers to negotiate with union 
representatives on a yearly basis on issues of pay and working hours. By 1985, 
71% o f firms were negotiating an agreement in this regard. The initial success 
which followed the passing of the 1982 law also served to endear more 
companies to the idea of company level bargaining, particularly since within a 
weakened union environment there was little chance of the accord frustrating the 
management's plans. In addition, employers were entitled to a derogation from 
certain statutory norms regarding overtime and working hours if they negotiated 
a company-level agreement with union representatives. In short, companies 
have found that company-level bargaining actually increases the level of 
flexibility which they enjoy in running their business.
The increase in the number of company-level agreements has not, however, 
undermined the role played by industry-wide agreements. The question is often 
one of the roles played by the different agreements. Over the course of the
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1980s, industry-wide agreements became framework agreements facilitating the 
subsequent company-level bargaining. Thus, whilst the ground rules are set by 
the industry-wide accords, the company agreement adapts these to the 
circumstances of individual corporations. As a result, company agreements 
focus more on management problems than on those of workers.
In theory, the range of workplace institutions in France should provide for a 
coherent framework for consultation and negotiation on pre-determined issues. 
In reality, the low level of unionisation in the country has created a situation 
whereby it is often the same people who sit on the different bodies. The law 
allows for worker representatives in a number of different capacities. The 
longest established function is that of the délégué du personnel, mandatory in 
companies with ten or more employees. Their task is to investigate specific 
complaints by employees regarding wages and working conditions, and to 
monitor compliance with labour legislation and collective agreements. The have 
the power to call in the labour inspectorate should a dispute become severe. The 
délégués du personnel do not represent individual trade unions. They are elected 
by the workers as a whole and must represent the entire workforce. They are 
elected each year and voting by secret ballot takes place over two rounds. In the 
first round, the recognised trade unions put forward their candidates, however 
should these not obtain 50% of the votes cast, a second round is held in which 
any employee, irrespective of trade union membership is entitled to stand.54
The members of the comité d'entreprise or works council serve as a consultative 
body between the company management and its employees. In reality, the 
works council has very few precise powers. It is required to meet on a monthly 
basis and must grant its approval to the employer before he can take certain 
measures regarding changes in individual working schedules and the profit- 
sharing scheme. Otherwise though, their role is basically consultative and they 
are appraised of key decisions to be taken in the company regarding working 
hours, employment terms and changes in staffing levels. The works council 
receives information on such areas as purchasing, sales, production and finance
every four months and an annual report on the general state o f the company. The 
council members are elected in a manner similar to the délégués du personnel.
The délégués syndicaux or trade union representatives have by far the most 
significant role in terms of the decisions which their intervention may lead to. 
Provision for them was made in the aftermath of the upheavals of May 1968 and 
the necessary legislation and agreements were passed in 1969. Trade union 
representatives are entitled to carry out their functions during working hours. In 
addition to this, there are entitled to engage in the collection of membership 
dues, the distribution of leaflets and the organisation of monthly meetings 
outside of working hours. In addition, they have special protection against 
dismissal. They have the exclusive right to engage in collective bargaining with 
the employer. Trade union representatives are significantly more likely to be 
found in larger companies.55
Broadly speaking however, the French system remains characterised by a 
number of specific problems regarding the role played by trade unions in the 
industrial relations system, and the continued existence of a conflict approach as 
opposed to one which seeks or even envisages the arrival at a consensus between 
the employer and the unions. I have outlined above the specific difficulties and 
shortcomings of the French trade unions which have contributed to their 
weakness as a standing force. In addition, faced with this reality, the state has a 
tendency of seeking to extend where possible collective agreements in order to 
secure industrial peace. However laudable this approach is, it does obscure the 
reality that the actual depth of collective bargaining remains unimpressive. For 
as long as French trade unions appear unable to overcome their weakness, and 
the extent of collective bargaining remains limited, there appears to be little 
prospect for any centralised partnership-type agreement at national level.
We saw previously how there is a splintering in French society which may be 
traced back to the period of the 1789 Revolution in terms of the main Left/Right 
cleavage, but which has obviously become more complex over time as the left
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has been split by communist and more social-democratic forces. There has, of 
course, also been a very real splintering on the right between the Gaullists, who 
have evolved as a more secular and interventionist police force, and the more 
Christian Democratic UDF which has been a more centrist if  also liberal -  
political movement.
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter has attempted to build on the theoretical overview provided in 
chapter 2 to offer a historical and analytical overview to the range o f factors 
which have contributed to the existing political cultures in both France and 
Ireland. We have seen that the existence of a political culture which is 
conflictive or consensual is the product of a wide range of factors which are both 
historical and cultural. It is possible to relate much of this to the cleavage which 
dominates politics in a particular society. We have seen how a left/right cleavage 
predominates in France, and how this situation has been reinforced rather than 
lessened in the period since the 1789 Revolution. In Ireland, we have seen how 
the national issue eclipsed economic concerns at the time of independence, and 
how a range of factors since then have contributed to a situation where a climate 
of relative consensus is possible on matters of economic and industrial policy.
A number of contrasts between Ireland and France may be drawn based on the 
evidence supplied in this chapter. In the first instance, there is the very powerful 
role played by the Catholic Church in Ireland whose influence over the people 
was such that it contributed greatly to the stability o f the new state by granting it 
its unquestioning allegiance from the outset. Another important role played by 
the Catholic Church was in its opposition to Communism. This strong point, 
allied with the party's own decision to give way to the national question in 1918, 
had the effect of stunting the growth of the Labour Party as a socialist movement, 
and consequently contributed to the lack of emergence of a left/right cleavage in 
Irish politics. When we compare this to France, we immediately see how the 
anti-clerical attitudes of many French republicans had the effect not only of
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marginalising the French Church, but also of engendering deep divisions 
between liberal Catholics and the strong conservative wing o f French 
Catholicism. The Catholic Church, rather than contributing to the absence of a 
left/right cleavage as in the case of Ireland, actually became caught up in such a 
cleavage in France, and generally associated with the right wing and indeed the 
most reactionary elements in the country.
In terms of the existence of social consensus or social conflict in economic and 
social matters, we have seen in this chapter how there was a concerted effort 
over several decades by the government to impose a sense of the national interest 
on the trade unions and overcome the turbulent labour relations history in the 
country. They have broadly speaking succeeded in doing this, however we have 
seen how given the adversarial history of trade unionism in Ireland, there has 
been a preference for a voluntarist rather than a corporatist approach. In France 
meanwhile, a range of factors such as the existence of conflict in society -  as 
presented by Vincent Wright and others -  and organisational difficulties within 
the trade union movement have meant that little prospect exists o f developing the 
kind of structures seen in Ireland, thus leading us to conclude that period conflict 
seems set to continue in France.
From the data contained in this chapter, this thesis will now go on to present a 
case study, the objective of which is to provide an empirical study based on 
much of what has already been discussed. To analyse the French conflict model 
and the particular relationship between French labour relations and politics, I 
have chosen to focus on the 1995 strikes, or rather social movements, which 
opposed a plan for social security cuts in order to assist France in meeting the so- 
called Maastricht criteria for European Economic and Monetary Union. It is 
essential for me to introduce the European picture here, since I believe strongly 
that the European Union, and the international context more generally, provide 
a unique framework for looking at how two societies address issues which are 
affected by their interaction with the wider world. In the case of the 1995 social 
movements, we get a clear picture o f how the imperative of qualifying for the
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Euro currency, laid down by a right-wing government, caused a large wave of 
protests from the left. These protests both focused on the defence of the status 
quo and also served to highlight the extent to which a gulf can exist between the 
different elements of French society.
In the case of Ireland, we shall see how the negotiation of the Partnership 2000 
deal once again highlighted the extent to which the country's prosperity was seen 
as being dependent on its ability to arrive at a pact which would link pay 
increases to a broader agenda of partnership between government, employers 
and unions. Such an approach builds on a legacy o f such thinking extending 
back several decades, and appears to underline the view that for Ireland to 
become wealthier, the country must both be competitive and present an image of 
economic and industrial stability to the wider world. With a history of high 
unemployment and emigration, the partnership approach has broadly been 
welcomed in Ireland, although we will see that there is a degree of opposition 
from certain sections of the trade union movement.
After the case study, chapter 5 will examine broader evidence regarding the 
relationship between Ireland, France and the European Union and build on the 
notion that the greater left/right division in France and the very different 
economic history of the country leads to considerably more debate regarding the 
whole project than is the case in Ireland. Once again, however, in the case of 
Ireland, we will see that whilst they appear to be convincing reasons regarding 
why a broad consensus has existed regarding the European Union up until now, 
there are reasons why this may not be the case to the same extent in the future.
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The building of the new Europe had been riding on a tide of consensus in both 
France and Ireland virtually since both countries first jumped aboard the 
European train. Everything in France pointed to a country in the driving seat of 
the European process from the 1950s onwards into the 1990s. The reasons for 
this are clear and well documented. Central among them is the Franco-German 
alliance and the role defined for both powers within it. Throughout the entire 
post-war period, and indeed up to the fall o f the Berlin Wall and the east- 
European communist régimes, France was the clear driving force in the 
relationship between the two strongest powers within the EEC. Through the 
particular set of circumstances which prevailed at the end of the second world 
war, France had once again found itself on the “winning side”, thus ensuring 
that it would provide the veneer of respectability for the future Federal Republic 
o f Germany which would itself seek to pin its aspirations firmly to the common 
European mast. France, with its permanent seat on the United Nations Security 
Council and international credibility provided on unlikely front for the new 
Germany at international level. Insofar as French attitudes to Europe were 
concerned, this was no bad thing.
For as long as France seemed to be holding all the political and diplomatic cards 
whilst being, itself, buoyed up by the perennially booming German economy, 
few within its borders were likely to complain about Europe being in conflict 
with France’s own interests. Indeed, they clearly had no reason to. Up until the 
launch of the 1992 project for a Single European Market in 1984, the EEC was a 
rather docile, inoffensive and intergovernmental nebulous, never really going to 
upset anyone, least o f all its leading member states.1 French self-assuredness 
about the protection of the country’s interests was further enhanced during the 
1960s by de Gaulle’s “Non” to Britain’s membership, which again showed that
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the EEC was unlikely to run counter to French interests, save for an unfortunate 
error.
However, during the early part of the 1990s, a number of key events occurred 
which altered the balance significantly in terms of the traditional role occupied 
by France and Germany within what was then becoming the European Union. In 
the first instance, the structure and nature of the union itself had been 
undergoing significant change over the latter part o f the 1980s, as the drive 
towards the completion of the Single Market led the community to take on much 
more of the supranational character for which it has become known today. Under 
the stewardship of Jacques Delors, the European Commission assumed an 
increased role as instigator o f policies and regulator o f their implementation once 
approved by the Council of Ministers or the Council. As such, Europe became 
somewhat less about amicable decisions between its leading statesmen - although 
the major decisions were still made in an intergovernmental fashion - and more 
about the role played by a supranational executive backed up by a Court of 
Justice to assist it in enforcing the rules. As the Single Market became a reality 
and the rules governing the behaviour of individual governments became tighter, 
so the Commission came to be seen more and more as a de facto  European 
government.
The second major change was the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the 
communist regimes throughout eastern Europe. The reunification o f Germany 
was, we know, a source of disquiet to both Britain and France, who had grave 
reservations about a resurgent Germany. Nonetheless, the reunification went 
through, but with it came another very significant change. The formal 
occupation of western Germany by the United States, Britain and France was 
declared at an end even though the scaling down o f troop numbers continues to 
this day. The restoration of German self-confidence which accompanied the 
country’s rehabilitation on the international stage marked the end of France’s 
assured domination of the Franco-German alliance. The reality was further 
rammed home in France by the depth of the recession to which the economy sunk
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during the early to mid-1990s whilst Germany largely escaped the immediate 
impact of the downturn.
The other major change which occurred and which is related to the first point I 
made earlier, concerns the change in the perspective of closer European unity as 
contained in the Maastricht Treaty. Whereas the benefits o f the Single Market 
were for the great majority an extension of the logical benefits o f being part of 
Europe in the first place, the Maastricht Treaty envisaged a number o f proposals 
where clearly went much further than the mere creation o f transnational 
structures for the greater good of all. It proposed a reduction of national 
sovereignty insofar as the drive towards economic and monetary union was 
concerned.
It is important to consider here the implications o f all o f this for France. In 
addition to the previous reservation with which France might be associated - 
namely the loss o f its traditional interventionist role in economic matters - there 
is also the necessary consideration of the role o f Germany, since it is the 
Deutschemark which will form approximately 30% of the new European 
currency. The convergence criteria for Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) 
have had particular effects for France. In order to satisfy the criteria set down for 
convergence and made particularly strict at the behest o f Germany, France found 
itself obliged to reduce its budget deficits, a requirement which led the 
reshuffled government o f Prime Minister Alain Juppé to bring in an austerity 
package known as the Plan Juppé in late October 1995.
This move caused one of the biggest waves of social protest to be seen in France 
for many years, and served as a potent symptom of the ideological problems 
posed for the country by a drive towards a liberal economic framework which 
represented a major break with the traditions of French economic management. 
France, as already pointed out, has long been a bastion of economic 
interventionism. In the aftermath of the second world war, the country engaged 
in a prolonged period of economic planning. At the outset, this was aimed at
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rebuilding a country languishing in its wartime ruins. However, the planning 
process continued as a major plank in French policy right up to the late 1960s 
and early 1970s. It served as the backdrop for the period known in France as les 
trente glorieuses, the thirty glorious years o f economic growth and prosperity 
which continued virtually unabated until the global economic tensions caused by 
the first oil crisis in 1973. From the initial reconstruction phase in the direct 
aftermath of the war, during the 1950s and 1960s, the process of economic 
planning served as the motor of the economic expansionism which saw France 
become a major world economic player.2
Les trente glorieuses had an important effect on French morale, accompanied as 
they were by a number of other developments of importance, such as France 
becoming a major industrial player through indigenous and domestically funded 
economic growth in a period where such growth could still be managed within a 
domestic economic framework, protected from the rigours o f today’s more open 
and globalising markets. As I have already pointed out, the developing EEC in 
which France was a driving force due to its special relationship with Germany, 
and the absence of Britain from the EEC scene were merely an extension of 
French economic policy at this time. President de Gaulle knew very well how to 
use France’s veto at community level, and in the case of his relationship with 
Britain, he knew that France held all the political cards.
4.1 The context o f the French public sector strikes of 1995
The strike by public sector workers which affected France in late 1995 rapidly 
became one of the most serious disputes in France for many years. The actual 
reason behind the strike was the Plan Juppe brought in by the government 
following a major reshuffle in October 1995, just five months after President 
Chirac’s election victory. It is useful to give some consideration here to what the 
nature of this plan was, and why it generated the reaction it did. As has already 
been stated, the overriding aim of the plan was a radical reduction in French 
budget deficits which had been growing steadily and when needed to be lowered
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if France was to qualify for EMU. From a deficit level of FRF 61 bn in 1995, 
the government intended to achieve a figure of FRF 17 bn for 1996. Under the 
Maastricht convergence criteria, France was required to achieve a budget deficit 
of less than 3% of GDP for 1997. In addition, spending on health was to be 
limited to an increase of 2.1% for 1996 as new restrictions were imposed on 
prescriptions on the state health scheme. The aim of the latter was to combat 
France’s soaring social security deficit - colloquially known as the trou de la 
Sécu - which by late 1995 stood at FRF 250 bn.
In order to achieve these objectives, it was clear that major spending cuts were 
necessary, and these were clearly going to be in the public sector. The seeds of 
conflict had already been sown in the education sector where agitation had been 
evident since the rentrée at the beginning of October. The persistent problem of 
overcrowding in French universities had shown itself to be as serious as ever, 
and there had already been protests regarding this situation. To this underlying 
state o f affairs must be added the contentious contents of the Plan Juppé itself.
As the largest and most inclusive public sector in western Europe, France’s has 
traditionally been awash with special treatment for its workers when compared to 
those earning their living in what is euphemistically referred to as the secteur 
exposé. The plan Juppé thus sought to reduce some of these special conditions. 
In particular, the special retirement scheme for railwaymen attracted the plan’s 
attention. As is fairly widespread within the French public sector, the 
railwaymen have a defined status as cheminots. As a result of their working 
conditions and the historical inertia of their status, they had long held the right to 
retire on full pension after 37.5 years of service as opposed to the 40 years which 
applied to most other grades.
For many observers, the 1995 strikes will be remembered particularly for the 
disruption occasioned to the national rail network. This recollection is an 
entirely justified one, since it was on the railways that the strike proved most 
solid and of most inconvenience to firms outside the public sector. For
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approximately one month, France’s rail system ground to a complete halt, 
despite an early government u-turn on plans to tamper with the pension 
arrangements o f the cheminots. The austerity package in general kept the strike 
going on for longer as it signalled, from the point o f view of the strikers, the 
starving of fresh investment in the public sector and thus, in the view of the 
railwaymen, indicated the risk of a period of neglect in areas such as the 
railways.
4.2 The factors underpinning the strike
There seems to be little doubt that the 1995 strike was a strong protest over the 
trends evident in French government policy, in the great tradition of major 
French industrial disputes. Tracing the origins of the discontent in a manner that 
would allow us to pin it down to one or two precise factors is obviously enough 
going to be difficult. In terms of European policy - important for reasons that 
will become clear - there had been vocal discontent in France at the time o f the 
September 1992 Maastricht referendum which was carried by less than 1%. 
However, in terms of the specific conditions which led to the strike movement 
which is the subject of this analysis, it might be advisable to look to the 
presidential election campaign of April and May 1995.
For many observers, Jacques Chirac won the 1995 poll on a platform which was 
far removed from the position that they had seen him espouse over the greater 
part of his political career. His campaign had an almost social-democratic ring to 
it, as he spoke of La France pour tons (France for all) and in particular o f the 
now emblematic fracture sociale, the divide in French society which excluded 
many from the benefits enjoyed by the majority. In a country which had been 
dominated since 1993 by the restrained liberalism of Edouard Balladur which 
combined new privatisations and free market opportunities with an overall 
conservative economic policy, Chirac cleared appeared to promise the sun, the 
moon and the stars. Out of the window went the caution of his lieutenant and 
fellow presidential candidate Balladur and in came the radical language of
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relance. In the end, however, the Chirosceptics undeniably won the day when 
the plan Juppé was drafted after the president granted an interview on internal 
policy matters in late October 1995.
4.3 The 1995 strike as interpreted by commentators and protagonists
How then must we interpret the range of ideologies, angers and hopes that made 
up the December 1995 strikes and how do they represent a French phenomenon 
which is comparable with similar dilemmas in other countries? Throughout the 
period of the strikes, the Horizons-Débats column of Le Monde provided a rich 
forum for debate of the issues involved among intellectuals and other notable 
figures in French society. This was in addition to the paper’s standard reporting 
o f events, which also provided useful insights into the spirit o f the strike 
movement.
“The anger of the street makes itself felt more effectively than the sum of all discontent.”3
Stéphane Israël seems to have found the correct tone in his article published in Le 
Monde on December 6 1995 and entitled Vive le mouvement social. It is one of 
many articles which best express the manner in which the strike movement struck 
a chord in the France of the time and set the tone for a reassessment of how 
changes in the European and world economies were set to affect France, by 
focussing on their impact on the government policy which spawned the plan 
Juppé. Referring to the rail strike, Israël states rhetorically:
“It is without doubt an intolerable privilege for a métro driver who spends half his life 
underground and who only sees the light of day when night comes, (sic) to stop working at fifty.”4
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That comment provides a clear illustration of the kind of debate that 
characterised the analysis of the strike on the part o f intellectuals and prominent 
left-wing figures. Among the many commentators giving their reactions in Le 
Monde was Jacques Attali. On December 15 1995, he published an article 
clearly relating the strike to questions of French sovereignty and the level of 
control French people have over their destiny.
‘No people can live long without a clear idea of its role in history’5
Attali places the responsibility for creating this clear idea and facilitating its 
adaptation to the circumstances of the moment at the door o f the nation’s élites. 
It is they who are charged, in Attali’s view, with ensuring the perennity o f the 
civilisation in question.
Attali bases his ideas on his interpretation of the role of nations and civilisations 
through history. He states that there is an
‘almost automatic link between the ability of a people to devise an image of its future and its rate of
growth.’6
Thus, for Attali, when a long term view of the country’s development is set out, 
which clearly presents the sacrifices required of the populace in a structured 
manner in order to realise objectives which may be regarded as legitimate, then 
the people will do what is necessary.
However, and with clear reference to the plan Juppé, insofar as it demanded 
sacrifices from the people for a project which Attali plainly does not consider as 
falling into the previous category, Attali makes the following remarks:
‘When, on the contrary, that same people has no more than a vague idea of what it will have 
become in two generations time, when it confuses the ends and the means, it lets itself go, ignores 
its heritage, leaves nothing to its children, declines, emigrates and forgets itself. That has 
happened to many countries in Europe and elsewhere.’7
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Unfortunately, Attali does not provide us with any concrete arguments to back 
up his case, thus leaving us to interpret it as we will. Nonetheless, he sees in the 
1995 strike movement echoes of a defining historical event of 200 years before. 
He states:
‘When France came to doubt her future, she did not give up, she did not emigrate, she did not 
even change dreams, but rather she changed her élite; that was called a revolution.’8
It is here that Attali makes reference to one of the key differences I have chosen 
to insist upon between the contemporary societies o f Ireland and France. Attali 
paints the picture of the developments which have dominated France since the 
end o f the second world war:
‘Since the second world war, France’s political gameplan was relatively clear and simple. Its aim 
was to train the citizens of the Republic and integrate them into a strong economy among the most 
powerful in the world, a player in a common, united European market in the face of the Soviet 
threat. To achieve that, she had defined an agenda, shared by more or less all the political,
economic, social and cultural élites.’9
Attali goes on to observe that the situation prevailing since the fall of the Berlin 
Wall and in the face of rising unemployment coupled with the ever greater role o f 
Europe, had led to a very different situation. Globalisation has, he argues, led 
to a situation where the French see a less optimistic future staring them in the 
face. The country is no longer big enough to stand as a large independent power 
without radical reforms. In Attali’s view, the future for France is clearly defined 
as being at best the equivalent of England and at worst that of Argentina, both of 
which were great economic powers during the first part o f the twentieth century. 
The central plank of Attali’s argument, which we will return to with other 
commentators later, revolves around a stinging critique of the inability of 
France’s élites to come up with a vision of France’s own destiny as a nation into 
the next century and beyond. He suggests that being
‘incapable of facing up to the need to redefine a programme of work for the next thirty years, they 
are in general satisfied to administer aimless sacrifices imposed by the world markets, Europe or 
any other reason totally unrelated to a plan which France could have for itself.’10
I l l
Here is a fundamental critique of what in France is known as la contrainte 
extérieure. This seemingly innocuous expression meaning ‘external obligation’ 
belies a much more complex notion in France whereby those in power in France 
manage to push the blame for unpopular decisions on factors or organisations at 
international level, thus attempting to evade responsibility for them.
Clearly there are those who will accept the contrainte extérieure as a ‘higher 
obligation’ and put forward the logic that France as a player in the international 
economy cannot afford to remain immune from the conditions and pressures 
experienced by other European governments. That view had, it must be 
acknowledged, been in the majority in France among mainstream forces during 
the early 1990s. It was, arguably, the lack of real debate over it which 
contributed to the strikes of December 1995. Another contributing factor, as 
mentioned above, was the plan Juppé itself. With regard to the reform of the 
social security system which constituted a major part o f it, Attali adds that this 
question:
‘at the heart of the debate on national identity and solidarity could only be technical and devoid of 
a sense of direction, and felt as a unilateral calling into question of the social contract.’11
This debate over the existence, or the lack of it, o f a model was expressed also 
in Le Monde ' s December 12 edition when the Horizons section ran an interview 
with the sociologist and prominent intellectual Alain Touraine and Dominique 
Strauss-Kahn, former socialist minister and one o f the better known thinkers 
within the Socialist Party. It is interesting that the issue of a vision and also of 
means and ends as they affect the single currency are also raised here. Touraine 
reminds us of the reconstruction of the French economy on a model very centred 
on the state, and above all very distinctively French. The state was the 
modernising agent and one of its principal interfaces as such was its social 
security system. Social security, for Touraine, was social progress and it was a 
model which worked well in its time.
That time ran until the mid-1970s when the international marketplace began to 
undergo a process o f opening up, into which France went but without modifying 
its structures. To quote Touraine:
‘France entered into a new liberal model in the worst way since there were neither political parties, 
unions (practically), employers - with the important exception of the government of Michel Rocard 
-, and few intellectuals who understood the necessity o f a global model in order to avoid rampant
ultra-liberalism.’12
Despite the differences between them that emerge during the interview - Strauss- 
Kahn plays his card as acting politician quite clearly when he defends the 
Socialist Party against some of the allegations of complacency raised by 
Touraine - the two men seem to coincide on a key point which is their analysis o f 
economic liberalism. This French viewpoint is a clear illustration of the gulf in 
perceptions that can exist between two societies over the nature of an economic 
or social system.
For Strauss-Kahn, liberalism is:
‘a phase of retreat, a social disorganisation between two periods of organisation. As one is leaving 
a period of organisation, one awaits the next. Intellectuals and politicians must invent a new form 
of regulation for thirty or fifty years. We are still caught in that middle period.’13
Touraine goes further:
‘I have often written ... that there is no liberal society. Liberalism is a transition, a breakdown, the 
passing from one type of social control of the economy to the other. However, here there is the 
absence of a model of reconstruction. People prefer the former model to no model at all. Juppé’s 
plan has failed because the French refuse to enter into a liberal transition without the prospect of
social advancement.’14
It is this absence of a model and the lack o f viable future prospects which are 
stated again and again in the Le Monde articles on the December 1995 strikes. 
On December 9 1995 again in the Horizons column, Laurent Greilsamer wrote 
on this topic in an article entitled Schizophrénie à la française. Based on its tone, 
there is an argument for suggesting that is article is less overtly sympathetic
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towards the strikers than some of the others I have referred to. It is, if anything, 
an attempt at explaining the favourable reaction of the French to the strike, even 
though many of them had their lives turned upside down by the all out public 
transport strike, particularly in Paris and some of the largest cities.
Greilsamer’s definition of schizophrenia appears thus to be based on the fact that 
even though the majority o f workers particularly in the private sector showed no 
willingness to actually go on strike themselves, no great understanding of the 
complex issues involved, they yet proved supportive of the strike, with some 
60% in favour of it throughout the period.
Looking at the conditions which were supposedly under threat in 1995 - generous 
pay and conditions for public sector workers, and their equally generous 
retirement schemes, Greilsamer takes up the issue o f the insecurity felt by many 
regarding future developments:
‘Is that France not gone? The French, worried sick, believe it is and are no longer quite sure 
about how to express their fear. Two fears are haunting them: the spectre of seeing the majority of 
young people unemployed or reduced to earning FRF 5,000 per month, and that of seeing retired 
people miserable, broken down and indeed homeless. It is as if mother France, once so generous, 
offering milk and wine has nothing else to offer now other than a cup of black coffee.’15
The strike movement mobilised intellectuals to a significant extent, although 
there didn’t seem to be significant differences between some of the analyses put 
forward. The sociologist from the Collège de France and prominent 
commentator, Pierre Bourdieu, entered the fray on December 12 1995 when he 
and a group of fellow intellectuals attended a meeting in an SNCF meeting room. 
Bourdieu referred to the strike as:
‘an historic chance for France and for all those who refuse the new alternative: liberalism or
barbarism.’16
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Bourdieu also attacked the élites and technocrats referring to them as:
‘this state nobility which derives its conviction of its legitimacy from its educational qualifications 
and the authority of science - particularly the science of economics.’17
Essentially, therefore, Bourdieu’s stance is a reactionary one. He is more 
concerned with attacking the end of a particular vision for France than he is with 
stressing the need for a new one. If  anything, Bourdieu appears to concluded 
that liberalism is an option open to France and it may be assumed from this that 
he is acknowledging the existence of liberalism as something more than a 
transitional phenomenon between the two kinds o f regulation as has been 
suggested by other commentators.
The contrary perception is taken up, and even expanded upon by a number o f the
figures I have mentioned already. Returning to Laurent Greilsamer at this point,
he again stresses the fact that the world, as it was known to that point, was
becoming undone. Thus he combats the impression - again as part o f his
‘schizophrenic’ argument - that the striking public service workers were in some
way the ambassadors of their private sector counterparts, “forced to work in
18order to keep their jobs.”
For Greilsamer, the public sector workers could not have been anyone’s 
ambassador, since a mission19:
‘presupposes a clear future to be built with precise proposals. Yet the railwaymen and the non­
strikers are merely building together, through an equal contribution, a nostalgia for a comfort 
which is threatened. No matter how modest, this was a well established form of social organisation 
promising better health, better social life and better well-being’20
Here again, despite the apparent distance taken by Greilsamer’s article, is this 
affirmation of the absence of a clear alternative which could have served as a 
tangible rallying call for the strike movement. It is in this manner that the 
December 1995 strikes may be seen as reactionary, more than a coordinated 
movement demanding progress in certain defined areas. O f course there is
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debate about this point, and some of it is indeed very convincing. In their 
Horizons article published on December 11 1995, Régis Debray and Sami Nair 
refer to the liberal debate saying:
‘Some say “France must be a full player in the globalised economy”, whereas the movement replies 
strongly, “W e are the living society. Monetary logic should be decided for us and not us for it.”21
In his Le Monde interview alongside Dominique Strauss-Kahn, Alain Touraine 
makes the point that:
‘French trade unionism has been almost entirely reduced to defending the public sector. For a 
policy of the future, two themes are fundamental. The first is solidarity. The second theme is the 
absence of diversity. France has a unifying model. It is a country in which feminism has 
disappeared; where in the name of an abstract universalism, immigrants are rejected. Our society 
needs to learn about diversity and not close in on its own identity, in other words on the state. The 
left has not yet carried out its cultural revolution, its opening up to the world, its acceptance of  
diversity, its recognition of the problems of solidarity. Mine is a call for the renewal of the model,
and the time we have to do it is very limited.’22
4.4 Opposition to the strike movement
The social movements o f late-1995 represented a period of political instability 
which was certainly the most serious seen in France since the winter o f 1986, 
and which indeed drew comparisons with the momentous events o f May 1968. 
This case study has already looked at the reasons why the movements came 
about. Broadly speaking, public sector workers felt they were being unfairly 
singled out in the governments bid to reduce the public deficit ahead of France's 
entering Economic and Monetary Union. Additionally, they were opposed in 
principle to the government's plans to address the debt-ridden social security 
system by imposing limits on what doctors could prescribe. Considerable debate 
went on regarding whether other workers in the private sector were tacitly 
supporting their striking compatriots by not reacting negatively towards them. 
By and large, ordinary workers in the major cities, deprived of public transport 
made heroic efforts to get to work, many prepared to walk for hours in order to 
get there and back.
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I have carried out an extensive search on a range of electronic sources, including 
CDROM bibliographical databases, the online catalogue of a variety of Irish 
university libraries, and an extensive personal search through back editions of 
journals such as L'Expansion, Modem and Contemporary France, LEsprit, Les 
Temps Modernes and others. In addition, I have carried out repeated searches on 
the Internet using the most reliable search engines, such as Yahoo! 
(www.yahoo.com), Yahoo! France (www.yahoo.fr) and Altavista 
(www.altavista.com). These searches have only served to confirm the view 
which I have advanced throughout this case study that the strike movement 
enjoyed widespread support.
Most of the publications that I have been able to find on the subject o f the strike 
movement have focused either on providing something of a narrative o f events, 
much as this case study has, or on analysing the reasons for such a calling into 
question of the approach being followed by the nation's élites in placing the 
emphasis on France's qualification for Economic and Monetary Union at the 
expense of some of the traditional generosity the country had shown its public 
sector workers. Few if any sources looked at the issue of outright opposition to 
the strike movement, and indeed it is my recollection, as somebody who lived 
through the period in France, that there really was little serious protest against it, 
with most people actually showing understanding for the values which the 
strikers were defending. Whilst French television made considerable capital 
during the course of the strikes on the images of the average citizen battling their 
way to work, and sometimes staying over in major cities with people they hardly 
knew, this coverage broadly speaking bore out the manner in which, far from 
developing a hostile attitude towards the strikers, most people seemed to take the 
inconvenience in their stride.
Among prominent philosophers, there was a degree of sympathy for the initial 
aims of the Plan Juppé. On November 24, L'Esprit published an "Appel pour 
une réforme de fond  de la sécurité sociale". This had the support of a number of
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figures including the journal's editor-in-chief, Pierre Rosanvallon and the 
prominent philosopher Paul Ricoeur. In doing so, they were clearly siding with 
the position of Nicole Notât and the CFDT, which is more or less the position 
with which L'Esprit may generally be associated. However, these thinkers 
quickly found themselves overtaken by events on the ground, as the social 
movement gained in strength and in seriousness. By December 5, having 
amassed some 300 signatures, they found themselves having to clarify that their 
support of a reform of the social security system was not intended to condemn of 
social movement that was ongoing at the time. One o f those who signed the 
Esprit petition, and who has already been quoted in this chapter, was Alain 
Touraine. As we have seen, Touraine was concerned with the need for a model 
to accompany the liberal path of the policy being proposed by the government 
during this period. During a televised debate on the Plan Juppé, he accused 
those who wanted to go back to an ultra-protectionist stance of creating the 
Soviet Union instead of the European Union.
An interview with Paul Ricoeur published in the Swiss magazine Construire 
during 1997 shed some light on his views on the developing global economy.
In the first instance, Ricoeur believes that the economy must remain competitive 
whilst not losing its soul. He says that he is particularly conscious of the 
difficulties inherent in doing this as a result o f the dominant position currently 
enjoyed by capitalism in the world It is for this reason that he opts for a solution 
which he freely accepts may be characterised as that of least suffering. This is 
the development of a large and powerful European Union which is able to hold
iits own in the world.
We see, therefore, a commonality with the view put forward by Alain Touraine 
-  and which will be better explained again later in this chapter -  that the problem 
does not concern the necessity for reform, but rather the manner in which that 
reform or course of action is explained, and the model which accompanies it.
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4.4.1 Organised opposition to the strike movement
It would, however, be wrong to argue that there was no organised opposition to 
the strike movement, since clearly a situation never arises in a democracy where 
there is unanimity on a subject of such considerable importance. What is 
important to note in relation to this strike movement in particular, however, is 
the sparse nature of this opposition and also, I venture to suggest, its almost 
comical nature, given the evidence of direct government collusion in the setting 
up of groups to oppose the strikers' actions.
On a party political level, the two governing parties obviously remained behind 
the prime minister in his attempts to reform the social security system, spurred 
on by the newly elected president which they had both supported. Perhaps of 
more interest is the position of the extreme right National Front since, obviously, 
it found itself in the position of being an opponent of the government, but also 
with a philosophy which differed considerably from the parties of the left which 
were four square behind the strike movement.
Early in the strikes, the FN attempted the double feat o f criticising both the Plan 
Juppé and the actions of the trade unions. Both Bruno Mégret and Jean-Marie Le 
Pen had advanced the argument that the deficit in France's social security system 
was the result of root causes which were not being addressed by the Plan, 
primarily those related to unemployment, immigration and European policy. 
Indeed, Le Pen suggested that the Plan would solve nothing, and only serve to 
worsen social injustice. With regard to the situation in the universities, Le Pen 
attributed this to the failure of government policies aimed at bringing the number 
of young people obtaining their baccalauréat up to 80% of the school leaving 
population. The Front National favours a much stricter selection process for 
university entry than that currently in force in France.24 In another speech, Le 
Pen engaged in a stinging criticism of the trade union movement, accusing it of 
striving to protect its 'caste privileges' and of engaging in a 'scandalous stirring 
up of popular discontent.'25
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In the political arena, as the strikes went on there appeared to be a feeling of 
desperation among government backbenchers at an apparent lack of leadership in 
the midst o f a situation which appeared out o f control. These tensions within the 
majority became particularly apparent in the middle o f the month when two 
French pilots who had been held for over 100 days by the Bosnian Serbs were 
released into the hands of the French Army's chief o f staff. The prime minister's 
announcement of their release caught deputies entirely by surprise, and in the 
corridors of parliament, Le Monde's sketchwriter managed to capture the view 
among RPR and UDF parliamentarians that their leaders were failing them.
4.4.2 The views of government backbench politicians
It is clear from their remarks that they did not all see eye to eye on the manner in 
which their constituents and supporters express their concern about events. 
There were those deputies who tended to play down the impact of the strike, 
arguing that their own constituents saw through the protests. Jean de Gaulle 
(RPR, Paris) said that he had been inundated by telephone calls from people who 
were fed up with the strikes, however he argued against a reaction which would 
be perceived as being too firm, arguing that such an approach could have the 
negative effect of pitting one group in society against another. A more hard-line 
approach was envisaged by de Gaulle's party colleague from the town of Meaux, 
Jean-Franyois Copé, who called for the setting up of a committee for the 
freedom of work and the defence of the town's public transport users, adding that 
the town hall had been inundated with calls from members of the public calling 
for alternative means of transport. His colleague from Scine-Saint-Denis, 
Senator Christian Demuynk, said he had been presented with 80,000 signatures 
from public transport users.
In their hostility to the strikes, the deputies on the government side appeared 
remarkably divided on the measures which should be taken either to resolve the 
strike movement or to combat it. Some expressed the realisation that public 
opinion regarding the strikes was surprising lacking in radicalism given the
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extent of the disruption being caused. For Thierry Mariani (RPR Vaucluse):
"Public opinion is expressing mixed feelings. There is a sense of irritation towards the strikers, but 
that doesn't prevent there from being a certain amount of sympathy as well, as a result o f blind
fear."27
His colleague, Jean-Paul Anciaux (RPR Saône-et-Loire) echoed his sentiments:
"We are at a defining moment. People are unsure, neither fundamentally for or radically against 
the movement. Many feel that civil servants are basically priviliged, but they are also telling 
themselves that they may have something to gain from the demands the civil servants are putting
forward."28
This uncertainty which deputies were noticing among their workers found itself 
mirrored in their own suggestions for how to deal with the movement. Some, 
such as Yves Nicolin (UDF-PR Loire), advocated a hard-line approach insisting 
that:
"Juppé should concede nothing on his reform plans, even if negotiation is possible on their 
implementation. If we relent this time, we'll have demonstrations against any reform we try."29
This view met with support in the words of Jean-Michel Fourgous (RPR, 
Yvelines):
"There is no question of continuing to negotiate with people who have shown the disdain they have 
for the country. It's a question of morale. Those people will have to tell us to which race they
belong."30
On the other hand, there were clearly those who advocated a 'softly softly' 
approach in terms of dealing with the movement, fearing the possible negative 
repercussions of being too rash. This was particularly so in relation to what I will 
analyse in more detail later, namely the attempts by the RPR to instigate 
counter-protests by concerned citizens, particularly the users of public transport. 
The RPR's Denis Jacquat declared that:
"...it would be a risky strategy which might only fan the flames."31
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Several deputies pointed to the growing sense of concern evident in the country 
regarding the extent of the strike movement, and to the increasing impact it was 
having on their constituents. As has already been evidenced by the statement 
from deputies representing the broad Paris region, the impact of the movement 
in its developmental phase was primarily an urban one, and indeed very much a 
Paris-centred one. However, this situation evolved over time as the postal 
service became steadily more disrupted around the country. Additionally, as the 
transport situation in the Paris region remained serious, and large numbers of 
long distance lorry drivers became involved in the dispute, many companies 
began experiencing serious supply problems. This worsening situation was 
reflected in a hardening of attitudes among rural government deputies in mid- 
December. This feeling was reflected by Adrien Zeller (UDF-FD Bas-Rhin) who 
asked:
"What is Chirac doing, what is the President of the Republic doing? That's what the grassroots 
are asking me. It is the President's responsibility, in his paternal role, to explain and to reassure 
whilst preserving things as they are. We need that."32
There were further indications o f frustration on the government back benches, 
and surprisingly close to the government as well. One of the major gaffes o f the 
period was made by the RPR deputy for Indre-et-Loire, Philippe Briand, who 
had been responsible for youth affairs during the Chirac's presidential campaign. 
He was hauled before party whips after making a public statement which 
appeared to strongly call into question the Prime Minister's abilities:
"We need to garner public support for our reforms, and there is a real Juppé problem. The 
relationship with the public hasn't worked. It's not really a communication problem. W e need a
visceral relationship."33
Aside from this variety of parliamentary opinion, one of the more interesting 
aspects of the opposition to the strikes was the manner in which the French 
government attempted to orchestrate this in a manner which was very blatant and 
which no real attempt was made to cover up.
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At the beginning of December, the national executive of the RPR, which 
included Alain Juppé as party president, sent a note to the leaders o f the party 
around the country which detailed five practical steps in mobilising local action 
groups against the strikes in the public transport sector. The leadership advised 
its faithful to ask citizens to sign a petition, the text o f which stated that they did 
not want to be taken hostage and asking to be allowed work. It was also 
proposed that leaflets be distributed calling on people to take part in a 
demonstration of 7 December. Neither the address o f the local party, nor any 
mention of the RPR, was to appear on these leaflets, and it was suggested that a 
P.O. Box be opened to serve as the address.
The fact that the party was willing to organise such a form of protest seems 
surprising given the obvious risks that it could further inflame the situation. It 
also seems obvious that the risk inherent in such an approach was only 
heightened by attempting to form organisations which were essentially 
clandestine in character, outside the formal structures of the party, but yet 
entirely manipulated and controlled by it. It also seems obvious that the only 
reason for engaging in such a desperate measure is a realisation that a protest 
movement of that kind is unlikely to come about of its own accord. The survey 
evidence regarding the level of support among the public for the strikers, their 
principles and their aims, provides a solid argument for believing that the French 
public, however inconvenienced, at no point became so angered as to 
countenance a large scale revolt against the strikers whose actions were forcing 
them, in many cases, to walk for several hours per day. Indeed, considerable 
amounts o f anecdotal evidence in the media pointed to a large degree of stoicism 
and solidarity among Parisians in particular. Frankly, the attempts by the RPR 
to stir up unrest among public transport users appeared to reflect little more than 
the disarray caused in the government circles by the extent of the movement, as 
evidenced by the variety of opinions expressed above by backbench deputies.
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4.3.3 Opposition from within the business world
Within the business world, opposition to the strikes came from a number of 
quarters. The national employers confederation, the CNPF, actually remained 
relatively modest in its pronouncements, contenting itself in the early part o f the 
strike with carrying out a survey among its members to assess the extent of 
disruption. It did, however, remain behind the government's plans and made 
calls on the government to be firm in its resolve whilst also calling for a quick 
return to normality in the country. Other business federations were more 
outspoken in their denunciation of the strikes. The small and medium sized 
business association, the CGPME, issued a statement on November 29 
announcing:
"Strike leaders, be aware that you are starving us."34
Other federations representing similarly exposed sectors of the economy also 
spoke out. In the building and metalwork sectors, the Fédération parisienne du 
bâtiment and the Groupement des industries métallurgiques parisiennes pointed 
to the damage being done to their members by the strike. For the latter, there 
were problems of disorganisation and supply difficulties. Another union to show 
its frustration was the Union des industries textiles.
It is also worth noting that coverage seeking to criticise the set of circumstances 
which gave rise to the strike movement tended to analyse the reasons for the 
strike, and the sense of discontent which gave rise to it, rather than engaging in 
outright attacks on the strikers themselves. This does not, however, mean that 
there is not a body of opinion in France which sympathises with the aims of those 
who seek to reduce the country's dependence on a large and costly public sector 
and to see further rationalisation in the apparatus of the state. Figures such as 
Michel Godet are vocal in their calls for lower numbers in the civil service. 
Writing in L'Expansion in March 1999, Godet argued that the range of sectors 
into which the French public sector penetrated was simply anachronistic in the 
European context. He calls for a 'progress contract' which would see the number
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of civil service positions reduced in return for an improvement in civil service 
pay. In concrete terms, he calls for a reduction of 10% in the civil service 
workforce over ten years to be achieved through natural wastage. He also wants 
to see performance related pay for public servants. Godet also calls for the 
private sector to be given the chance to experiment with the management of 
certain parts of the public sector, up to and including the SNCF.
The same edition of L'Expansion contained the views of a number of thinkers on 
how to kick start or simply wake up {réveiller) la France. It is characterised by 
the views of liberal thinkers, and some of the most provocative opinions are put 
forward by Charles Wyplosz and Jérôme Gautié on the question of combating 
unemployment. They propose a significant reduction in the costs of employing 
someone, particularly in the case of work which is not particularly well 
qualified. They also propose a measure which was the source of public unrest in 
France when it was first proposed several years, namely the creation of a smic 
jeunes -  a minimum wage for young people which would be at a different level, 
and by definition a lower one, to that paid to older people. Charles Wyplosz 
argues, however, that if such a measure were accompanied by a form of 
workplace training, it would play a constructive role in reducing youth 
unemployment.
The authors also suggest a new form of contract which would allow a worker to 
work alternately for a number of employers. The idea behind this is the 
requirement o f employers to have greater flexibility in their workforces requires 
an alternative to the unemployment/employment cycle that can occur. An 
attempt by employers to offer contracts which would include a provision for 
alternative employment elsewhere in the case of a downturn is suggested as an 
alternative for this cycle. On a personal level, I find this suggestion somewhat 
bizarre since it is difficult to see how an employee would become loyal in a 
situation where they could simply move on to another company were they no 
longer needed by one employer.
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These are the ideas of the liberal fringe in French economics and they remain 
somewhat on the margins. Elsewhere in this thesis we encounter the views of 
Elie Cohen who may be seen as the doyen of the ultra-liberal lobby in France at 
the present time. Well formulated and passionate as these opinions may be, they 
have tended to carry little water in the real world of politics where policies even 
remotely based on them have attracted large scale public protest and have, as we 
have seen, had to be shelved on a number of occasions.
4.5 Interpretation of the issues raised by the strike
It is clear, therefore, from the arguments as they were presented at this time, 
that the December 1995 strikes raised two important issues in France which had 
been somewhat neglected. The first is the clear attachment of workers in the 
French public sector to certain conditions of employment and service which the 
government, through the plan Juppé wished to revise. In addition to this, the 
attempt to deal with the serious social security deficit - the so called trou de la 
Sécu - proved highly controversial since the public health sector in France had, 
along British lines, been a very wide ranging and generous one. Inevitably, any 
attempts to limit and recover losses in the health sector was going to be highly 
controversial. We only need to recall the importance of the health issue in the 
1987 and 1989 general elections in Ireland to appreciate the key importance 
played by health matters in any country. In a nation such as France it is 
reasonable to assume that the generosity of the state, particularly in the health 
sector, will be seen as indicative of its attitude towards its citizens and measured 
against the standards of treatment they have come to expect. Clearly, in a 
France known for large scale state involvement at all levels o f the economy, the 
modifying of long standing arrangements for a project as diffuse in the public 
mind as EMU provoked a reaction, the intensity of which few had anticipated.
The second issue is the question which has dominated a large part o f the 
discussion in this chapter so far. That is the issue o f the model within which 
France operates, and its relevance in a changing world. We have already seen
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how Alain Touraine and others believe that a need exists for France to adapt its 
national model to changed circumstances. He has even spoken of present day 
France defending an abstract universalism, thus opening up the debate on an 
aspect of French identity, namely the ideas that emerged from the enlightenment 
and which have constituted the philosophical basis for French republicanism for 
the past 200 years. Universalism, linked in the French mind to modernity, 
provides the rationale behind the idea of the homogenous nation state. It is the 
defence of society as a social actor which guarantees equal rights and freedoms 
to all those living within it and which - by extension - opposes the notion that 
there must be those who are left outside the homogenising, unifying, centralised 
forces which characterise French universalism in its standard form.
It is thus at the base of the volontarisme which is to be found in French society, 
and which is may the seen through the operation of the Etat jacobin  insofar as the 
state’s intervention in a wide range of matters in concerned. The desire and 
search for a model that is apparent from the comment on the December 1995 
strike by French writers provides evidence of the extent to which, even those 
who have arrived at a position of hostility regarding the present framing of 
universalism - Touraine being a preeminent example - are exponents o f the 
continued existence of a model and reject the notion of liberal society as an end 
in itself but view it rather as a transitional step in the search for a new model of 
social progress.
4.6 Further theoretical perspectives on the French model
Touraine expands further on these themes in his 1992 publication Critique de la 
Modernité. It is clear that his hostility to liberalism is no less marked than his 
opposition to the continuation ad infinitum of the model which France has 
followed thus far. Looking at liberal society, Touraine chooses particularly to 
castigate the United States which he describes as a society where down-and-outs 
have ever fewer chances of rejoining the fast lane, and where social inequality is 
on the rise regardless of the rapid increase in wealth visible among the middle
classes. He describes this pattern as going beyond what is traditionally referred 
to as modernity and entering the realm of the postmodern which he describes as:
‘the dominant mode of management of our society in this end o f century period.’36
Aside from the somewhat generalised critique of liberalism which he accuses of 
being too centered on individual gain and thus removed from any idea of the 
common good, Touraine puts forward the view that the biggest danger with 
liberalism is that it appears to be the greatest protection against all the attempts 
by various powerful élites ‘particularly those claiming to speak in the name of 
mankind and society.’37 Touraine goes on to suggest that money:
‘can take on the appearance of being the least brutal o f masters since it appears the least personal, 
detached from the imposing manner and powerful ambitions o f men with grandiose plans.’38
In the same vein as many of the comments made before the December 1995 
strikes by himself and other commentators, he formulates the critique o f the 
liberal approach which is surely one of the most interesting arguments to have 
come out of the movement in France at that time.
‘It reduces society to a market and a continuous flux of exchanges, but it does not take into account 
the types of behaviour which escape from this reductionism. It does not explain the defensive 
search for identity or the search for balance. It understands neither national passion nor the 
culture of the excluded. In one word, it is the ideology of the élites who lead change and who feel 
sufficiently confident to prefer movement to rest, offensive action to defensive action, the 
impersonal nature of communications systems to subjectivity. These are élites whose ability to lead 
the silent majority must not be underestimated.’39
Whereas Touraine seems convinced of the need for a renewal o f the 
universalistic model to take into account changed circumstances, an opposing 
view may be found in the writing of Jean-Claude Guillebaud. In his 1995 book 
La Trahison des Lumières, he sets out to demonstrate that the legacy o f the ideas 
of the Enlightenment is anything but obsolete. Modernity, he argues, is being 
questioned not as a result of its loyalty to the Enlightenment, but rather because 
of its betrayal of it.
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Guillebaud appears primarily concerned with identifying the hallmarks of this 
betrayal of the ideals of Enlightenment as they manifest themselves at the present 
time, and with using these as an argument not for the replacement o f the 
Enlightenment and its values with a new model - as seems to be the view of 
Alain Touraine - but rather as a launching pad for an appeal simply for a return to 
the ideas of Enlightenment as they are expressed in their most traditional form. 
To put it simply, Touraine acknowledges that a critical point has arrived in terms 
of the model which has shaped France and that the necessity of a replacement for 
that model has arisen. Guillebaud looks at many of the developments o f interest 
to Touraine as simply the betrayal o f fundamentally valid ideas and - to quote a 
much misused expression - calls for a back to basics approach.
One of the analyses in Guillebaud’s book - a phenomenon which undoubtedly 
exists and which merits careful consideration - is the apparent return of the 
“local” in the face of the globalising ethic. He begins his analysis o f this with 
reference to an article published in Spring 1994 in The Washington Post 
Providence referring to demands by students living on university campuses to be 
housed separately on the basis of race, sexual orientation or religion.40 
Guillebaud muses on the manner in which “without explosions, without anger or 
even heated discussion”41, the melting pot which constitutes the founding 
principle o f the American dream is challenged. The parallel with France is 
interesting since the American dream and universalism are remarkably similar 
ideas insofar as the homogenisation of American society was comparable in its 
social importance to its French counterpart.
Guillebaud presses forward in this vein by examining the reappearance of 
dialects and the vitality of folklore and the ‘roots revival’ evident in culture 'from 
Moldova to the Inuit territories of the Canadian arctic.' He also invites us to 
consider “the unprecedented vigour of the patriotism of principalities, micro­
nations or provinces.” This is a worthwhile consideration when we consider that 
the European Union which is accused of calling sovereignty into question also
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places great importance on the idea of a Europe of the regions. It is interesting, I 
feel, to note that this growth of a regional identity seems to go hand in hand with 
globalisation, as if  one is merely a compliment to the other. It is as if  the link 
between economic globalisation and liberalism is inextricably tied in with 
heightened individualism, a factor which does not entirely appear absent from 
those regions which most clearly embrace the idea of a Europe of the regions. I 
am thinking of Catalonia and Lombardy as two particular examples. Considering 
globalisation, Guillebaud examines the countries most swayed by the idea. 
Doing so, we find strong support for globalisation among the countries o f the 
G7, whilst countries like Mauritania and Burkina Faso remain aloof.42
In my view, however, Guillebaud’s analysis does not necessarily stand up 
insofar as he fails to take note o f a vital aspect in the correlation of globalisation 
and the increased role played by local or regional identity. It is worth noting that 
regional identity is much more likely to be a luxury of the rich than the poor, at 
least in Europe. Why are Catalonia, Lombardy and Scotland among the 
strongest examples of this local revival? Surely at least in part because they feel 
strong enough to embrace this and not lose out. Why will the next Spanish UN 
peacekeeper to the killed be more than likely from Extremadura or Andalucia and 
not from among the Catalan middle class? Nationalism of course plays a role, as 
does the propping up role o f the universalist nation state in the regions which 
cannot afford to break away from it. The local and the global are not too sides of 
a situation, rather they are on the same side. The Europe of the Regions 
dimension is also the story of the Euroregion. It is the resurgence of a local 
identity whilst embracing the global marketplace.
4.7 The 1995 French strike -  an analysis of the role of the trade unions
Returning to the 1995 French public sector strikes, the role played by the trade 
union movement was obviously key. It is worth mentioning that many 
commentators have stressed the bottom-up nature of the movement, with 
grassroots trade unionists often encouraging their leaders to play a full part in the
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strike. Writing in Les Temps Modernes, Jean Pons referred to what he termed 
“la chance perdue des syndicats” - the missed opportunity o f the trade union 
movement. For Pons, this missed opportunity concerned the manner in which 
the term ‘general strike’ was used by trade union leaders at the beginning o f the 
period of social unrest on October 10 1995 in Paris43 only to be somewhat 
discarded later.44 Indeed, when the movement was at full strength, union 
leaders showed evidence of shying away from the term, even though it was 
being used on the streets by their grassroots members. Pons directs his ire most 
specifically at the CFDT which he accuses of going against the wishes of its 
members in not supporting the strike.
In his article in Les Temps Modernes, Pons initially enunciates the aspects o f the 
strike which he found to be of most interest. He refers to the toying with the 
notion of general strike as being of interest since it calls into question the 
traditional image of strikes being controlled from the top or by coordinating 
committees. He suggests that this gap between the positions adopted by union 
leaders and those adopted by rank and file members points to a new departure 
whereby the conduct of the strike on a day to day basis was being planned on a 
bottom up basis by the rank and file and being communicated to the union 
leadership. This approach also highlighted what for Pons is the major problem of 
democracy - that o f representation.
Pons quotes the general secretary of the metalwork section of Force Ouvrière 
from Le Monde on December 3-4 1995 as saying:
‘workers no longer believe in the ballot paper. The strike is now the only weapon they have to
express their desire for change.’45
Pons gives consideration to the meanings of the strike movement and concludes 
that the argument that it was merely a rejection from ordinary workers and the 
provinces o f the Parisian political élite is too shallow an interpretation to draw. 
Rather, he suggests that this represented a call by the grassroots for these élites 
to improve their practices. In particular, Pons suggests that their reduction of
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complex macroeconomic theory to the level o f home economics actually came 
across not as a desire to communicate with even the most modest o f French 
citizens, but as a lack of understanding of the voters and an insult to their 
intelligence.
However, this calling into question of the political system clearly does not 
address the situation regarding the French trade union movement itself. In Pons’ 
view, clear similarities exist between the grassroots distrust o f the political 
establishment and the bottom up nature of the strike movement itself. The 
common thread here, for Pons, is the crisis of representation. Trade unionists, 
caught up in the distrust being expressed o f the political establishment and the 
ballot paper, may have felt that the best way of maintaining control over the 
movement was through maintaining direct control over their leaders. Pons states:
‘there were never as many faxes being sent between the grassroots and the top in a complete 
reversal of the normal flow of communications.’46
Pons looks upon the ‘discredit’ of the trade union movement as being much less 
certain or defined than that which affected political parties. Whereas an 
increasingly cynical electorate is ever more aware of the small amount o f real 
power it has over elected politicians, the expectation still remains that trade 
union leaders will be the spokespersons of those people whom they are elected to 
defend. Pons makes the point that the economic logic that underpins so much of 
government policy and that led to the strike movement seemed a little too similar 
to the logic of the company accountant that they were forced to work with on a 
daily basis. In fact, the whole conflict, in his eyes, was not so much a problem 
of economic argument per se, argues Pons, rather it was the case that the 
‘pseudo simplification’ of major government policy resulted in economic 
discourse being devoid of its scientific foundations and reduced to the analysis of 
the company accountant.
Pons is critical of the trade unions on a number o f levels, all o f which concern 
their reaction in terms of politics, party, ideology and action when faced with a
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social movement which was clearly a call for new and radical political positions 
to take into account the desire for a radical answer in the face of the 
government’s espousal of the liberal economic agenda. He criticises them for 
failing to show greater leadership insofar as calls for a general strike and the 
assortment of grievances coming from the members were concerned. He is 
particularly critical of the CFDT for not having listened to its members and in 
particular for resorting to ballots when protesters in the street were demanding 
action. He says that the clear message to both politicians and trade union leaders 
was that the solution put forward by the plan Juppé was not the right one and that 
others were required.
To reinforce all of this, he quotes from Rousseau:
‘The general will which should direct the State is not the will of times past, but rather the will o f 
the present. The true characteristic of sovereignty is that there is always an agreement of time, 
place and effect between the direction o f the general will and the use o f public force.’47
4.8 1995 - A strike in defence of the Republic?
External and internal perceptions of the December 1995 strikes obviously 
different. To all intents and purposes, the movement took on the appearance of 
a revolt against the course of the French state within Europe. The comparisons 
with the situation of May 1968 abounded and there was talk of a break being 
made with the ideology of the élites. From an internal point of view, the 
international comment and analysis of the disruption being caused by the 
movement was not the dominant point of view.
In Les Temps Modernes, Robert Redeker presented an analysis of the strikes 
which made mention of the notion of grève républicaine. It is an idea which, 
from on Irish standpoint, merits some explanation. Fundamentally, it represents 
a split from the idea of a strike demanding a clean break or radical reform instead 
sets out to defend and reinforce the republic. Redeker thus puts forward the idea 
that the 1995 strike was defensive rather than offensive. Whilst this may not
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appear particularly unusual, there is a difference between a strike movement 
which seeks to defend the sectional interests o f those taking part in it, and one 
which seeks to defend an entire social model. For Redeker, this is the distinction 
between a ‘grève républicaine ’ and a ‘grève prolétarienne. ’
‘A proletarian strike is based on the idea of class struggle; it considers itself to be a step on the 
road to a revolution to come. A republican strike, however, instead of being concerned with the 
idea of class, is mainly concerned with the idea of the people and with the maintenance in the 
present of the principle of a past revolution.’48
Redeker expands on this argument by conceding that the December 1995 strikes 
contained elements of a proletarian strike insofar as the disruption of economic 
life was concerned. One of the main differences, with regard to past action, in 
1995 was the tactic used. Halting production no longer held the same importance 
as previously, given that it is no longer the centerpiece of economic activity. 
Therefore, the strike also affected communication - SNCF etc... - transmission 
(teaching) and services.
Throughout his article, Redeker refers to the strikes as something of a revival of 
republican values and traditions, as if these had in some way been lost in time. 
The battlefield is marked out by Redeker when he states that:
‘these republican values are combatted by the financial markets which wish to globalise the “anti­
social”. They are combatted by the government through its fanaticism for privatisations, through 
which the property of the French people is sold off at knockdown prices.’49
The strike was, for Redeker, an opportunity to break from the existence 
whereby the citizen is merely a consumer or commuter and as such it afforded 
people the chance to rediscover both community and society. Indeed, there was 
even a progression evident as the specific demands of particular communities 
blended into the broader national movement. The process mirrors the origins of 
the French republic itself since the hitherto varied and disparite regions came 
together to form a national community - or society.
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From Redeker’s perspective, the sense of threat facing the public sector was 
exacerbated by the media treatment of the strike movement which seemed totally 
alien from the feelings of the hundreds of thousands of people taking part in the 
demonstrations. He singles out in particular the economist Jean-Marc Sylvestre 
who, in addition to his television work on TF1, also appeared daily at breakfast 
time on the public service radio station France-Inter. The manner in which 
Sylvestre attacked public sector workers over their perceived privileges, and 
referred to stable employment, retirement benefits, equal access to social 
security and dignified working conditions as being taboos which must be 
overcome50 shocked the author who, in a footnote, added his view that the 
guarantees o f the public sector should be the norm to be imposed on the private 
sector.
Redeker reaches the core of his argument when he states that what many o f the 
élites who are influenced by ‘Asian, Anglo-Saxon and German models’ need to 
appreciate is that there is:
‘a French model unique in history: the republican model which is, mutatis mutandis, what the
strikes were pointing out and defending.’51
He continues:
‘The republican ideal is not an economic ideal of administering technocracy and management. 
Rather, it is a political idea under which economics are subsumed. The two ideals - the economic 
and the political - generate two types of existence. One is economic, centred around work and 
consumption; and the other is political and involves active participation in public affairs.’52
This viewpoint is one which tallies with discourse regarding attitudes towards 
social exclusion in France as opposed to in other countries, and which I will 
return to in the next chapter.
Redeker is in no doubt about the effects of a world where economics are allowed 
to become the dominant force:
‘A world dominated by economics is a world which has taken its leave of history. It is a post-
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historic universe devoted to administration. A political world, however, is a world which shapes
history as much as it is shaped by it.’53
4.9 Irish industrial relations - a model of social partnership and consensus?
We have seen in the previous paragraph that Irish industrial relations at the 
present time revolve around the social partnership model. The negotiation of the 
present social pact, Partnership 2000, was completed in December 1996. This 
pact was the replacement for the Programme for Competitiveness and Work 
(PCW) which had covered the period 1993-97 - the successor to the Programme 
for Economic and Social Progress (PESP) and the Programme for National 
Recovery (PNR).
Writing in the Irish Times on December 19 1996, the paper’s Industry and 
Employment Correspondent, Pâdraig Yeates stated:
‘Partnership 2000 is more than a pay deal. It sets out to create a new social contract.’54
The pact was negotiated against the backdrop of sustained economic growth 
which had seen large levels of job creation and significant increases in inward 
investment in Ireland, primarily from US based multinational corporations. This 
growth had come against the backdrop of Ireland’s continued membership of the 
European Union, and along with considerations such as a suitably qualified 
workforce, low corporation tax and lower labour costs made Ireland an attractive 
European base for many of these corporations.
Thus, it was an agreement bom out of a different set of imperatives than those 
which had gone before. The social partners no longer found themselves bound 
by some great moral code to generate the conditions necessary for some elusive 
period of prosperity. Now the period of prosperity, albeit o f recent origin and 
still uncertain prospects, was there and as a result the need was to generate a new 
accord which would not only lay the groundwork for continued prosperity based 
on prudent economic management and conservative wage management. The
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increased prosperity exacerbated demands that workers see the fruits o f their 
labour in a manner which they had not before - through significant taxation 
reforms - and it also placed an emphasis on measures to increase social inclusion 
through policies aimed at providing relief for those groups in society which had 
not seen their lot increase during the preceding period of economic growth.
Returning to the analysis o f the Irish Times journalist Padraig Yeates, 
Partnership 2000 emerged as an ambitious looking agreement since:
‘for the first time it provides an integrated package of pay rises and tax cuts that will enable trade
unionists to calculate the value of the deal.’55
The social inclusion element of Partnership 2000 was clearly designed to appease 
sectors of the trade union movement, anxious to see progress on spreading the 
fruits o f increased prosperity among those who had not benefited from the upturn 
in the economy. The Conference of Religious of Ireland in a plan taken up by 
the National Economic and Social Forum suggested a job creation plan for the 
long term unemployed. This idea was expanded under Partnership 2000 and now 
aims to give people who have been unemployed for at least five years a chance to 
do socially meaningful work at the going rate. As we shall see later, discontent 
over the extent of the social exclusion package proved to be one of the major 
talking points in the progress towards ratification of the agreement.
On the pay front, there was real pressure on the unions to deliver a pay increase 
that reflected the changed realities of Irish society and took into account the fact 
that, particularly among PAYE workers, there was a strong desire to enjoy more 
of the fruits of their labour than had been possible during the more difficult times 
of several years earlier. In the case of Partnership 2000, a total pay deal of 
9.65% was agreed, which was not too far off the 10% opening demand of the 
Irish Congress of Trade Unions. It compared reasonably favourably with the 
8.25% cumulative pay award under the Programme for Competitiveness and 
Work. However once again, this had not been without controversy, particularly 
since the final 2% of the award is conditional, based on the performance of the
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company in question and ultimately a matter for local bargaining.
From the point of view o f the employers federation IBEC, the deal once again 
offered the scenario of continued industrial peace for three more years, the 
maintenance of stable wage costs more or less in line with those of Ireland’s EU 
neighbours. Any increases were to be offset against reductions in Corporation 
Profits Tax and changes in PRSI.
Another interesting departure in the Partnership was the creation of a National 
Centre for Partnership and Change. This initiative was to have the support o f the 
ICTU, IBEC, the Labour Relations Commission and other state agencies and its 
objective was to provide joint training for trade union officials and human 
resource managers.
The Irish economic model seems to be built on an idea o f consensus which we 
will go into in more detail later The pacts and partnerships which have 
characterised it have, as we have seen, been set up in the interest of creating or 
protecting national economic growth. It is perhaps understandable that the model 
would not have been questioned very much in the past when stable management 
of the economy was seen as essential for necessary progress. However, during 
the process of ratifying Partnership 2000, new voices were raised injecting 
scepticism into the debate. The fundamental strength in the albeit limited 
movement against Partnership 2000 lay in the hope that the country’s largest 
trade union SIPTU might decide to reject it. A move against the Partnership had 
surfaced within SIPTU, and this was as much an internally focussed protest at 
the direction taken by the union, as an outward looking protest aiming for the 
rejection of the Partnership model overall.
4.10 The opposition to Partnership 2000 - an influential minority?
The formal “Campaign against Partnership 2000” was launched in Dublin on 
January 16 1997. Its most prominent figure was Mick O ’Reilly, Irish secretary
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of the Amalgamated Transport Workers Union. O’Reilly called for workers to 
reject the agreement and for trade unionists to return to local bargaining, adding 
that “the sky w on’t fall in”56 if the partnership were rejected. O ’Reilly’s demand 
originated in the viewpoint that partnerships inevitably meant less for workers 
than if they were free to fight their corner more independently. He is one of 
many trade unionists who agree with the principle that negotiations on a 
partnership are not necessarily a bad thing since they establish a floor for future 
claims. However, the central plank in O’Reilly’s argument was that following 
the breakdown of national agreements in the early 1980s, increases o f between 
12.5% and 20% had been won for workers following the abandonment o f the
S712% ceiling contained in the national programme.
An interesting observation was made at the same launch by Mr Des Bonass of the 
Irish National Organisation of the Unemployed. He stated that the executive of 
the INOU was calling for critical acceptance of the new agreement, simply 
because it did not wish to be left out in the cold. In other words, being inside the 
system of pacts and partnership entails having a voice. Dissenters are not 
recognised as legitimate interlocutors and so cannot take part in the mechanisms 
for negotiating, implementing and monitoring an agreement. It is almost as if 
one’s legitimacy in terms of one’s position depends on one’s desire to be part o f 
an agreement. Thus is perhaps defined Kriesi's Political Opportunity Structure in 
the context of present day Ireland.
Three days later, however, the INOU national executive council decided to 
reject the Partnership as a result of what it considered the insufficient emphasis 
placed on the social pillar - specifically minimum rates of social welfare. The 
social inclusion element of the agreement became one of the major points of 
contention in the aftermath of its publication, as the trade union movement was 
preparing to make its decision on ratification. Central to the concerns of the 
INOU was the issue of income adequacy on which the organisation had felt the 
government had not yet provided satisfactory reassurance. In addition, the 
INOU was seeking an increase in the number of employment schemes on offer to
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those out of work.
Indeed, the formal launch of Partnership 2000 was cancelled as a result o f the 
disagreement over the social inclusion question and the only way out o f the 
impasse was a reversal by the government o f its previous policy on December 20, 
1996 whereby the social inclusion element was boosted by £25 million.
For many observers however, opposition within the trade union movement to 
Partnership 2000 will for a long time remain associated by Carolann Duggan. 
Ms Duggan first came to light at the same meeting o f the campaign against the 
Partnership reported by the Irish Times on January 17, 1997. Described as “a 
SIPTU member in Waterford”, Ms Duggan stated:
‘The country is booming, the employers and the banks are making a fortune in profits, up 45 per 
cent according to Billy Attley. Yet the workers who created all the wealth are being told to take a 
rise of 7.4% over three years and three months.’58
The Carolann Duggan phenomenon was as much about SIPTU and the broader 
Irish trade union movement as it was about Partnership 2000. Ms Duggan is an 
assembly line worker in her thirties at the Waterford plant of a multinational 
corporation Bausch and Lomb which manufactures compact lenses. A  member 
of the Socialist Workers Party, she affirms her commitment to class struggle. 
However, at the time of her coming to prominence, she had the dubious 
credentials o f not being a shop steward and never actually having been on strike. 
Duggan became a representative figure for a large proportion o f SIPTU members 
disenchanted with the partnership model and holding the view that it (the model) 
had done very little for the underpaid.
Elementary mathematics reminds us that percentage increases in pay will always 
bring more to higher earners than lower earners if the agreed increase is to be 
across the board. Adjustments to tax rates and tax free allowances can however 
balance matters somewhat in favour of the lower paid. However, it is clear that 
Carolann Duggan tapped into a feeling among lower paid members of SIPTU
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that they were not benefiting from partnership arrangements to the extent they 
might. However, as I have already stated, there was also a strong undercurrent 
of criticism of her own trade union’s structures and functioning in Duggan’s 
remarks.
What is important to note, in the case of Carolann Duggan and the issue of trade 
union opposition to Partnership 2000, is just how close the deal actually came to 
rejection. One of the biggest single setbacks to the ratification of Partnership 
2000 came when Mandate - the union representing many shop workers - decided 
to oppose it. Since the workers represented by Mandate are very often low paid, 
this decision clearly sent out a message to other low paid workers. The social 
partners will doubtless have been further dismayed by this, given that the ICTU 
had managed to get the issue of trade union recognition on the agenda.
SIPTU represents some 197,000 Irish workers. It is clearly a massive movement 
in Irish terms. The union is active both in the public and private sectors and is 
thus a powerful voice in defence of the interests of its members when it actively 
advocates them. The only major difficulties SIPTU has been encountering in 
terms of its presence in Irish industry, concern its access to some of the recently 
established multinational corporations present in Ireland - particularly in high 
tech sectors - and also its appeal as a union among workers in such firms.
However, the major problem facing SIPTU is arguably - and perhaps 
paradoxically - its size. As a mass union it is run on a very professional footing. 
It leading officials are full time professionals and many of them are paid salaries 
not dissimilar to workers at management level in large companies. It would 
clearly be impossible for SIPTU to behave or go about its business like a small 
craft union, however Carolann Duggan’s campaign identified a distance between 
the workforce and the leading members of the trade union movement that had not 
previously been effectively addressed.
There thus existed something of a perception among lower paid workers who
141
were members of SIPTU that the union had become something of an 
establishment player, there to act as a voice for its members in its dealings with 
the ICTU and other social partners certainly, however challenged in terms of its 
relationship with many of its own rank and file and as a mirror o f the broad 
diversity of its nearly 200,000 members.
Within a couple of months of SIPTU’s members agreeing to ratify Partnership 
2000, the extent o f internal dissent within the union became apparent in SIPTU’s 
presidential election. The SIPTU top brass were in for shock by the challenge 
posed by Carolann Duggan who managed to secure a nomination for the election 
which she contested against the senior official Jimmy Somers. The first and most 
interesting thing to note with regard to the success enjoyed by Ms Duggan’s 
candidacy was that she achieved a vote of 43%, almost identical to the no vote to 
Partnership 2000 among SIPTU members.
In an interview with The Irish Times published on April 11 1997 she stated:
‘I believe that workers should control the unions and 1 believe that at the moment we don’t control
them.’59
Referring to the union leadership she added:
“I think they’re shook up (sic) and they will now have to listen to what’s going on on the factory 
floors and to know what it’s like to work in a factory and live on eight, nine and ten thousand 
pounds a y e a r .... The economy is booming, the bosses are making a mint, the banks are making 
millions. Workers have created that wealth and w e’re getting nothing.”60
This sentiment was addressed in an Irish Times editorial on July 8 1997 which 
dealt with the question of Trade Unions and Partnership:
‘The partnership approach has been designed to offer an alternative path to traditional wage 
militancy; but it requires reciprocity at national and local levels if it is to succeed. According to the 
general secretary of the ICTU, Mr Peter Cassells, workers have failed totally to penetrate the 
citadels o f capital and ownership in the workplace, through profit-sharing, share option schemes
or other forms o f stakeholding.’61
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4.11 The impact of dissent on the trade union leadership
In the aftermath of Ms Duggan’s unexpected success in the SIPTU presidential 
election, the union set about a process of what can only be described as damage 
limitation. Clearly conscious of the demands from within its ranks for greater 
militancy regarding pay issues and the terms of Partnership 2000 in particular, 
the union issued a circular advising members to seek pay rises over and above the 
9.25% sanctioned by Partnership 2000 before conceding extra productivity or 
changes in work practices.62 Although the circular, which raised the ire o f the 
employers federation IBEC, was issued by Jimmy Somers before he became 
president of SIPTU. it was not withdrawn clearly because SIPTU did not feel in 
a position to adopt a more conciliatory approach given Ms Duggan’s strength at 
that time. Under Partnership 2000, 7.25% of the pay award is to be given to 
workers across the board with no preconditions, whereas the remaining 2%, 
whilst it is intended to be paid, can be withheld in extenuating circumstances. In 
return for payment o f this final 2%, employers can seek extra productivity or 
restructuring in the workplace.
This apparent hardening of SIPTU’s line in response to the presidential election 
result was clearly designed to impact on the minds of the union’s members in 
advance of the next key test of the union’s cohesiveness - the election of vice- 
president due in Autumn 1997. I would suggest here that the leadership of 
SIPTU was extremely conscious of the temptation that would exist on the part of 
Ms Duggan and her supporters to muster as much support as possible in the vice- 
presidential race and possibly upset the applecart with a win. The added 
attraction here, as pointed out by Padraig Yeates in The Irish Times on 
September 8 1997, is that the union’s vice-president has responsibility for 
industrial relations and has the power to issue members with strike sanctions.
However, a number of factors conspired to ensure that Ms Duggan’s influence 
waned considerably in the second poll. The leadership’s candidate, Mr Des 
Geraghty, was one of the most popular and effective trade unionists in the
country. Geraghty’s long track record in trade unionism was clearly not seen in a 
negative light, despite the charge by Carolann Duggan that he and his fellow
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candidates were “middle aged apparatchniks embedded in union structures.” In 
the aftermath of the result of the election, Des Geraghty gave an interview to the 
Irish Times, his answers in which were commented upon by Padraig Yeates. 
Geraghty presented himself as both an innovator and a traditionalist, defending 
this view o f himself by asserting that:
“trade unions must become a focal point to assert the values of solidarity, equality, equity and 
democracy in the world of work - and in the wider community. We have to challenge the value 
systems of the global money market that protect rich and powerful financial institutions. That 
means we have to think globally ourselves. We have to organise globally and, equally, know how
and when to react to local problems.”64
Showing his grasp for the broader range of issues, and clear sense of vision, 
Geraghty adopts a considered approach to the issue of pay militancy as practised 
by trade unions. He is of the view that militancy on the pay issue does not of 
itself produce improvements in living standards. Recalling earlier battles, 
Geraghty points out that he negotiated very large increases in pay in the 1980s 
but that these were “eroded by high inflation and taxation.”65 Reflecting this 
desire to address broader issues, Geraghty points out that one of his current areas 
of concern is house prices which he views as one of the factors which render 
improvements in the economy less effective than they might otherwise be.
“We have members who are paying £700 to £900 a month and mortgages for relatively modest 
homes. It is pointless talking of pay rises ahead o f inflation if this sort o f thing is allowed to reduce
the real take home pay of workers.”66
It is clear that Des Geraghty places tremendous importance on the necessity for 
trade unions to grow and expand into organisms which are capable of operating 
in a broader range of sectors as is demanded by changing times. His campaign 
was marked with calls for the kind of reforms already mentioned here, but also 
by calls for another £500 million in tax cuts for the PAYE sector, greater child 
support services for working parents and, reflecting his concern over the housing 
issue, government action to curb house prices for young home-buyers.
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To put it simply though, the reason why Carolann Duggan proved no match for 
Des Geraghty was the latter’s ability to portray himself both confidently and 
honestly as an experienced fighter with an impressive track record of holding out 
under pressurised strike conditions. In addition, he was able to show a firm 
grasp of the wider agenda and sense of vision. Carolann Duggan was seen 
essentially as a protest candidate who shook the establishment up in the 
presidential election but who, in terms of the wider issues of organisation, 
strategy and tactics, was not a serious match for Des Geraghty. In addition, the 
fact that for all her radicalism, Duggan was not even a branch shop steward and 
had never been involved in a strike almost certainly did nothing to reinforce her 
standing with members who may have wanted to see her as a champion of 
campaigning trade unionism.
However, although the influence of Carolann Duggan within SIPTU was waning 
during all o f this period, she did not disappear totally as was proved during what 
may be judged as a somewhat vindictive debate at the SIPTU conference in 
Ennis, Co. Clare in early October 1997. A motion supported by the union’s 
leadership proposed that in future any member seeking to seeking to run for 
election to general office in the union be nominated by at least five branches or
5,000 members. The rule prior to this was one branch provided it had at least 
500 members. This was clearly an attempt to limit the possibility of a candidate 
like Duggan achieving a similar degree of success in the future, however the bid 
failed. Much as this showed an attachment among SIPTU members to internal 
democracy and pluralism - values close to the heart o f Des Geraghty as we have 
seen - the Ennis conference also proved the extent to which Duggan’s support 
was merely transient and of a protest nature. In particular, when motions were 
presented condemning the scope of the salary reforms for top officials these were 
strongly defeated.67 Thus SIPTU, having appeared to teeter on the brink of 
taking a radical swing away from conciliatory tactics, proved itself to be far 
more attached to a fundamentally consensual approach both internally and 
externally than had earlier appeared to be the case.
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4.12 The lessons of the Partnership 2000 negotiations
We saw clearly in the previous chapter the range of factors which have 
contributed to Ireland's transition from a country where an adversarial 
relationship was considered normal in industrial relations, to one whose 
industrial relations mechanisms are based on a system of social partnership. 
However, the frictions which accompanied the negotiation o f Partnership 2000 
gave an indication of the potential shortcomings of such an approach, and seem 
certain to resurface as the Partnership's successor agreement is negotiated in the 
months ahead. It is possible to contend that the reliance on such an approach to 
industrial relations is inextricably linked to Ireland's status as a poor country. We 
have seen how Lemass and others contended that controls were necessary if  the 
country were to grow to achieve anything like its full potential. The current 
series of partnerships and programmes grew out of the serious economic crisis in 
which Ireland had found itself in the 1980s and the need for serious corrective 
action to be taken in order to steer the country out o f that situation. The nub of 
the problem as regards such agreements can be found in Carolann Duggan's 
assessment that not enough was being gained by workers at a time when the 
country as a whole was booming.
Who could deny that strictly limited pay increases appear difficult to comprehend 
against the backdrop of the type of economic figures which are being reported ad  
nauseum at the present time? The country is running an increasing budget 
surplus, the numbers at work are at unprecedented levels and an increasing body 
of opinion suggests that we may have reached de facto full employment. And 
yet, the government and employers continue to appeal for restraint. The reasons 
behind such an approach make sense in the conservative logic of international 
business, to which Ireland is so much a part, however somewhat less so to 
figures on the left o f the trade union movement. For the government and 
employers, wage restraint will allow the country to retain its competitive edge 
and ensure that multinational investment and job creation will continue to come
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Ireland's way. To people such as Carolann Duggan and Mick O'Reilly, this 
merely provides evidence of a Celtic Tiger economy which is not properly 
attending to the needs of all its cubs.
It is worthwhile here to ponder on the comments o f Paula Carey in the last 
chapter. She referred to the ad hoc or flexible nature o f voluntarist industrial 
relations in Ireland, and the fact that the various institutions which existed did so 
to meet the needs of their particular time. She was also adamant that negotiating 
a new agreement to replace one which is expiring is not a foregone conclusion. It 
is perhaps the case that in this context, as in others which we will examine in the 
next paragraph, changed circumstances will present challenges for Irish society 
that have remained unmet up until now. Conscious of the broader needs of 
partnership, there have been moves to incorporate more wide ranging issues. 
The National Economic and Social Forum is an example o f an organism which 
exists to consider a variety of issues of concern to the various social partners and 
society in general. However it seems certain that much remains to be done if  the 
full potential o f partnership is to be realised.
As has already been mentioned, the crucial issue of trade union recognition in all 
workplaces will almost certainly be raised by the trade union side in the 
negotiations for a replacement to the current partnership. At present, the pay 
aspect to the partnership deal is binding across the economy, despite the fact that 
many employers who implement it do not recognise trade unions within their 
own companies. This is particularly the case with regard to the multinationals 
which, after all, make up such a vital part of the Irish economy today. There is 
thus a situation where those employers reap the benefits o f the unions' 
participation in partnership without according them anything in return. I 
mentioned previously that the development of broader partnership structures was 
important. In reality, however, what matters most to those who are sceptical 
about the benefits of partnership is the bottom line, in terms of what pay deal can 
be achieved.
147
It is likely that this is where the fault line will emerge in the next round of 
negotiations and it will not be an easy question to resolve. The partnership 
process to date has proved itself in terms of the stability it has brought and the 
tangible benefits achieved by workers. However, with the economic prosperity 
being enjoyed by Ireland today, the question legitimately arises regarding 
whether workers are receiving enough reward for their contribution to economic 
success. Partnership in good times is surely different to partnership in bad times, 
and it will be most interesting to see what new accommodations are inserted into 
the new pact. For it is my view that one will emerge. I believe the remarks of 
Paula Carey provide sufficient evidence of the commitment o f the union side. I 
simply contend that the pressures from the left will be more acute and ultimately 
harder to rebut given the spectacular continuation of the country's economic 
growth over the past two years.
4.13 Conclusion
Whilst the two events which form the core of this case study may not appear 
entirely compatible at the outset, they do provide us with an interesting snapshot 
of the contemporary labour relations situation in Ireland and France, particularly 
in the manner in which it interacts with more general issues of national economy 
policy. The Irish partnership model is seen as providing the basis both for 
sustained national economic growth and for inspiring confidence among potential 
international investors or companies considering locating their operations in 
Ireland. In the case of France, the more confrontational situation described 
herein reflects both the more confrontational nature of the relationship between 
the labour movement and society's élites and also the latter's unwillingness or 
inability to take into account the views of such movements and their supporters 
in the framing of policy. It would, however, be erroneous here not to remind 
ourselves of the low levels of unionisation seen in France overall, and the fact 
that the unions are almost absent in the private sector. Rather, their large scale 
actions are o f a much more political nature and they are able to mobilise very 
large numbers of people who may normally be totally apathetic to factory floor
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trade unionism, in support of particular causes.
The lines of division are clearly drawn in terms of the relationship between the 
government, unions and employers in larger issues of French economic policy, 
and it is on these questions that the unions have the greatest success in mobilising 
their strength, particularly against a right-wing government. The reality in 
Ireland is as we have seen different, but partnership negotiations serving as the 
forum for the airing of a range of issues and their incorporation into a national 
agreement. In both countries, however, the spectre o f Europe looms large. In 
Ireland, as we shall see in the next chapter, Europe has been associated with 
increased prosperity for the country and has generally been seen as a positive 
thing. In France, Europe has also been seen in a predominantly positive light, 
however this chapter has demonstrated that this is not always the case, 
particularly when it calls into question rights or benefits which are important to 
the French people or nation.
We will see in the next chapter how the question o f Europe is viewed more 
generally in both Ireland and France, and this will enable us to have a clearer 
understanding of how the issues dealt with in this thesis so far are reflected both 
in public opinion and in political debate on the issue of Europe.
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Chapter 5
Ireland and France: Different perceptions of a common European Union
5.0 Introduction
This thesis has so far addressed a number o f issues. We have looked at issues 
which contribute to the political culture of European societies and in particular 
the manner in which these have historically arisen in both Ireland and France. 
We have done this through a process of analysis which took account of a number 
of factors often seen as being associated with the development of political culture 
and also with its comparison across societies. After that, I presented an 
historical overview of the political and social development o f both Ireland and 
France, with a view to describing the role played by a number o f groups in the 
makeup of the political culture which has come to exist within them. The case 
study chapter of this thesis was intended to provide a practical overview of a 
dynamic of social conflict versus social consensus as I have seen it operating in 
both countries, and now in this chapter I wish to continue down the broadly 
empirical line developed in the case study by bringing the relationship between 
both countries and the European Union, an important element in contemporary 
debate, up to date and looking more closely at the key stages in its development 
in both societies.
We have seen that both Ireland and France have experienced very different 
patterns o f development, even though we can point to the range of common 
factors or characteristics identified between them in Chapter 2 as providing a 
suitable basis for comparison between them. We have additionally seen that they 
are faced with a common issue in terms of their membership of the European 
Union, which supposes that the countries of Europe which it chooses to admit 
have a commonality o f interests in terms of the manner in which they seek to 
address their own future development and that of the other countries o f the Union 
in the context of an evolving world order. However, the European debate in
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both countries, or the issues raised by Europe, have exhibited a range of 
differences.
We may seek to explain these differences simply in the context o f the historical 
differences between both countries if  we wish. It is very likely that the answer 
will lie in such an explanation at any rate. Or we may suppose that a broader 
range of real issues are involved, which are needless to say historical in origin, 
but which reflect a different outlook on the future and the desirability of certain 
outcomes for the future development of the country.
What I therefore wish to do in this chapter is present a range of evidence and 
argument regarding both countries and their European links. I will start with an 
overview of the results in the Eurobarometer surveys carried out across the EU 
with a range of respondents in each country. The advantage with this survey is 
that it allows us to look at answers to common questions provided at the same 
time across the European Union. I will then present other more contemporary 
survey evidence for France, pointing to particularly relevant developments since 
1995 in an attempt to depict the development in that country's relationship with 
the European Union since the period of the social movements described in the 
case study.
In the case o f Ireland, our task is somewhat easier. The relative enthusiasm for 
the process of European Union as described in the Eurobarometer findings is 
broadly speaking borne out by a range of popular votes on European issues in 
Ireland, brought about by the necessity of a referendum to amend the Irish 
constitution with which many EU treaties would initially be in conflict. Thus we 
have an electoral record on European issues in Ireland which does not necessarily 
exist in the case of France.
This chapter also includes an overview of the relationship between the European 
Union and French industry which is important in order to better appreciate the 
specific concerns raised in the previous case study chapter, and which adds to
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the perspective from which the relationship between France and Europe may be 
better understood.
5.1 Why the question of perceptions of Europe?
The European Union is made up of fifteen member states, the great bulk of 
which may be defined as nation states in the sense that they are home to a defined 
national community. Given the status o f the nation as an imagined community, 
each o f these countries has its own history, culture and range of nationalist 
myths and shibboleths on which it bases its identity. The same is not true of the 
European Union as a whole. Thus far, there has not been the development o f a 
European cultural history or identity with which the citizens can identify on the 
same level as those of their particular nations.
For Roger Eatwell, however, this does not permanently hinder the prospect of 
the development of a European identity. He quotes the French academic Ernest 
Renan who stated that in nation building it is more important -  even in the 
business o f distorting history favourably for one's side -  to forget than to 
remember. One of the dimensions to European identity on which Eatwell 
focuses is Europe's relationship to socio-economic modernity and progress. This 
is the idea of Europe as the home of the Industrial Revolution and also of the 
extensive welfare state. The latter has been called into question with the advance 
of globalisation, with several countries such as Germany and France attempting 
to push through some cuts in their social security systems. Nonetheless, as we 
will see later in this chaper, the European Union has now put a particular focus 
on job creation.
This is important, since if  the European Union is seen to go against the 
traditional values of many member states by opting for an ultra-liberal agenda, 
this can give rise to fears regarding the negative effects of the Union and 
ultimately put pressure on national governments. For this reason, Eatwell 
proposes that it seems more sensible to imagine Europe as an open identity,
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willing to learn from others, linked to the creation o f an economic programme 
which avoids the worst scenarios o f globalisation or Fortress Europe.
5.2 Eurobarometer and attitudes in Ireland and France
The Eurobarometer survey carried out twice yearly by the European Commission 
is a regular survey of the opinions of the citizens of the European Union member 
states. As such, it stands virtually unique in its role as a comparative 
examination of views on identical issues across Europe. Among the questions 
asked by the Eurobarometer survey on a regular basis are those concerning 
citizens views of the influence they can bring to bear on their respective national 
governments and also the confidence they place in a variety of institutions both 
local and national.
In addition to the rolling Eurobarometer poll, the Commission regularly 
publishes a concise overview of the trends observed in the polls over an extended 
period. One such overview covers the period from 1974 to 1994, undoubtedly 
the years during which the EU went through its most lacklustre period followed 
by a radical renewal under the stewardship of the Commission president Jacques 
Delors. The findings in this collection of surveys reveal a great deal about 
attitudes to Europe across the member states during these periods, and can also 
be used, in tandem with other data, to draw out comparative information 
between any number of member states.
Firstly we shall look at figures concerning attitudes regarding each country’s 
membership o f  the European Union during this period. Looking at France, we 
see approval ratings generally consistent in the high fifties or low sixties 
percentage wise up to the mid-1980s. Then there came the period of renewed 
European construction under the presidency of France’s Jacques Delors, and the 
figures began to rise. By 1987, approval for French EU membership was 
touching 70%, and the reasons for this are not hard to imagine. This period 
preceded the reunification of Germany and the concern this aroused in France.
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The fact that Jacques Delors was French lent a certain gallic hue to the whole 
process of reinvigoration he brought to the then EC, and consequently the idea 
of Europe as a French project was reinforced.
Some rather wide variations were recorded towards the very end of the 1980s 
with figures ranging anywhere between 63 and 70%. After 1992 however, the 
positive findings fell back substantially. Over the course of that year they went 
from 59% to 55%. The aftermath of the Maastricht referendum - which saw 
France accept the Maastricht Treaty by a razor thin 51%/49% margin - did not 
spell the end of the calling into question of France’s very participation in the EU. 
By April-May 1994 just 50% of French respondents could say that they 
considered France’s EU membership to be a good thing. This figure did recover 
substantially to reach 58% by late that year.1 Flowever, the decline had not been 
arrested. By spring 1996, just 48% of French respondents considered the 
country’s membership of the Union to be a good thing. A very significant 33% 
said they could not say whether EU membership was good or bad for France.
A similar falling off was seen in figures concerning the benefits or lack o f  them  
to France o f  the country’s membership o f  the EU. These were generally in the 
high fifties in the period post-1987, having been somewhat lower prior to this. 
However 1992 once again found itself marking a turning point. The second and 
final poll o f 1991 recorded a percentage of those claiming benefit o f EU 
membership of 51% and by mid- to late-1992 this had reached 45%. The fall 
continued, dropping to 39% in April-May 1994 and recovering three percentage 
points by the end of that year. Significantly, the numbers of those confident in 
the assertion that France had not benefited from its EU membership were at all 
times much higher than those who simply had no opinion on the matter. When, 
in 1994, just 39% of respondents felt EU membership had been of benefit to 
France, 40% stated the contrary. In the previous survey, 40% felt the country
•5
had benefited from membership as opposed to 39% who did not. By spring 
1996, the number of those believing France had benefited from being part o f the 
EU stood at 44%.4
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From 1988 onwards, Eurobarometer measured opinions regarding the hopes 
people had regarding the single market. Possible responses were very hopeful, 
rather hopeful, rather fearful or very fearful. The first incontrovertible finding is 
that, among French respondents, the most common response was rather hopeful. 
The numbers of those saying they were very hopeful fell virtually constantly 
between March-April 1989 and April-May 1994. From a figure o f 23% in the 
former it had reached 5% by the latter survey. It is particularly significant that 
evidence from the statistics showed that not all o f those who stopped being very 
confident went on to swell the ranks of the rather hopeful. Both the rather fearful 
and very fearful categories recorded significant rises during the period under 
examination. Matters improved somewhat in late-1994 and in December o f that 
year, 12% of respondents said they were very hopeful regarding the single 
market. All in all, mean responses throughout the period 1988-1994 show those 
very hopeful accounting for some 13% of respondents, the rather hopeful at 
approximately 37%, rather fearful 30%, very fearful 11-12% with in the order 
o f 7.5%-8% not proffering a reply. In the spring 1996 survey, 9% of French 
respondents felt very hopeful, 42% were rather hopeful, 24% were rather fearful 
whilst 18% were very fearful. 7% said they did not know.5
In the case of Ireland, support fo r  European Union membership  has
consistently been strong. In the first ten years after we joined, the number of 
those viewing our membership as a good thing generally stood at about 50%, 
and on some occasions it was notably higher, hitting 67% in October 1975. As 
in France, it suffered something of a falling back during the early- to mid-1980s 
as the Union appeared to stagnate. From 1988 onwards, support for Ireland’s 
membership literally boomed, and figures above seventy percent predominated.6 
By December 1994 support for EU membership in Ireland stood at 82%. Just 5% 
thought our membership was a bad thing, 10% said it was neither good nor bad 
and 3% did not answer.7
In terms of the benefits or otherwise accruing to Ireland fro m  E U  membership,
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there has been a practically constant progression in terms of satisfaction. The 
figure remained in the eighties through the early part o f the 1990s and in 
December 1994 it hit 90%.8 In spring 1996 it stood at a still most impressive 
86%.9 It is reasonable to say that Europe became a high profile news item during 
this period. Jacques Delors’ drive towards the completion of the single market 
by 1992 received widespread progress, and it was accompanied by a series of 
high profile developments involving Ireland at European level. The country’s 
1990 presidency of the European Council came in the immediate aftermath of the 
fall of the communist régimes of central and eastern Europe. In particular, the 
question of German reunification was on the table, and the holding of a special 
European Council meeting in Dublin in March 1990 provided the Taoiseach 
Charles Haughey with an opportunity to demonstrate the pivotal role that Ireland 
could play in wider political affairs at European level. The Irish presidency was 
determined to stand by the desire of the German government to secure European 
backing for the reunification project. Chancellor Helmut Kohl has repeatedly 
stated his gratitude for the role played by Haughey and the Irish officials in 
achieving the desired outcome. In addition to this, Iraq’s August 1990 invasion 
of Kuwait, although it occurred after the end of Ireland’s presidency, afforded 
the Irish government another high profile opportunity to prove the benefits of 
Europe through its participation in the Troika. This grouping of EU foreign 
ministers composing the present, last and next countries to hold the presidency, 
was active in terms of the shuttle diplomacy which characterised the months 
between the invasion of Kuwait and the commencement of hostilities by the 
international coalition assembled in Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf.
Europe remained on the Irish political agenda with the Maastricht Treaty 
referendum which was enthusiastically ratified by the people in the referendum 
of June 18, 1992 (69% yes/31% no). The promise o f a massive cash injection of 
£8 billion by the EU at this time doubtless reinforced the widespread feeling that 
Ireland was most definitely benefiting from Europe!
The issue of the single market is another which has recorded widespread support
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among Irish Eurobarometer respondents. There was a certain euphoria about 
expectations from the single market which was evident in the years during which 
it was not yet a reality but was a subject of constant discussion in the media. In 
1988 and 1989 for example, findings of Eurobarometer surveys carried out 
among Irish respondents showed that some 28% of those interviewed with very 
hopeful regarding the single market, 50% were rather hopeful, 10% were rather 
fearful and 2% were very fearful. 10% did not reply. Over time, the figures 
showed something of a levelling off as the single market became an everyday 
reality. In general, 20% of respondents said they were very hopeful, again 50% 
remained rather hopeful, approximately 10% were rather fearful and 4% were 
very fearful.10
As would be expected, similar levels of euphoria were reported concerning 
people’s general attitude towards the single market. In 1988/9, a massive 70% 
of Irish respondents considered it to be a good thing, 15% felt it was neither 
good nor bad and just about 8% felt it was a bad thing. 5% did not offer a reply. 
By 1992, the figures had levelled out at 55% believing the single market was a 
good thing, 25% saying it was neither good nor bad and 6% believing it was a 
bad thing. 14% did not reply.11
The Eurobarometer figures covering the period from 1974 to 1974 clearly show 
differences between France and Ireland insofar as attitudes to Europe are 
concerned. Later in this chapter we shall see more survey evidence and analysis 
o f political attitudes to Europe in both countries. However, the evidence 
presented thus far omits the period directly covered by the 1995 social 
movements in France which formed much of the basis for the preceding chapter. 
The difficulty with this evidence is that taken in isolation, it is difficult to extract 
any concrete conclusions from it which improve upon those we may draw from 
the previous evidence. Just to complete the picture therefore, the findings o f the 
Spring 1996 Eurobarometer poll showed scant difference between the Irish and 
the French in terms of their perceived influence on their national governments. 
Both of them came in slightly above the EU average but still recorded low
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findings. Just 26% of Irish and 24% of French respondents felt they could 
influence their national governments with the EU average standing at 22%. 
When it came to their perceived influence on the EU, the findings were even 
worse. The EU average of perceived influence stood at 18% with Ireland at 19% 
and France at 17%.
One reasonably interesting finding which does deserve a mention concerns the 
difference between French and German respondents concerning perceived 
influence on the European Union. The figure was 23% of Germans believing 
they were influential and 71% believing they were not. Given the known French 
reservations regarding German reunification, and the reappearance of Germany 
as a political as well as economic player on the international stage, it is 
interesting that such a divergence could exist between two partner nations. This 
finding must surely underline the viewpoint that French voters no longer view 
the European Union as something which they can automatically hope to impose 
their will on. This fact was reinforced by the Spring 1998 summit decision 
which saw President Chirac fail to impose a French candidate as first president o f 
the European Central Bank. In order to avoid a French veto, Chirac’s candidate 
will succeed the successful Dutchman, who will retire before the formal end of 
his mandate.
In looking at these figures, one could adopt various approaches. It is inevitable 
that in the case of Ireland, the view of Europe that is conditioned by the 
considerable financial benefit accruing to the country from membership had 
tended to be paramount. As one of the smaller member states, Ireland’s priority 
over most of its time in the Union has been to maximise the general economic 
benefits of membership, through skilfully handling the various funds available to 
the country as a result o f its comparatively disadvantaged status within the entity. 
The very apparent EU funding of infrastructure improvements, particularly 
regarding the road network and later the railways and Dun Laoghaire seaport lent 
a very evident face to the money that the Union was investing in Ireland. In the 
sphere of agriculture, the advent of policies such as the Common Agricultural
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Policy and practices such as intervention gave farmers a much greater degree of 
economic security than they would hitherto have known. It is also worth 
mentioning that in the political sphere, the EU has allowed Ireland to broaden its 
foreign relations by lessening the country's traditional dependence on its links 
with Britain.
The reality is that precious little media coverage is given to many questions 
regarding the broader political agenda of the European project in the Irish media, 
and internal developments in individual member states. This is not necessarily 
due to ineptness on the part of Irish journalists covering European issues, since 
with particular regard to coverage on RTE television and radio, it is clear that 
most correspondents are very well abreast of their brief. Rather, the priorities of 
European coverage - from experience I can assert that government pressure is 
often firmly behind these - centre around the direct financial benefits accruing to 
Ireland from negotiations on a variety of issues. That there would be benefits has 
not generally been in doubt since Ireland has always been a net beneficiary o f EU 
funds, as opposed to wealthier nations such as France which have been net 
contributors. It is, in my view, reasonable to assume that with allocations of 
structural funds set to diminish very significantly by 2006, the consensus 
regarding the benefits o f EU membership to the country will reduce somewhat. 
It is certainly the case that an effort by the Irish government to raise awareness 
and support for the broader agenda underpinning the European Union is seriously 
overdue.
Almost inevitably, France will not exhibit the same kind of blind europhilia 
evident in Ireland. This is not as such to do with the fact that the French as a 
nation are any less gullible or naive in their expectations than the Irish. Clearly, 
the volontarisme which we have spoken of previously will give the lie to that 
notion, since in terms of what they believe it is possible to obtain from protests, 
the French go much further than the Irish. Rather, the French perception of 
Europe takes the broader line and encompasses greater concern with the overall 
political process than does the Irish one. France cannot as such point to direct
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monetary benefits from being part o f the European Union. Like any member 
state, it can point to the benefits that accrue simply from being an EU member, 
in terms of participation in a strong single currency and the anticipated economic 
clout to be derived from association with a transnational institution as apparently 
determined in its objectives as the European Union. The hard reality is that 
France often did not have as much success imposing its own agenda on the 
European Union, particularly in most recent years. The French interest in 
generating European industrial champions where once there had been French 
ones has not been a priority shared by many other member states. In the area of 
research, development and innovation there has additionally been a reluctance at 
European level to back initiatives seeking to set new European standards in a
range of technological areas. One French proposal, relating to High Definition
■ 12 Television, was given a trial in the early-1990s, but has since been buried.
5.3 French economic and industrial policy in the European context
At this point, I wish to move away temporarily from considerations of attitudes 
among the French populace towards the European Union, to look in more detail 
at the manner in which Europe has impacted over the years on France's economic 
and industrial policy. I believe that this analysis will compliment the information 
already provided with regard to France throughout this thesis, and will prepare 
the ground for my concluding remarks on contemporary French political culture 
later. I wish to justify this focus on French industrial and economic policy to the 
exclusion of Ireland on the basis that, in order to understand a significant aspect 
of the rationale behind the French perception of Europe, we need to consider the 
economic niche that France was attempting to carve out for itself in port-war 
Europe.
Hussein Kassim divides France's relationship with Europe into two major 
periods. The first concerns the years from the 1950s to the 1980s, and the 
second, the years which have elapsed primarily since the Single European Act, 
but also since the re-emergence of a strong German political identity in the
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1 3aftermath of the collapse of the Communist bloc.
The earlier period which, in Kassim's analysis, continued until 1986, saw 
Europe contribute to France's achieving its two great post-war objectives. The 
first was economic modernisation and the second the containment of Germany. 
For Kassim, the former was arrived at through the development o f the common 
market and the great economic changes that occurred in France during the 1950s 
and 1960s. These changes saw France move from being a predominantly rural 
economy to a largely urban one. As this was happening, it was necessary to 
retain the support of farmers whose sector was now losing its traditional 
importance, but whose support was necessary^ to see the change through. The 
government managed to do this by supporting the adoption of the Common 
Agricultural Policy.14
Insofar as containing Germany was concerned, for Kassim this was achieved 
through co-operation with the country's eastern neighbour in policy making 
endeavours.15 However I feel that there was significantly more than this 
involved. Clearly, the German state from the post-war period to the beginning 
of the 1990s was one which showed little appetite for a large scale presence at 
international diplomatic level. Germany appeared far more content to enjoy its 
phenomenal economic recovery and bask in the respectability o f the developing 
EEC and its alliance with France. Indeed, it is entirely fair to say that if 
Germany put all of its huge economic clout at the service of its alliance with 
France and of Europe, throughout this period the 'political' respectability of the 
new Germany was very largely French in origin. A constant undercurrent points 
to the view of many German leaders that the country's successful participation in 
international organisations on a 'one among equals' basis, contributes to 
containing the demon within. Germany simply did not have the political will to 
make its presence felt internationally.
During this period, Europe was merely a tool at the service of French interests. 
Not that this was the intention of the community as a whole. France was merely
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able to use its membership to ensure that French interests would be protected 
within it. France's interventionist policy continued unabated, a strategy which 
according to Elie Cohen may be defined according to the following criteria. 
Firstly the economy of administered financing whereby credit was strictly 
supervised by the state. Secondly came an inflationist social compromise, which 
Cohen has described as 'the consensual refusal o f the state, the trade unions and 
the employers to control nominal changes in incomes and prices'. Thirdly came 
the pursuit of grands projets, with the state intervening in support o f national 
champions in industries selected for their strategic importance.16
It was during the 1980s that things began to change. Undoubtedly the most 
significant change in terms of the medium to long term development o f the 
French economy was that occurring outside France. Increased openness in the 
international economy meant that domestic economies were steadily becoming 
too small. In order to compete, most countries began to favour anti-inflationary
17policies. This, naturally, signalled change in France.
In addition, a number of changes took place in France. There was the 
abandonment of the principle of 'Keynesianism in one country' which had been 
adopted by the French socialists in the aftermath of their 1981 election victories. 
A restructuring was undertaken of the banking and financial system, first under 
Jacques Delors and then under Edouard Balladur. The state also commenced its 
retreat from the interventionism which had characterised its operation since the 
post-war period. Kassim discerns three strands of continuity in the European 
policy pursued by French presidents from de Gaulle to Mitterrand.
Firstly, he points to European integration as being a way of containing Germany. 
Secondly, the role o f European institutions in providing an instrument for the 
achievement o f French policy objectives, particularly those which could not be 
achieved at national level. Thirdly, there has been a commitment to an 
intergovemmentalist conception of integration - the 'communauté forte aux 
institutions faibles.' This last point may be understood as a French attachment to
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the idea o f a Europe in which the rules would be fixed by sovereign governments 
at summit meetings, with France enjoying its usual high degree o f influence.
Strengthening the Union's supranational institutions naturally supposes a
18watering down of the intergovemmentalist approach.
The Single European Act represented the first major challenge to France's control 
of its European affairs. As Kassim points out, France was a supporter of the 
Act, seeing in it potential to develop one of its priorities which had not been 
dealt with up to then. The French wished to see European industry gaining a 
competitive advantage in world markets through Europe becoming an economic 
force with which to be reckoned. The internal market would allow European 
firms to develop continental economies of scale and expose them to market 
disciplines, thus forcing them to increase their productivity and efficiency. 
Furthermore, France sought collaboration in research and development at 
European level, and called for the single market to have a social dimension.19
France was to be disappointed by Europe's response to its vision. Rather than the 
promotion of a European level industrial policy and the creation of European 
level champion firms on the model which France had adopted at home, priority 
went to the promotion of trade within the single market area. For Kassim, the 
failure of the European Commission to allow the takeover o f de Havilland, 
Boeing's Canadian division, by Aérospatiale and Italy's Alénia, provided 
evidence of its lack of willingness to assist European firms to compete
90effectively in world markets.
But perhaps the level on which the Single European Act is best known for having 
presented France with a challenge, is that of deregulation and economic 
liberalisation. That the Community should opt for a drive towards deregulation 
in the aftermath of the adoption of the Single European Act was hardly 
surprising. What was, however, significant, was the way in which it pushed 
ahead in an ambitious manner, aiming to open up sectors which had traditionally 
been bastions of protectionism and anti-competitive agreements. One o f the
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Community's key weapons in this strategy was its competition powers. By 
steadfastly applying Articles 85 and 86 of the SEA, governing anti-competitive 
agreements between firms and the abuse o f dominant positions by firms, in 
addition to the EEC Treaty provisions on the control of state aid, and the
adoption of a new instrument for regulating mergers and acquisitions, the then
• ■ 21 EC made significant progress towards completing the single market.
Whilst France was by no means alone in being affected by these changes in 
European policy, the result of their implementation was to impact in a 
particularly potent way on the country, since it affected a number of sectors in 
which the French state was still involved such as the car industry and air 
transport. Specifically, in the case of firms requiring state aid such as Bull, 
Renault and Air France, and de Havilland's proposed merger, the French were 
instructed either to meet certain criteria or to drop their plans to intervene 
altogether.22
Whilst the EC had long been a factor in French policy making, the aftermath of 
the SEA meant that the country was now destined to enjoy a very different 
relationship with Europe, in which once a policy was adopted at the 
intergovernmental level, the Commission's role as guardian of the common good 
- at least insofar as the observance of treaties and decisions were concerned - was 
to see it call the shots as regards the French in a way which had not hitherto been 
the case.
In tandem with these changes in France's relationship with the EC/EU, 
significant changes were occurring in the Franco/German alliance. These 
changes started with German reunification, a subject on which France shared the 
reservations expressed more openly by Britain. Yet, France found itself fairly
— r)'\ ipowerless to prevent Germany from reunifying , and instead decided to 
continue its policy of promoting further integration to continue its approach of 
containing Germany. This suited Germany as well, which, after all, saw the 
continued development of the European Union as essential for keeping in check
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those forces within its borders who would favour a more go-it-alone approach. 
At any rate, Germany's approach to Europe was modifying as well. Its 
confidence bolstered by reunification, it now felt itself more in the driving seat, 
pushing for more supranationalism in the Maastricht negotiations.24
In the currency debate, France's support for EMU came under pressure from 
German economic policy in the aftermath of reunification. High German interest 
rates in order to fund the cost of reunification, and France's rejection o f a 
German offer to adjust parities, led to heavy speculation against the Franc. 
Financial reforms in France in its attempt to meet the Maastricht convergence 
targets engendered large scale hostility, the continuation of a questioning of 
Europe's role in French affairs which started with the divisive 1992 Maastricht 
referendum.
This overview affords us a useful perspective on how issues with a social and a 
national sovereignty dimension are closely tied to economic matters in France, 
and it is clear to see how frustration with the new limitations being placed upon 
the state - particularly when the result of these is a government imposed austerity 
package - can boil over as escape hatches which were once viable options are no 
longer so.
The link between the social and the economic here is surely linked also to the 
history of French economic planning which is considerably different to its Irish 
counterpart in a number of respects. As pointed out above, the legacy o f Les 
Trente Glorieuses and the extended period of prosperity it brought about 
contrasts sharply with Ireland's experience of protectionism. Furthermore, 
dirigism itself played a central part in the economic planning o f the Trente 
Glorieuses period, which saw France manage its economy with a series of 
national plans which, right up until the oil-crisis o f 1973/4, ensured that the 
state in France would be seen as a father figure acting in defence o f national 
interests and all times and capable of ensuring well being and social progress, 
even against a backdrop o f political uncertainty, such as that which was in
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evidence as the Fourth Republic crumbled.
However, pressures from outside and the steady realisation o f the limits of the 
French state have over a number o f stages led to changes within. The liberal 
economic reforms which have taken place within France since the mid-1980s 
have largely been marked by waves o f privatisation. Yet, in analysing the extent 
to which this apparent recourse to liberalism represented a break with France's 
dirigiste past, Maclean suggests that 'it is perhaps nationalisation which should 
be seen as the aberration, albeit brief, in the continuum of French dirigiste 
rule.25 The firm found its rehabilitation in the privatisation process, as a State, 
which had exceeded the limits Laurent Fabius had warned it not to in 1984, 
found its empty coffers more potent than any ideology.
However, as Jack Hayward remarks, the question of trade liberalisation has 
caused sporadic panic among sectors of the French élite. The realisation during 
the course o f the 1990s has been that globalisation was gaining the upper hand 
internationally. Government efforts to bring in a more liberal, competitive 
agenda sparked a protectionist backlash, embodied by the 1993 report on the 
fiscal and economic effects of delocalisation of French industry and services by 
Senator Jean Arthuis - later to become Finance Minister under Jacques Chirac in 
1995. The report predicted eventual job losses of up to five million people by
correlating unemployment with free competition, foreign investment and
26delocalisation, welfare provision and loss of competitiveness.
5.4 France and Europe today
As we have seen, both from the figures presented in the overview of 
Eurobarometer findings above, and the evidence in the case study regarding the 
European dimension to the strike movements of late-1995, Europe has come to 
constitute a source of political division in France much more than in Ireland. 
Admittedly, there are grounds for suggesting that this has not always been the 
case, but rather that it is the result o f a transformation in more recent times.
Referring to the 1992 referendum on the Maastricht Treaty which was carried by 
a margin of 51%-49%, Pia Christina Wood points out that:
"the tenor of the debate, the high level of interest demonstrated by the public, and the closeness of 
the vote appeared to support the conclusion that "Europe" had been transformed from a quasi- 
foreign policy issue into a domestic issue of primary importance."27
It is necessary to look at French attitudes to Europe in recent times, and 
particularly to bring these up to date to gain a clear impression of where the 
country's European identity is going now. When President Mitterrand came to 
power in 1981, it is fair to say that Europe was not apparent as one of his major 
campaign priorities. There had been discussion of Europe at the 1979 Congress 
in Metz when the Socialists had appeared rather split over Europe. On the left of 
the party, the CERES28 group led by Jean-Pierre Chevènement came out as 
being strongly opposed to further European integration, adopting an anti- 
European and nationalist stand. Further to the right of the party, (although with 
prominent left-wing members), a group led by Michel Rocard and Pierre 
Mauroy advocated support for European integration, and in particular the 
development of a workers' Europe. Mitterrand's own faction steered a middle 
course including the protection of French sovereignty and independence, the 
reinforcement of the powers of the European Parliament without weakening 
national parliaments, enlargement but only with protective economic 
preconditions, and dislike of the EMS. However, in the immediate run-up to 
the Presidential Election, Mitterrand shifted somewhat towards the CERES 
position, following a challenge for the presidential nomination from Rocard. In 
the 110 propositions document on which Mitterrand won the election, only three 
proposals referred directly to Europe. Following his victory, the new President 
chose to focus his domestic policy on the Socialist economic agenda, and his
- — on
foreign policy on NATO and France's leadership role in developing countries. 
Among the first government of Mitterrand's long tenure as president, there was a 
clear division between pro- and anti-European integration ministers. On the one 
hand, men such as Pierre Mauroy (Prime Minister), Claude Cheysson (Foreign 
Affairs) and Jacques Delors (Trade) clearly represented the pro-Europe side in
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the cabinet, they were outweighed by Chevenement and the four Communist 
ministers. Wood argues that the integrationists did not finally win the day until 
Mitterrand's decision to maintain the franc in the ERM in 1983.
Having reinforced his control over France's European policy, President 
Mitterrand then decided to push the European agenda as part of the repositioning 
of his administration. In a speech in Strasbourg during the European Election 
campaign of 1984, the President made a groundbreaking speech during which he 
advocated support for the proposed European Union Treaty. This treaty seemed 
to run contrary to many of the values which, up to then, had been dear to the 
heart o f French Socialists. It proposed numerous measures o f institutional 
reform, including strengthening the powers of the Commission and the European 
Parliament and increasing majority decision making. Such measures had 
previously been viewed by the government as being detrimental to national 
sovereignty. Indeed, in February 1984, French Socialist MEPs had voted 
against the draft European Union Treaty. However, here was Mitterrand clearly 
reversing the party line.
However, the 1984 campaign was dominated by domestic issues, and 
consequently the President's speech was not the major campaign issue it perhaps 
ought to have been. Nonetheless, the parties of the Right did express their views 
on European issues in their formal declarations on the campaign. Although the 
RPR and UDF presented a common list to electors, clear divergences emerged 
between them on key issues. The RPR reiterated its traditional position that the 
EU should never be allowed to undermine French sovereignty and thus opposed 
all moves to increase the supranational nature of its operation. The UDF, for its 
part, found itself in a delicate position, as a part o f the main opposition but yet 
with a much more pro-European outlook that its fellow candidates in the RPR. 
This division between them was one of the main reasons why the UDF campaign 
at that time focused on European issues.
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It would be remiss to mention the 1984 European elections without making some 
reference to the National Front, since it was then that it first emerged as a potent 
national force. However, once again its campaign focused on domestic issues, 
and in terms of its European focus was hostile to an EU which threatened French 
sovereignty. It did, however, see the EU as being a positive development in the 
face of a common enemy -  the USSR.
Between 1984 and 1989, there had been many major developments in the 
European sphere, particularly the Single European Act and the development of 
the Delors framework for completing the single market by 1992. Consequently, 
it was possible in 1989 for the election debate to espouse a much more resolutely 
European agenda. The feeling that France was in the driving seat of a European 
train which, overall was serving it well, led to the presence of something of a 
rush among the major parties to appear the most Euro friendly. This was so 
much so that the prominent UDF politician, Simone Veil, broke away from the 
main UDF-RPR list, to form her own list dubbed les centristes, arguing that the 
main opposition list was made up of two fundamentally contrasting views o f the 
future of European integration. However, it was in 1989 that divisions between 
the major parties over Europe appeared to have reached the point o f a virtual 
consensus.
This was of course broken by the Communists, National Front and Greens. 
Wood reports that the Communist Party was the most openly hostile to Europe in 
1989, despite the insistence by the tête de liste Philippe Flerzog that the 
Communists were not opposed to European integration. However, their 
campaign called for 'constructing Europe differently and a different Europe' and 
accused the SEA of 'hampering France's liberty and sacrificing its economy to 
German domination.'31 Indeed, the Communists tried to wave the Gaullist 
banner, arguing that they were the sole defenders o f French sovereignty.
In that latter context, they were joined by the FN. It is worth bearing in mind 
that, in 1989, the RPR's official line was decidedly pro-Europe. Although the
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slogan it championed, along with the UDF, was 'A Strong France in a Strong 
Europe.', it openly supported initiatives such as monetary union with a single 
currency, and protection of a social Europe. Consequently, a space was opened 
up for the FN to occupy traditional Gaullist ground, and this it did by advocating 
subsidiarity as the best approach for constructing EU policy and suggesting that 
the Union itself should remain something of a confederation. Le Pen adamantly 
opposed what he termed 'a cosmopolitan and multiracial Europe', however he 
supported a common European defence and security policy, a common European 
currency, and a regulatory institute similar to the board of the US Federal 
Reserve. However, many aspects of the FN's campaign focused on domestic 
issues where it had established a presence, namely immigration and law and 
order.
It is clear that between the European elections of 1989, and the Maastricht 
referendum of 1992, something happened to rock the consensus on European 
issues among the major political forces in France. On the one hand, there was 
the ground covered by the PCF, FN and Greens in 1989, and their attempts -  
certainly in the case of the first two -  to hoist the Gaullist banner o f national 
sovereignty and the national interest. Wood reminds us that a range of 
developments had occurred to change the political face of Europe in the 
intervening period. The communist régimes of eastern Europe collapsed, and 
those countries began to embrace democracy. Meanwhile Yugoslavia broke up 
and descended into violent interethnic combat, and Germany reunified. The 
reunification of Germany posed particular dilemmas for major countries such as 
Britain and France who had become accustomed to a Germany which, on the 
international stage, was politically weak as a result of the established post-war 
order. Ancestral fears of a resurgent Germany were very much in evidence in 
early-1990, and President Mitterrand was anxious to ensure that the country 
would pin its colours firmly to the European mast, rather than seeking to pursue 
its regained power through more independent means. This was of particular 
importance since the number of foreign troops on German soil was to be 
drastically reduced, and its official status as an occupied country ended.
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I do not intend here to provide an overview of the provisions of the Maastricht 
Treaty; these are well known and are easily available. What I want to do is 
illustrate the new range of political opinions which prevailed in France 
surrounding this referendum. The political developments o f spring 1992 were, 
by any definition, disturbing for Europe's political leaders. Whilst questions 
relating to national sovereignty were always going to be on the agenda, they 
could scarcely have imagined the extent o f the dissent that would be voiced. 
Throughout 1991, the traditional opponents of further European integration 
within France were vocal in their opposition to the thrust of Mitterrand's policy 
and the treaty in general. They were joined by a variety o f figures from the RPR, 
led in particular by Philippe Séguin, who argued that the Maastricht Treaty 
would severely compromise French sovereignty. In a decision for which he was 
later to be criticised by many pro-Europeans and domestic political 
commentators, President Mitterrand reacted to the dissent by agreeing, on June 
3, 1991, to hold a national referendum on the ratification o f the Maastricht
Treaty. Although within the National Assembly, the vote on amending the 
constitution to ratify the Maastricht Treaty was passed by a large majority, this 
was not the case when the matter was put to the country.
Wood reminds us that RPR dissension over Europe was nothing new. The 
Gaullist party held a traditionally trenchant view of the authority of the nation 
state and thus generally opposed moves of a supranational nature. She quotes the 
noted political commentator Alain Duhamel:
"The Gaullist family has the cult of the French difference, the obsessive fear for France's identity,
and a terror of French obliteration."33
There had in the past been differences within the RPR at the time of the 
introduction of the Single European Act, but now the party's internal differences 
over Europe were supplemented by an additional major fear: what would be the 
effect of this new treaty on the balance of power between France and Germany 
within Europe? Would France now be less in a position to control a resurgent
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Germany than before? What of the provisions of the Treaty: the European 
Central Bank, additional powers for the Commission and the European 
Parliament, and the right to vote for all citizens of the Union? In the eyes o f 
Philippe Séguin, these were all dangerous steps leading to the end o f the nation­
state in Europe and the development of a federal structure.
As might have been expected, the UDF was more united on Maastricht than the 
RPR, however it did have its prominent dissenter in the person o f Philippe de 
Villiers, leader o f a movement known as Combat des valeurs. Once again, he 
presented many of the same criticisms as Séguin, but added an increased degree 
of xenophobia, denouncing plans to allow foreigners to vote in France and 
expressing concern over further breaking down of borders which would lead to 
an inflow of refugees and immigrants.
Not surprisingly, both Séguin and de Villiers were joined in their hostility to 
Maastricht by the National Front. Many of Le Pen's arguments were very similar 
to those of the other two men, however they did take on a more racist character, 
with the leader of the FN alleging a global conspiracy which would lead France 
to national suicide, and provide for only more immigration, insecurity and even 
AIDS. Jean-Marie Le Pen additionally complained that the treaty would allow 
the foreign representatives of big capital, stateless bankers and Brussels 
technocrats to gain greater control over French decision making.
The Communist Party also opposed the treaty, but Georges Marchais was quick 
to point out that the kind of Europe he wanted was neither isolationist nor based 
on the Maastricht provisions, but rather something completely different. The 
main tenets of their opposition to the treaty were: 1) the idea of a supranational 
Europe dominated by Germany, 2) the negative domestic social impact of 
Maastricht: higher unemployment, lower wages, fewer jobs from greater 
competition, increased social tension accompanied by rising nationalism leading 
to a profound crisis, 3) The link between the treaty and the policies o f la grande 
bourgeoisie.
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It is true that the Maastricht referendum was carried by virtually the narrowest of 
margins in France, and that the score obtained by the 'no' camp represented a 
stunning success for a collection of opponents of the treaty who were challenging 
the assumed consensus on Europe that had been seen in France in the preceding 
years. However, it is also worth noting that, in achieving a victory, the 'yes' 
campaign also recorded a not insignificant political achievement, given the fact 
that a precedent had been set earlier in the year in Denmark when the electorate 
had rejected the treaty in a surprise outcome, which proved particularly 
embarrassing since the country held the rotating EU presidency at the time.
However, Maastricht marked a major turning point in the sense that, according 
to Wood, it marked the inclusion of Europe as an element o f debate and 
disagreement in the domestic political arena for the first time, as opposed to its 
perception as an issue which was by and large one of foreign policy, and thus an 
area outside the hurly burly of domestic concerns.
The event which forms the focal point of the case study of this thesis, in the 
French context, is the social movements of late-1995. It is therefore of some 
interest here to look at the presentation of Europe in the presidential election 
campaign of 1995.
By and large, the campaign did not particularly focus on European or 
international issues, with the exception of that run by Philippe de Villiers. Jean- 
Marie Le Pen did refer once again to the issues of the Maastricht referendum, 
but predictably focused much of his venom on his old reliable topic of 
immigration. The three main candidates centred their campaigns around issues 
such as unemployment, salaries, taxes and defence which, although they do 
have undoubted European connections, were presented in a primarily domestic 
context. Indeed, on European issues there was a broad measure of agreement on 
the need for European integration among the three main candidates. They were, 
however, vague on the substance of their European vision, with Chirac happy to
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refer to Europe as 'a necessary ambition' in the current era, Jospin describing it 
as the natural framework for the action of the French government, and Balladur 
viewing Europe as indispensable for the future of the country.
Both Balladur and Jospin restated their allegiance to the Maastricht Treaty, 
whilst Chirac was somewhat more reticent, arguing that he still viewed a 
renegotiation of Maastricht as desirable, however standing by his rather reticent 
1992 support for it. Indeed, in terms of political relations within Europe, the 
Franco-German alliance seemed to be given the highest priority by the three 
candidates, Jospin declaring that Franco-German relations were 'the essential 
axis o f European construction', and Chirac devoting a whole article in Le Monde 
to the subject, albeit under the headline Une volonté pour l'Europe. Evidence of 
differences over the speed of European integration appeared in relation to the 
timetable for the single currency. Balladur, who was Prime Minister at the time, 
and who directly linked France's prospects for economic recovery to its role in 
Europe, pressed for the rapid introduction of the single currency by 1997 if 
possible. Lionel Jospin, the Socialist candidate, felt that France would have 
difficulty in meeting the Maastricht convergence criteria in time for a 1997 start 
to the single currency, and suggested that 1999 was a more realistic start date. 
But Chirac was the most non-committal o f the three insofar as fixing an exact 
date was concerned. He simply argued that the single currency ought to be 
introduced once all of the criteria outlined in the treaty had been met. Chirac 
devoted much of his attention between the first and second rounds of polling to 
the idea that there existed a fracture sociale, causing social exclusion, and he 
seemed most concerned with taking radical steps on the domestic front to 
alleviate this. Indeed, even if  Wood tends to play down the differences between 
the major candidates over Europe in her analysis -  pointing to the strong 
adherence to European policy by the Chirac administration in the year after the 
President's election -  I believe the key fact is that a man who had seemed less 
concerned about establishing timetables for European integration when he was 
seeking election then seemed to embrace the fast track approach absolutely 
within a few months of taking office. There was a clear shift of focus there.34
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In the event, the French elected Chirac as their new president in May 1995, 
opting for a man who in the eyes of many was a recent and unconvincing convert 
to many of the social justice arguments he was presenting. As I have outlined 
earlier in the case study, Chirac revised much of his policy and reshuffled his 
cabinet late in 1995 with his announcement that the social security system would 
have to be radically reformed and the country's budget deficit cut in order to meet 
the Maastricht convergence criteria. It is useful then to trace the relationship 
between the French and Europe over the intervening period, and in particular to 
explore the relationship with the broader phenomena of global economic change.
During the course of the 1997 General Election campaign, the noted economic 
liberal Elie Cohen was interviewed in L'Alsace newspaper on the theme of 
globalisation, and how it was viewed by the French. In the early part o f the 
interview, Cohen nails his pro-European colours firmly to the mast in these 
terms:
"During the last GATT world trade talks, France used strong arm tactics, in Paris, threatening to 
use its veto. But in practise, it was European solidarity which allowed us to save face, since 
Europe accounts for 45% of world trade. A delegate who speaks for that 45% obviously carries 
much more weight than one who speaks for France alone, which accounts for just a tiny part of 
world trade. If France can, today, still consider herself as a power, it is only because she speaks in
the name of Europe."35
His interviewer, Francis Laffont, asked Cohen if  France was the European 
country with the greatest sense of fear regarding globalisation:
"There is, in that regard, a real French exception. I have found it amusing to look at the extent to 
which we blame globalisation for all our problems, and drawing up a list of them is almost like 
naming the ten plagues of Egypt. Globalisation is the cause of our unemployment, the erosion of  
our public services, the loss of our economic sovereignty, the development of inequalities etc... 
And behind the great scapegoat of globalisation, there is a secondary scapegoat: European  
integration. It is seen as the factor which accelerates globalisation."36
Cohen goes on to provide his own explanation for this, citing the perception of 
the state that existed in France in the aftermath of the liberation at the end of the
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Second World War. There was an insistence on technical progress, the State and 
the Nation. Great technical progress was seen as a way of strengthening national 
sovereignty, and the role of the state in flagship industries such as Electricité de 
France was seen as representing a rationale superior to that o f the market.
This model worked well, Cohen points out, until the 1970s, when the oil crises 
affected economic progress around the developed world. The French 
government, under President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing -  who was, by nature, a 
liberal in cultural matters, resorted to policies of state interventionism in his 
economic response to recession, and taxation went up, on average from 35% to 
42% over the period. For Cohen, it was paradoxically under the Socialist 
government elected in 1981 that the French private sector was encouraged to 
look to more liberal approaches in doing business.
In Cohen's judgement, this proved to be a positive experience. By the end of the 
1980s, large French firms in the private sector were adapting well to the 
exigencies o f an increasingly global market and were becoming more and more 
competitive. Indeed, even during the difficult economic times of this decade, 
many large French companies continued to enjoy healthy profits, having adapted 
their operations successfully to the rigours of the international marketplace. The 
problem, though, was with the still very large public sector. This had remained 
practically static in terms of its modus operandi as the private sector and the rest 
of the world had undergone significant changes.
In their attempts to push through changes, the French political élites have, as we 
have seen, attempted to justify these by the need to adapt the country to the 
changing situation internationally. In Elie Cohen's view, such a policy is 
profoundly misguided. He argues that reforms which are forced through, and in 
particular, which are based on a fundamental lie, will not work. This is because 
globalisation or European integration are not the only factors requiring France to 
reform itself. The need to reform is much more fundamental. Cohen argues:
"If globalisation was our problem, we wouldn't have such trade surpluses."37
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He goes on to argue strongly that the many social ills for which globalisation is 
blamed are not, in reality, a consequence of this phenomenon at all. Essentially, 
Cohen's explanation for high French unemployment revolves around the 
country's high labour costs and excessive regulation for part-time work.
Elie Cohen is thus attempting to present here an explanation for why 
globalisation and European integration are not the source of France's ills. 
However, what does this tell us about the nature of the relationship between the 
French and Europe over recent years?
Cohen has usefully stated above how a number o f economic problems have 
affected France which have not necessarily had a link to Europe. Yet we know 
that European integration or the demands of the global marketplace have often 
been cited in France as justifying the need for reform. As the case study has 
shown, the insistence on carrying through reform merely in order to satisfy an 
external requirement was always likely to meet with sustained resistance at some 
point, and during the course o f the 1990s there was a more significant body of 
public opinion in France likely to question the course of the country's European 
policy than had been the case before.
The Chirac/Juppé government's move to resolute support for the process of 
European integration, budgetary rigour and Maastricht convergence criteria 
thrown in, opened up a space in mainstream French political discourse which, 
needless to say, proved attractive to the Socialist leader, Lionel Jospin, striving 
to formulate a policy which would clearly distinguish between him and his 
predecessor in the Elysee, François Mitterrand. Thus, when President Chirac 
took what transpired to be the ill-advised decision to dissolve the National 
Assembly in spring 1997, the Socialists were presented with an opportunity to 
present another vision of Europe than that presented by the outgoing government.
They seized the opportunity to do so at the end of April, with a joint declaration 
agreed with the Communist Party. The occasion was a rally in the Palais de la
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Mutualité at which Lionel Jospin and Robert Hue set out on a common platform 
for the general election. Two points set out in this programme were to become 
major issues pushed by this coalition after it had, unexpectedly, won the 
election. These were: (1) following discussion with the social partners, the 
introduction of a law aiming to reduce the length of the legal working week to 35 
hours, (2) give Europe back a meaning by going further than the conditions of 
the Maastricht Treaty. Another path should be followed in order to arrive at a 
European social policy, harmonising national legislation.
Here then was an attempt to refocus policy at both a national and a European 
level on the idea that problems of unemployment could be solved by reverting to 
approaches which were clearly interventionist, and designed to at least partially
•5 0
to leave the rules o f the market behind. It was an approach which bore 
significant fruit with the electorate, who reaffirmed their confidence in the party 
they had virtually annihilated at the polls just four years previously.
Once back in power, the Socialists set about giving effect to their reforms, with 
calls for a European summit on jobs. This concession was one of the first given 
to the new government on the occasion of the Amsterdam summit just a few 
weeks after the second round of the election held at the end of May 1997. It 
appears that the French government pushed its point with considerable alacrity in 
Amsterdam, judging it wise to point out that the Council had formally 
recommended greater consultation with affected workers when major layoffs 
were proposed, such as in the case of Renault Vilvoorde in Brussels. Dominique 
Strauss-Kahn, the Finance Minister in the new government, said he European 
colleagues had been particularly sensitive to France's problems during the talks, 
illustrating just how much the shifting political sands in the country were viewed 
with suspicion by its European partners.39
Before the summit actually happened, the French found a willing partner in the 
Italians who also had a left leaning government at the time. At the 17th Franco- 
Italian Summit in Chambéry in October 1997, both sides agreed a common
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declaration on reducing the length of the working week. Of particular interest is 
the satisfaction expressed by President Chirac, who stated that he had spent over 
two years endeavouring to ensure that Europe was exemplary in social matters.40
The actual summit itself was a businesslike affair. It adopted an ambitious text 
setting out a plan of action for all EU countries to deal with their unemployment 
situation over a five year period. Each country was obliged to draw up a national 
plan of action aiming to provide, at the end of a five year period (an extension 
possible for those countries with the greatest unemployment problem), a job, 
training programme or other occupation for young people unemployed for more 
than six months, and older people unemployed for more than twelve months. In 
particular, it is intended that training be provided to 20% of unemployed people 
as opposed to 10% according to the European average at the present time. These 
national plans will face an annual roundtable review at European level, although 
no specific sanctions were envisaged for non-compliance.
One major sticking point in the summit was the issue o f labour market flexibility. 
Significant changes were required to legislation which the Commission argued 
would create 12 million jobs in Europe in 5 years if  adopted. The main problem 
was the French attachment to job security and the term flexibilité was anathema 
to that. In the end, the term souplesse was adopted, whose meaning is roughly 
the same in English but distinct in French.41 Despite the differences that might 
have been anticipated between a Gaul list president and a Socialist government on 
this issue, there was no public falling out over the results of the jobs summit. 
President Chirac did make a comment warning the government against 
expérimentations hazardeuses, however his official spokesperson was anxious to 
insist that this was a general remark and not a criticism of a specific aspect o f the
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government s work.
It would seem then that some lessons were learned from the protests which 
surrounded the government's drive to reduce deficits in order to meet the Euro 
convergence criteria, and its attempt to depict these criteria as an end in
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themselves. The push for Europe to take unemployment and social policy more 
seriously was accompanied by a general bid by the European Commission to 
devote more attention to the EU's interaction with the ordinary citizen. One 
major Europe-wide initiative underway during this period was Citizens First, an 
energetic programme which involved widespread dissemination of information 
leaflets, information over the Internet, and also freephone telephone numbers to 
inform citizens of the range of entitlements they had in the EU.
The French Foreign Ministry has introduced a yearly survey of attitudes to 
Europe in France, which is carried out by the noted polling organisation Ipsos. 
The results of the 1998 survey confirmed objectively that public opinion 
regarding the European Union in France was once again becoming more 
favourable. The 1997 survey had revealed that approximately two thirds o f the 
population had a positive view of Europe, whilst one third had a negative one.43 
In 1998 however, 77% of people (a 9% increase on the previous year) believed 
that Europe was overall a good thing for their country, whilst 71% (+7%) 
believed it was a good thing for people like them.44 Specifically, the survey 
revealed an increase in positive attitudes to Europe among socio-professional 
categories who had previously been more reticent: women, workers and staff of 
private sector companies. The traditionally Europhile sectors o f the population 
remained so: students, senior managers, high-earners and those having
achieved a third-level education. Of particular significance would appear to be 
the fact that much of the increase in those expressing a positive view about 
Europe were people without a political affiliation, whilst members o f parties 
traditionally cold to aspects of European integration such as the Communists or 
the National Front remained sceptical about the benefits o f Europe to people like 
them.
Regarding the emotions people feel when they think of the la construction 
européenne, there has once again been an increase in positive attitudes. Overall, 
these increased from 59% in 1997 to 67% in 1998.45 Some 25% of people 
expressed either a feeling of enthusiasm or confidence regarding the process, a
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rise of 10%, whilst 42% of respondents said that the emotion they felt was one 
o f hope. 21% expressed a feeling of worry, but this figure, although high, 
recorded a decrease of 8% compared to the previous year. The one major 
exception here concerned supporters of the Communist Party where a feeling of 
fear (43%, +5%) overshadowed that of hope (36%, -14%)
O f particular interest in these figures is the perceived relationship between the 
European Union and economic globalisation. As we have seen earlier in the 
interview with Elie Cohen, and in the case study, there has been an association 
made between globalisation and European integration, and the assumption made 
that the two were virtually co-terminous, as regards the agenda they were 
pursuing and the economic model they espoused. The emphasis put on job 
security and the fight against social exclusion at European level by the French 
government was clearly aimed at combating this.
It will therefore have proved heartening for the government to see in the 1998 
survey on the European Union that the people did not equate globalisation and 
European integration. 73% of them saw the European Union as a means of 
protecting the country from the effects o f globalisation, whilst just 25% held the 
opposing view. Even a majority o f Communist and National Front supporters 
subscribed to this point of view -  the figure in the case of the latter was 
particularly worthy of note with a full 60% of FN supporters viewing Europe as 
providing a shield for France against globalisation. There was also an increase in 
the numbers of people expressing the view that Europe would be beneficial to 
France in the long term.46
In terms of the conclusions drawn by the authors o f the report, the impression 
given is of a country (France) which is steadily reconciling its differences with 
Europe after a difficult period. The only points in the survey which point to 
lingering differences over Europe are in the areas of:
1) Enlargement -  57% of UDF supporters and 51% of RPR supporters are 
favourable to accepting new member states to the union, with both figures
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showing a noteworthy increase over the previous year. 69% o f Socialist 
supporters were o f the same opinion, however among Communist supporters, 
55% of respondents were opposed to enlargement, an increase of 8% over the 
previous year.47
2) Attachment -  the notion of European citizenship has made little progress in 
France, with 41% saying they are first French, and 15% first stating they are 
European. Indeed, the survey marks an increase in respondents affirming 
their allegiance to a town, city or region ahead of the country. 49% of 
respondents cited Europe in fourth -  and last -  place in terms of their 
allegiance to a geographic or political entity. Just 25% of respondents 
considered European citizenship to be something very important. Among 
Communist and National Front supporters, the numbers of people viewing 
European citizenship as being important or very important actually declined 
significantly. Among the Communists, 10% less o f respondents saw EU 
citizenship as being of importance, whilst among FN supporters the figure 
was down by 22%.48
In its conclusions, the report thus highlights these divergences, and indeed states 
that there is evidence of increased polarisation between those forces who are 
favourable to European integration and those who are against. Thus, although 
there was a significant recovery in overall support for the European project 
between 1997 and 1998, there was also a hardening of attitudes among those 
groups hostile to the development of the Union.
The increased satisfaction rating with the course o f European integration was 
also reflected towards the end of 1998 in a major opinion poll on attitudes 
towards the entering into force of the Euro which was to happen some weeks 
later. The survey was the latest in a regular series o f polls carried out by IPSOS 
for Agence France Presse on European public opinion. Carried out across the 
five largest EU powers (France, Germany, Spain, Italy and the United 
Kingdom), the survey revealed that the French had become the most favourable 
to the single currency. In just a two month period, 6% more French respondents
(69%) saw the Euro as something positive. The average across the five countries 
was 61%, with Germany at 56% and the United Kingdom at 48%.49
5.5 Ireland and Europe
Discussing the relationship between Ireland and Europe appears, at face value, 
to be an easy task. As we have already seen from the Eurobarometer figures, the 
benefits of European Union membership appear to be widely appreciated in 
Ireland, at least in economic terms. The fact that the country's economic 
progress since 1973 was so evident in terms of the development o f infrastructure, 
the rise in per capita earnings, and direct subvention across a wide range of 
economic activity, meant that few could call into question the positive impact of 
Ireland's membership of the Union. Additionally, we have figures for Ireland 
which are more reliable than for France in many cases as a result of their being 
the results of frequent referenda on European issues.
There has, however, been a persistent strain of opposition to EU membership in 
Irish society, from the outset to the present day. In many respects, the faces at 
the forefront of this opposition have remained the same down through the years, 
although the precise issues have tended to vary somewhat. John Coakley, 
Michael Holmes and Nicholas Rees have written on the persistence of opposition 
in Ireland to EU integration. Their analysis centres on:
1) Irish public mass and élite attitudes towards Europe in the context of the Irish 
nationalist tradition.
2) The development o f opposition to the integration process from the period 
immediately before accession to the present day, focussing especially on 
referendum campaigns.
3) The patterns of opposition that have emerged among political and other 
élites.50
In the first category, they point out that one o f the main contrasts between
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Ireland and most of its EU partners over the course o f this century has been the 
preoccupation with national sovereignty and independence -  a direct 
consequence of the fact that the country only gained its independence in 1922 
and really only managed to consolidate it in 1937. Ireland got involved at an 
early stage in the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation and the 
Council of Europe (1949), however the country's participation was limited and 
considerably more energy went into establishing national identity and 
independence. By the time Ireland joined the EU in 1973, public attitudes 
towards this new departure in overseas relations were more positive. The authors 
suggest that four characteristics of the Irish nationalist tradition may serve to 
explain this.
1) There has firstly been a diminishing of nationalism among the public and the 
élites. The notion of'unfinished business' in the relationship with Britain that 
was evident in the country in the post-independence period gradually gave 
way from the 1940s onwards as the country's independence from was 
established and Irish unity developed into a long-term political goal, rather 
than one whose realisation was seen as potentially achievable in the 
immediate for short-term future. This allowed other, more everyday issues 
become prominent, particularly in the run-up to elections. Moreover, the 
switch from a protectionist economy to a more open one from the late-1950s 
onwards reflected a clear abandonment of the traditional objective o f aiming 
for maximum self-reliance in economic matters. There was also a reappraisal 
in the Republic o f the nationalist stance with regard to Northern Ireland. 
During the 1970s and 1980s there was a steady abandoning of state sponsored 
nationalist symbols and rituals in the Republic, and a less nationalist image 
of the past was cultivated in the schools.
2) Persistent nationalist attitudes have been anti-British rather than anti- 
European. Indeed, Ireland has proved itself able to take pride in its historic 
links with continental Europe which are extensive, from the travels o f Irish 
monks around Europe, to exchanges involving scholars and manuscripts, 
and the granting of exile in many European countries to members o f the Irish
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gentry over the centuries. For an extended period, most Irish clergy and 
many members of the gentry were educated on the continent, in institutions 
such as the Irish colleges in Louvain, Rome and Salamanca. Links with 
those institutions have survived down through the centuries.
3) Anti-British attitudes are not incompatible with the development o f Ireland's 
relations with Europe. Indeed, there was a realisation that these offered 
Ireland the chance to free itself from the extreme dependence on Britain that 
had characterised its trading situation for centuries. In 1961, Britain 
accounted for 61% of Irish exports and 46% of imports, and a large amount 
of the remaining trade was with Northern Ireland. The effect of joining the 
EU on this state of affairs was clear. By 1990, just 28% of our exports were 
going to Britain and only 38% of our imports were from that country. In 
addition, there had been substantial direct financial assistance to aid the 
agricultural sector in particular, and also to develop the country's 
infrastructure.
4) Surviving nationalist views may be portrayed as compatible with European 
integration insofar as the acceptance of political links with the EU raises the 
prospect of enhanced political autonomy. Even though sovereignty in certain 
areas would be shared with the institutions of the Union, Ireland would have 
a voice in the decision making process. This could thus be perceived by the 
Irish élites as exchanging an enduring situation in which the country was 
dominated in the economic and cultural fields by Britain, for one in which 
we enjoyed a looser, multilateral association with the other states of western 
Europe. Thus, there was a link between Irish nationalism and Europeanism 
insofar as removing the country from British domination was concerned.51
As already outlined, attitudes to external relations in Ireland went through a 
number of developments in the decades following independence. There was an 
extended period during which the consolidation of national sovereignty took 
clear priority over foreign policy initiatives, and indeed throughout much of the 
1940s and 1950s, the question o f partition continued to play a deciding role in 
the politics of the Republic. The political élite at this time showed only sporadic
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interest in European integration, and this was a matter o f even less concern to the 
general public. Ireland continued with its wartime policy of military neutrality 
by shunning the possibility to join the NATO alliance in 1949. It did however 
join the Council of Europe as already mentioned, and in 1955 the United 
Nations, and membership of both of these bodies was positive for the State's 
standing internationally.
The decision by the government to apply for EU membership in 1961 attracted 
little debate. There was little effective opposition among the major political 
parties and Labour was the only party of any significance to oppose the move 
and call for a different form of association with our European neighbours. 
Attitudes in the country were changing rapidly, and pro-EU attitudes were on the 
increase among the growing middle class and government officials who 
supported moves to modernise the country's economy and reduce its dependence 
on Britain through access to a larger European market. The initial application did 
not proceed as a result of France's veto of Britain's application, which had been 
submitted at the same time as Ireland's. The application was renewed in 1967, 
and this time there was even less opposition to its submission. In debate in Dail 
Eireann, amendments were brought to the government's motion by Fine Gael 
and Labour, when it came to a vote, the House agreed to proceed with the 
application without a division.
5.6 Ireland's European debate
From 1967, it was to take seven years before Ireland would finally join the EU, 
and it was in that period that the first principled opposition to the country's 
membership of the Union surfaced. The questions which divided the people 
were perhaps predictable, but they proved remarkable in their longevity and 
potential to divide. They were:
1) the extent to which Irish sovereignty would be impaired
2) the degree to which the country could retain its neutral status
3) the economic effects of joining the European Union.52
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These issues formed the basis for most of the debate in the referendum which 
was organised in 1972 on joining the European Union, and were debated by the 
range of forces which mobilised in a bid to win over the Irish people. Fianna Fail 
and Fine Gael continued their support for European integration by advocating a 
'yes' vote to membership. They were joined by the Department of Foreign 
Affairs, which did not hide its eagerness to see the referendum passed, and 
which published a white paper on accession to support its view. The main lobby 
group advocating a 'yes' vote was the Irish Council o f the European Movement 
which assisted in the co-ordination of a strong campaign. Business and farming 
organisations also came out in favour of a 'yes' vote. One rather unlikely party 
advocating a positive outcome was the tiny Irish Communist Organisation which 
argued that western European unity was inevitably a part of capitalist 
development, and its advent would serve to hasten the socialist revolution.
The 'no' campaign was led by the Labour Party, even though a number of the 
party's key members were known to favour accession. "Official" Sinn Fein -  the 
party that would in time become Sinn Fein The Workers' Party, The Workers' 
Party, Democratic Left and merge with The Labour Party in 1999 -  also opposed 
the referendum, as did the Communist Party of Ireland. Two small parties, 
Aontacht Eireann (made up mostly of former members o f Fianna Fail) and 
"Provisional" Sinn Fein (broadly speaking the Sinn Fein of today, although 
without figures such as Ruairi O Bradaigh who left in 1986) also opposed EU 
membership.
We will see later how the concerns raised by the opponents of EU membership, 
which I enunciated above, came to be remarkably persistent in terms of their 
appearance in subsequent campaigns. In 1972 however, the odds were stacked 
heavily against the 'no' supporters, given the line-up of parties advocating a 'yes'. 
No less than 83% of the electorate voted to join the EU, with 17% voting 
against. This proportion of the population voting against compared to 36% in 
Denmark and 53% in Norway which both held referenda on EU membership at
188
the same day.
The authors point out that such a high degree of acceptance of EU membership, 
and the conservative consensus in support of the EU in the country, rapidly 
earned the Irish the reputation of being enthusiastic Europeans. This image was 
further reinforced by their high degree of participation in the first European 
Parliament elections in 1979. At 63.6%, turnout was above average for the nine 
member states at that time, however the figure needs to be clarified for a couple 
o f reasons. In the first instance, the election was held on the same day as the 
local elections, and the turnout recorded was roughly in line with the norm for 
such polls, and compared favourably with that recorded in 1974. Additionally, 
the European Parliament campaign saw itself dominated by mostly domestic 
issues, and this was reinforced by media coverage which was, by and large, 
ambivalent to the broader European dimension of the poll. One significant 
change that had occurred between 1972 and 1979 concerned the position of the 
Labour Party. Now allied at European level with the Socialist group, it found 
itself part of a broader political family which was much more committed to the 
process of European integration than it had previously been, and indeed moreso 
than Fianna Fail which was allied with the conservative European Progressive 
Democrats.
Neither the 1979 or 1984 European elections saw the development o f significant 
degrees of opposition to the country's membership of the EU. The elections were 
contested by a limited number of parties -  Fianna Fail, Fine Gael, the Labour 
Party and Sinn Fein The Workers Party -  in 1979, with three more parties 
putting forward candidates in 1984 -  the Democratic Socialist Party, Sinn Fein 
and the Green Alliance, the latter of which would later become the Green Party. 
Flowever none of these minor parties secured more than 2% of the vote.
Where opposition to Europe resurfaced, and with surprising intensity, was 
regarding the ratification of the Single European Act in 1986/7. This affair, 
which came as a bolt from the blue for the political establishment, started off
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innocuously with the Fine Gael/Labour government's decision to ratify the Act, 
having signed it on February 17, 1986. The remaining requirement, as far as the 
government was concerned, was to have the Act ratified by both Houses of the 
Oireachtas, and lodge the instrument of ratification with the Italian government 
which held the rotating presidency of the Union at that time. Before the 
instrument was lodged, however, Mr Raymond Crotty, a lecturer in 
Agricultural Economics at Trinity College, Dublin, acting as a private 
individual, took a court action attempting to have the SEA declared 
unconstitutional. This case went to the Supreme Court and on April 9, 1987, 
the five judges of the highest court in the land ruled by majority verdict that the 
provisions on foreign policy co-operation of the Single European Act were 
unconstitutional, and that a referendum was thus necessary in order to ratify the 
Act.
This decision was completely unanticipated by the political classes in Ireland. 
"The reaction to the decision among the political establishment was one of 
incredulity."53 Such were the assumptions that the decision would go in favour 
of the State that no-one, even on the anti-SEA side, had made plans for the 
referendum which was necessarily to follow very quickly. The Supreme Court 
judgement posed particular difficulties for the recently elected Fianna Fail 
minority government. Charles Haughey, who had returned as Taoiseach after 
nearly five years in opposition, had expressed fears from the opposition benches 
that the provisions of the SEA could endanger national sovereignty. During the 
Dail debate on the ratification of the Act, Fianna Fail had sought to have 
safeguards for regional aid and neutrality inserted into it, however these moves 
had been unsuccessful. It was anticipated, however, that Fianna Fail would 
attempt to append a statement on these questions to the SEA before the 
referendum, but this was not to be. Instead, the new government announced its 
intention to seek ratification by the people of the initial SEA which it had, in 
part, opposed in opposition.
An interesting array of supporters and opponents assembled for the referendum
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campaign. Once again, the two largest parties, Fianna Fail and Fine Gael came 
out in support of the SEA, and they were joined by the recently formed 
Progressive Democrats. The Department of Foreign Affairs was once again 
anxious to see a 'yes' vote, however it was less active in 1987 than the 
Government Information Service, which was responsible for spending a budget 
of £345,995 on the campaign.54 The Irish Council for the European Movement 
was, once again, the pre-eminent interest group calling for a 'yes' vote and 
formally led the campaign. Farming and employers' organisations also called for 
a 'yes' outcome.
Perhaps of most interest in 1987 however, were the opponents to the 
referendum. The Labour Party did not adopt a formal position on the 
referendum, allowing individuals to make up their own minds. Otherwise, the 
party political opposition to the SEA was from the usual quarters. It was outside 
party political structures that the most interesting opposition was to be found. 
The Irish Sovereignty Movement provided the nationalist opposition to the Act, 
and it was joined by Irish CND which campaigned on the issue o f Irish 
neutrality. A number of activists on the issue of Third World development 
campaigned on a similar platform, arguing that Ireland should have less to do 
with blocs which were only exacerbating the dependent status of the developing 
world.
The Green Party raised issues of nuclear party and safety, whilst a range of 
conservative Catholics, led by Family Solidarity, expressed fears that 
secularism and liberalism throughout Europe could led to the introduction to 
Ireland of European abortion and divorce laws.
I have some recollection of the 1987 campaign, and a good one o f later 
campaigns on European issues in Ireland, and I endorse the view put forward by 
the authors that referenda campaigns seem to split the 'yes' and 'no' camps into 
the most polarised positions possible, the rationale behind this being that in 
order to win a referendum, the arguments for and against must be presented in
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absolute terms, and the position defended by the opposition must be seen as a 
threat. Thus, the pro-SEA campaign was characterised by its insistence on the 
benefits to Ireland of EU membership to that point, and the threat to these should 
the country reject the Single European Act. Indeed, some spokespersons went as 
far as to suggest that Ireland's continued membership of the EU was in question. 
The variety of groups opposing the Act got together into two campaigning 
coalitions. The Constitutional Rights Campaign campaigned on a broad base, 
putting forward nationalist, economic and other arguments against ratification of 
the SEA. A second group, the Cosainthe Coalition for Peace and Neutrality was 
primarily concerned with world peace and development issues. Just as the 'yes' 
campaign presented absolutist or maximalist perspectives arguing that Ireland's 
whole course of economic and social development was at stake, the 'no' 
campaign argued that ratification of the SEA would inexorably lead to the end of 
Ireland's neutrality.
In the end, although it was vocal, the 'no' camp did not really succeed in 
bringing over large numbers of voters to their side. One week before polling, an 
opinion poll showed 70% of the Irish people were planning to vote 'yes'. It is 
worth noting however that the numbers opposed had risen from 17% in 1972 to 
30% in 1987, thus indicating that despite the changes which had occurred in the 
country as a result of EU membership, there were those who believed the 
country was compromising its independence and its standards by its association 
with the Union. Indeed, I believe that this interpretation is an appropriate one to 
draw, since the positions enunciated by those opposed to the Single European 
Act -  and other EU developments -  often suggested that Ireland was losing 
something of itself as a result of the EU.
Raymond Crotty, who had won the Supreme Court action that forced the 
referendum, saw the EU as an association of powers with a colonial history, and 
argued that Ireland as a former colony would be much better radically reforming 
its internal structures to shed the colonial legacy, than joining up with powers 
from whom its history fundamentally differed. This argument based on the
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country's colonial history had a clear link to arguments on neutrality and even on 
the developing world since many activists on the latter issue saw the European 
powers as colonialists whose policies were still to the detriment of the 
developing countries.
As indicated by the opinion poll, the people voted by a clear majority to ratify 
the Single European Act. However, the divisions raised by that campaign, and 
the fact that the many disparate opponents o f Ireland's European policy had 
found strong spokespersons in Raymond Crotty and Anthony Coughlan to name 
just two, and the ability to organise themselves into fairly coherent coalitions 
pushing a range of arguments which, although considered unconvincing by a 
clear majority of the electorate, converged reasonably successfully to make a 
coherent campaign.
Such was the coherence indeed that these groups did not simply disappear after 
the poll, but rather remained in place to contest the 1989 European election 
campaign. In Munster, the combined energies mustered against the mainstream 
EU policy led to the creation of Ireland's only political movement set up to 
campaign exclusively on European issues, and to fight European elections only: 
People First -  Meitheal. As with the coalitions who fought the SEA referendum, 
thus group drew its support primarily from a range of left-wing, ecology, 
development and peace-groups. Although candidates standing specifically on 
EU issues polled poorly in 1989 -  Raymond Crotty in Dublin securing 5.7% o f 
the vote and Joe Noonan of People First -  Meitheal in Munster 3.2%, there was 
a significant vote for parties whose general position was hostile to Europe. This 
was, in particular, the election in which the Green Party began its breakthrough 
into Irish political life, and its Euro-candidate Trevor Sargent achieved 8.3% of 
the vote in Dublin. In Leinster, significant parts of which follow Dublin voting 
trends, the Greens achieved 6.3%. The Green Party added a particularly 
European dimension to its campaign with the participation of leading Green 
figures from the continent, including the high-profile German Green deputy, 
Petra Kelly.
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European issues continued to play a surprisingly important role in the developing 
moral and social fabric of Ireland in the years ahead, and if  the spectre of 
Ireland's obsession with moral issues such as abortion and divorce had already 
raised itself in European matters in 1989, it was to do so again in 1992 in the 
most unanticipated setting. Since ratifying the Maastricht Treaty required a 
change to the Irish constitution, the plans for a referendum were already in train 
in the early months of 1992. Then, the attorney general secured a High Court 
injunction preventing a fourteen-year-old girl who had been raped by an adult 
male from travelling to Britain for an abortion on the grounds that the State was 
obliged to do all it could to uphold the constitutional ban on abortion approved 
by the electorate in 1983. The effect of this development was to bring the 
abortion question once again to the fore in Irish public affairs, and to cause it to 
become confused with the Maastricht Treaty. Specifically, the Irish government 
had managed to insert a protocol in the Treaty whereby the Union could not 
enforce changes to Ireland's abortion laws. As the courts debated the affair o f the 
14-year-old rape victim -  which became known as the X Case -  it went to the 
Supreme Court, which ruled that Ireland's ban on abortion was not watertight, 
and that it in fact it actually permitted abortion in certain circumstances. Thus a 
new abortion referendum was necessary to clarify matters.
However, before that could be held, there was the Maastricht poll, and fears 
that the protocol which the Republic had inserted in the Treaty could be either 
too restrictive to social change or too weak to prevent eventual changes to 
Ireland's abortion laws. O f the major political parties, the dissent was most 
serious in Fianna Fail, when one T.D. and one senator were expelled for voting 
against the party on Maastricht during the passage o f the White Paper through the 
Oireachtas. However, the possible damage arising from these defections was 
lessened when the Labour Party rowed in behind the Maastricht Treaty, clearly 
putting its support behind an extension of European integration for the first time.
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The Maastricht Treaty was carried by a margin which, once again, touched 70% 
in favour. However, the manner in which that result was achieved was to 
become a problem in itself as a court case was taken by Patricia McKenna of the 
Green Party arguing that the government should be precluded from using public 
funds in a referendum campaign, or that funding should be provided to both 
sides from state coffers. Essentially, the debate in 1992 was particularly bitter, 
as a result of the enmeshing of the traditional hot potato of abortion with the 
coherent anti-European integration camp that had resurfaced in Ireland in 1987. 
The Irish Council for the European Movement was considerably less prominent 
in the Maastricht campaign, and instead the Government Information Service 
mounted a massive campaign for a 'yes' vote, using public funds. Clearly, this 
is a questionable tactic in a democracy where the function of the State is surely to 
organise democratic polls in a neutral manner. It is then, surely, the role of 
political parties and interested groups and individuals to campaign for either side 
and to come up with the funds to do so. The Green Party Dublin Euro candidate, 
Patricia McKenna, successfully brought a case to the Supreme Court arguing 
that the spending of State funds on one side of a referendum campaign was 
unlawful.
As a result o f the McKenna judgement, the Government Information Service has 
now withdrawn from campaign duties, and a referendum commission is put in 
place to co-ordinate the public information campaign in advance o f a referendum, 
proving equal airtime and opportunities to disseminate information to both sides.
How do we then assess the proper nature of Irish opposition to European 
integration? It must be acknowledged in the first instance that access to 
resources can be a major factor, and the McKenna judgement highlighted the 
glaring imbalance between the resources available to the mainstream political 
establishment in terms of pushing the pro-integration agenda. Faced with the 
consensus in the ranks of the major political parties on European issues, those 
opposing the thrust o f European policy were always fighting an unforgiving 
battle as far as attracting large numbers o f votes was concerned. I believe that it
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is also necessary to look to the social position occupied by these groups in Irish 
society to develop a greater understanding of the difficulties they faced in gaining 
broadly based support.
Much has been made of the 'hegemony' of the conservative parties in Ireland, 
and when we discuss conservatism, we must be aware that the term can be 
employed in both economic and more moral terms. In the economic sphere, the 
greatest difficulty faced by opponents of the position held by the main parties, 
involved finding arguments to counter the reality that Ireland had enjoyed 
significant material benefits from Europe, and these were of importance in a 
country which had traditionally enjoyed a standard of living well below the 
European average.
The issue is rather similar to the role played by multinational firms in the Irish 
economy. The practices o f these firms -  such as profit repatriation -  are well 
known, but insofar as they provide employment in an economy which badly 
needs it, there is a reluctance to criticise them excessively. Ditto for the 
European Union. The high moral ground promoted by many o f those 
campaigning on an anti-Europe platform seemed difficult to reconcile with the 
benefits accruing to the country as a member of the Union. Was the possibility 
that Europe would attempt to adopt a defence framework at some future point 
really a reason to vote against a treaty which aimed to complete a single 
economic market offering greater trading prospects to Irish business? 
Additionally, some of the issues which were being advanced by the 'no' side 
were distant, and rather academic, from the standpoint o f the average citizen. 
Raymond Crotty's view on radical economic reform, such as a high tax on land 
ownership in order to encourage productivity in agriculture and the removal of 
income tax and a consequent fall in gross pay, were interesting theories on paper 
but ultimately highly unorthodox and suspect in the context of a conservative 
society.55
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However, I believe that there is an interesting blurring of the conservative and 
the liberal in all o f this, since although the economic policies and social outlook 
of the main parties in Irish society may be seen as generally conservative, we 
have already seen how the changes in Irish society which allowed the country to 
revise its foreign policy outlook arose from a maturing process in which 
traditional nationalism lost much of its hold, and in which Europe was seen as 
enhancing national sovereignty, by allowing the country to participate, broadly 
speaking, as an equal in a community of states which would lessen the 
traditional dominance of Britain in the country's trading and political 
relationships. The country had resorted to policies based on an open economy 
after a disappointing experience with protectionism in earlier decades. There did 
not appear to be much desire in the country to go back down that road.
By and large, opposition to EU integration in Ireland has tended to have a 
number of targets. The most trenchant opposition has been hostile to virtually 
any form of European integration on the grounds of national sovereignty and 
autonomy. The Irish Sovereignty Movement is the best known of the groups 
adopting such a standpoint.
Somewhat less trenchant are those who oppose the European Union in its present 
form and outlook as opposed to the principle o f European integration. These are, 
broadly speaking, left-wing groups who oppose what they see as the right wing 
policies being pursued by the EU and what they see as its capitalist development.
The third level o f opposition looks to specific EU policies and opposes specific 
measures, or the threat of measures, to erode matters such as Irish neutrality. 
Many of those who state their opposition on these grounds to the EU belong to 
third world or development groups, and beyond these specific issues, they do 
not tend to offer a fundamental vision of European integration.
A range of principles thus appears to characterise the only significant threats to 
Ireland's attitude to European integration. Some o f these principles are likely to
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be revealed in time as receiving more public support than others. Specifically, 
the question of neutrality appears to be the issue most likely to cause significant 
divisions. In the most recent European referendum in Ireland -  on the 
Amsterdam Treaty -  the proportion of voters voting 'yes' slipped to 
approximately two thirds in the aftermath of a bitterly fought campaign, which 
saw pro-neutrality campaigners draw particular attention to the aspiration in the 
treaty that the Union would examine the prospects for moving towards a policy 
on defence.
Ireland is, however, perhaps better known for its pragmatism in economic and 
general political issues, and high-minded radical principles seem less convincing 
than the more flexible if conservative outlook of the major parties. This is 
particularly so when people see the economic benefits o f the more pragmatic 
policy and compare these to what they may get out o f going with the principles 
advocated by fringe elements calling for a more principled standpoint. The result 
across a range of referenda and European elections bear this argument out, 
however I do suggest that the gradual gain in support that these groups are 
enjoying could imply that in a referendum on a purely military or sovereignty 
related issue, the result could well be much closer than has been the case to date.
5.7 Conclusion
If  we are to look at them in the European context, we must first conclude that 
Ireland and France have approached the European Union project from very 
different perspectives and backgrounds. In the post-war period, France, as a 
country which was devastated during World War II attracted to ideas which 
would promote co-operation with other states, both to help in its own 
reconstruction process and to enhance its prestige as a leading European state. 
Thus it was two French elder statesmen who were most closely associated with 
the formative plans for the European project: Maurice Schumann and Jean
Monnet. We have seen earlier how the French attitude to Europe over several 
decades was to look upon the Union as a potential extension of France's 
sovereignty and autonomy in the European context. As we saw particularly in
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the brief overview of French industrial and economic policy, even when faced 
with the Single European Act which vested a range o f regulatory powers in the 
Commission, France pinned its hopes on the pursuance of policies to assist 
European firms become major world players, support collaboration in research 
and development and promote a social dimension to the single market.
The response to this, however, was disappointing. The main emphasis was on 
trade, and free trade at that, within the single market area and, as we saw, 
France actually ended up having its knuckles rapped under competition 
regulations on several occasions. We have seen earlier in the Eurobarometer 
findings that Jacques Delors' tenure as European Commission president was 
accompanied by an increase in positive attitudes towards Europe. However, this 
sense of satisfaction waned somewhat during the 1990s as the impact or potential 
impact o f the Maastricht Treaty and the Euro divided the French political 
establishment and a large section of public opinion. It was in this period that 
Europe became a subject of real political debate in France, as opposed to a major 
foreign policy issue falling largely within the presidential domain.
Essentially, as we have seen, the problem has been one of how France and 
Europe interact and the impact that each one can have on the other. The 
Socialists clearly saw the problem and, as we have seen, they brought forward 
initiatives particularly to deal with the employment issue. There has been a 
recovery in survey attitudes regarding the French and Europe in the recent past, 
and the government is surely hoping that this will continue in the light o f its 
European policy and domestic policies such as the 3 5-hour working week.
Ireland's relationship with Europe has been different to France's in the sense that 
the central issue as presented by the mainstream parties has been the benefits -  
financial primarily -  accruing to Ireland from EU membership. Given the 
economic history and state of the country, this argument was a particularly 
cogent one, and one which largely could be delivered on given the country's 
disadvantaged status in comparison with the EU average. Opposition to EU
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membership has largely centred around a range of sovereignty-based arguments 
linked to questions of neutrality, the environment, and alternative means of 
combating the country's economic underdevelopment. There was clearly a 
considerable distance between the two arguments, and given the electoral 
strength and popular appeal of the two major parties -  Fianna Fail and Fine Gael 
-  both of whom supported the European project, results o f referenda on Europe 
were rarely in doubt. It is, however, worth noting that popular support for Irish 
neutrality remains strong, and were a referendum to be held where this clearly 
was the issue at stake, it is difficult to predict what the outcome would be.
Ireland is a country which experiences considerable consensus on European 
matters for the reasons I have summarised above. However, matters are 
changing. The loss to the country of a large amount of the funding which has 
been coming its way over an extended period may well result in Europe 
becoming a more contentious issue in the future. It is also becoming clear that 
contentious issues such as defence and security will have to be addressed. A 
variety of social problems in states bordering the EU, most particularly in former 
Yugoslavia and the wider Balkan area, have lent a sense of urgency to that issue. 
It is also the case, however, that the country's ability to hold on to and provide a 
livelihood for its young and educated population should enable the political class 
to broaden the overall European debate and prepare society for the changes 
ahead. The European dimension to Ireland's economic success should be of 
assistance in this regard.
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I have sought to do a number of things during the course o f this thesis. The 
central one has been to present an overview o f the issue of social conflict and 
social consensus as viewed in the contemporary political culture o f Ireland and 
France -  with particular regard to developments in the European Union and 
changes in the global economy. Drawing specific or important conclusions from 
this analysis is not a particularly easy thing to do. however since it is the job of a 
study such as this to draw conclusions and suggest possible interpretations, this 
is what I now wish to do in this final chapter.
Chapter 5 provided us with evidence which shows that, in general, the European 
Union project remains viewed in a positive light in both Ireland and France. By 
and large, the benefits of belonging to it are acknowledged, there is a good deal 
of support and attachment to the broad ideals of European unity and we have 
even seen how. in France, it is not seen by a majority of the people as being co­
terminous with globalisation. Indeed, we have seen from survey evidence that 
there is a trend whereby positive views regarding Europe are actually on the 
increase in France, despite the developments o f recent years.
This finding cannot, however, mask the more substantial evidence regarding 
concern in France at an erosion of aspects of sovereignty as a result o f European 
Union policies. A number of points ought to be re-stated here. The existence of 
a dominant left-right cleavage in France means that a fundamental conflict exists 
on key issues of politics, and this conflict is rooted in the history of the country 
as it has evolved over the past two centuries. The legacy of the use of force or 
demonstrations in France is a strong one. and its use under the Fifth Republic is 
connected to the exclusive style of polity that France has become, in which more 
power is vested in the executive president and less in the hands of the people's 
representatives in parliament. We have seen how the European Union which, as
6.0 Conclusion
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part of France's foreign policy, had largely fallen within the presidential domain, 
has become a topic of much greater debate and dissent as it began to have a 
negative as well as a positive impact on the manner in which France wished to 
expand its influence in the world. The particular crisis which erupted in late- 
1995 was an example o f how great the attachment can be within France to values 
or established rights which have built up over time, and how abandoning a 
specifically French model for an outside one which seems to offer less protection 
can incite an angry backlash.
To a significant extent. 1 believe that we can attribute this to France's history as a 
prosperous country in the European context. When you have built your country 
up after devastating wars and become a wealthy and highly prosperous country, 
offering good careers to your citizens and levels of education and training worthy 
of the best countries in the world, this naturally creates a certain inertia, and we 
have seen that in the case of France this inertia was les trente glorieuses. The 
alarm raised in France by the strikes of late-1995, the calling into question of 
Europe during that period -  but also since the Maastricht poll and the prospect 
of more of the same ahead at some future point, sent out a profound message to 
the French political establishment. France's insistence on a greater focus on job 
creation at European level is one positive result to have come out of all this, and 
the manner in which the EU has sought to pay more attention to citizens' 
concerns appears to have reaped benefits in the increase in positive opinions 
regarding Europe in recent surveys.
It is on this last general point that I believe w'e need to draw the most striking 
contrast with Ireland. Clearly as a country which has historically been much 
poorer than France, Ireland will look upon the economic benefits o f Europe in a 
different way. We must also consider here Ireland's overall economic outlook, 
which is much different to France. The legacy of mass emigration and the 
inability to provide sustained employment for the people means that any 
incentive which attracts jobs to Ireland is welcomed. The European Union is 
clearly seen as part of that process, since the country serves as a European base
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for a variety of multinational corporations, attracted by a range o f factors 
including tax incentives, but also the fact that Ireland is a fully fledged member 
of the European Union. Despite the acknowledged drawbacks with 
multinationals, such as the repatriation of profits to the home country, the job 
creation potential of those companies is often seen as the most important. The 
country's more general relationship with the European Union is. I believe, seen 
in remarkably similar terms. We have seen how opposition to the EU in Ireland 
has often played the sovereignty card, and regardless of this the great majority of 
the people, with the backing of most of the significant political parties, have 
consistently affirmed their faith in the country's membership of the EU through a 
variety of referenda.
The benefits of EU membership have been particularly obvious in the Irish 
context, and the national media has also played a role in ensuring that this is so. 
Large scale transfers of funding to Ireland, associated with infrastructure 
development have been the public lace of the EU. And this has done its job in 
terms of the public perception of Europe. Indeed, the Eurobarometer evidence 
has shown us the extent to which the Irish people are satisfied with the country's 
progress in Europe, but my central argument is that this satisfaction comes 
against a very different backdrop to France, both in terms of the country's 
economic and political history, and in terms of the manner in w'hich the tangible 
benefits of EU membership to Ireland have manifested themselves. It might be 
said that in the Irish context, sovereignty is all very well, but if  qualified young 
people cannot find a future in their own country, a certain loss o f it might be a 
price worth paying.
I wish to return to political cultural concerns here by way of bringing this thesis 
to a close. The main political cleavage in Ireland has. as we have seen, 
concerned the national issue. As such, one might have thought that more 
opposition would surface to Europe than has previously been the case. Yet we 
saw in the last chapter that Europe has been seen as one way of distancing the 
country from its traditional dependence on Britain whilst acknowledging the
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realities o f the real world which required more co-operation with other countries. 
The European Union was not seen as being associated with the national question. 
It has rather been seen in Ireland in much more economic terms, and we have 
seen that the main cleavage in the country has not been about economics. If 
Europe has had a political dimension in Ireland, it has if anything been about 
distancing ourselves from the yoke of the national question and maturing as a 
state through the development of more complex relationships with the world 
around us. Despite the importance of Europe, and the significant debate 
regarding it elsewhere, it has thus tended to be a fairly non-contentious issue in 
Ireland -  except with regard to securing funding!
I believe that it is in this sense that we arrive at a reasonably coherent conclusion 
regarding the differences between Ireland and France. The questions of 
cleavage, sovereignty and the role of the state are seen in a different light in both 
countries. I have already dealt in this conclusion with the issue of cleavage and 1 
believe that this has been substantially addressed throughout the thesis. With 
regard to sovereignty, I believe that we must conclude that given France's very 
different history -  particularly in economic and social terms -  it exhibits much of 
the attachment to its own sovereignty that we can expect to find in countries with 
a long, independent history, a colonising past and a successful economic track 
record. Acknowledging the need to sacrifice any of these can be difficult, 
particularly where the replacement for them is not particularly well defined. In 
the case of Ireland however, where the country was not significantly better off as 
a result of independence, there was less to lose and a lot more to gain from going 
down the European road.
The role of the state comes in here as well. In the case of France where the state 
has traditionally played a major role in many aspects of the life of the citizens, 
there will be a range of expectations regarding its role in defending the perceived 
interests o f the state and of the people. Where, as in the case o f France, there 
exists a divergence o f opinion regarding aspects o f the state's activities — such as 
in the case of the Gaullist government's approach to reducing the country's
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budget deficit and the opposition from the trade unions and parties of the left -  
this can become a genuinely sensitive political issue. In the case of Ireland, 
where the state has always shared its responsibilities with other actors, 
particularly the Catholic Church, there is considerably less debate over the role 
of the state, although it is reasonable to insert the caveat that there has been a 
certain amount of concern caused by plans to privatise or part-privatise parts of 
the semi-state sector such as Aer Lingus or Telecom Eireann.
We have thus a different political culture and a different formulation of political 
debate between Ireland and France. These matters should not be viewed as static 
however. As Ireland becomes wealthier, so the Irish government will come 
under pressure to do whatever is necessary to preserve that wealth and it is very 
likely that, as direct EU aid to Ireland dries up, there could be more criticism of 
the European Union in Ireland, particularly if  questions such as tax 
harmonisation were to force Ireland to abandon many of its incentives which 
have proved so useful in attracting foreign investment to this country.
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